I don’t things turned out well for either side in terms of questioning, but I do feel the majority are leaning towards at least upholding the Bilski decision. Then again, it could just be bias, you are pro patent and feel it could lean pro patent and the FSF is anti-patent and felt it was leaning anti-patent, so who knows.

I think they are in a majority of opinion that software alone does not meet the machine or transformation test, and if they decide the uphold the machine or transformation test it is likely that the opinion will look poorly for software patent advocates. The idea that a computer running new software is not a new machine could be the real key here for software patents

I do feel though that Bilski is dead no matter what. His particular patent claims were ripped to shreds so I doubt he will get his patent supported. The bit about the alphabet was pretty funny.

That certainly makes the water a little more muddy doesn’t it? It is almost as if he has completely different feelings when the question presented is couched in patentable subject matter terms.

I plan on spending some time going through the patent cases of the Supreme Court and creating a cheat sheet on how the Justices came down on issues. I am not sure when I will get to that, likely toward the end of the year or the beginning of 2010 when things slow down for the holidays.

Thanks for point this out.

-Gene

I hadn’t realized that Justice Stevens had written Parker v. Flook (a truly awful opinion). But you might also want to consider this portion of Justice Stevens’ dissent in Microsoft v. AT&T:

I disagree with the Court’s suggestion that because software is analogous to an abstract set of instructions, it cannot be regarded as a “component” within the meaning of §271(f). See ante, at 9–10. Whether attached or detached from any medium, software plainly satisfies the dictionary definition of that word. See ante, at 9, n. 11 (observing that “‘[c]omponent’ is commonly defined as ‘a constituent part,’ ‘element,’ or ‘ingredient’”). And unlike a blueprint that merely instructs a user how to do something, software actually causes infringing conduct to occur. It is more like a roller that causes a player piano to produce sound than sheet music that tells a pianist what todo. Moreover, it is surely not “a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use” as that term is used in §271(f)(2). On the contrary, its sole intended use is an infringing use.

At least in the Microsoft case, Stevens had a better analogy for how software works (similar to the Jacquard loom which was the predecessor of the IBM punch card). Now Bilski’s claim doesn’t involve software, but at least I sense Justice Stevens moving towards at least the 20th Century, whereas Justice Scalia has yet to leave the 19th Century.

Does he want to kick the wooden wheels and stare squarely into the horse’s mouth, count all the teeth, check the metal shoes for wear and tear?

Are two look-alike computers running side by side, clearly the same machine to him?

How about two look-alike saucers of clear liquid? Are they chemically the same? One could be H2O and the other HCl. Please drink very carefully dear judge!

A horse is a horse of course and some of us have heard of a talking horse, the famous Mr. Ed. But what goes through a judge’s mind? Who knows?

This post was mentioned on Twitter by DTcomputers: Exploring Justice Steven’s Patent Past for Clues http://bit.ly/4ndVt6...