Posts in US Supreme Court

The Supreme Court’s Bilski v. Kappos decision—which celebrated its 10th birthday this past weekend—still matters, even in the age of Mayo-Alice. For one thing, the case marked the end of the patent-eligibility peace. For another, Bilski stands for the well-known principle that the “machine-or-transformation” test offers a “useful and important clue” as to whether the process claimed by a patent will qualify as patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101. And at the same time, it stands for the fact that the machine-or-transformation test has been far more trivia than principle, the case law not having applied or considered that Bilski “clue” much beyond the Bilski case itself.

On June 30, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to Chrimar Systems, Inc., thereby letting stand a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and declining to consider the controversial issues of “when a judicial decision becomes binding on the parties, and whether a decree from a different branch of government can reverse an Article III court judgment.”

The U.S. Supreme Court has sided with Booking.com, ruling that a generic term paired with .com “is a generic name for a class of goods or services only if the term has that meaning to consumers.” The opinion was delivered by Justice Ginsburg and joined by eight members of the Court, with Justice Breyer dissenting and Justice Sotomayor filing a separate concurring opinion. In the Booking.com case, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was urging the High Court to reverse a judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that held BOOKING.COM to be a registrable trademark. But the Supreme Court ultimately found that the genericness analysis should turn on consumer perception, rather than a “per se rule” against trademark protection for a generic.com term.

Ten years ago today, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down what at the time was one of the most important patent decisions in decades. It signaled a new era in patent law—not least of all because Bilski seemed to jumpstart the Supremes’ interest in patent cases. On this milestone anniversary, it’s worth reminding ourselves how we ended up where we are today. In the years since Bilski, the Court has decided Mayo v. Prometheus, Myriad and Alice. If the decision in State Street can be said to have marked the onset of a golden era in the patentability of software and business method patents, the decision in Bilski marked the beginning of the end, and Alice was its death knell, with its introduction of a two-step test for eligibility. Indeed, the unpredictability of application of 101 extends throughout all practice areas.

The Federal Circuit has been criticized for creating categories of abstract ideas when applying Alice v. CLS’s two-prong framework and for refusing to define the contours of an abstract idea. Naturally, this causes uncertainty for those drafting patent claims. A typical view is that claims can be drafted by analogizing to them to the decisions. However, analogical reasoning has limited utility where the Federal Circuit continues to define new abstract ideas. This article argues that Alice’s definition of a patent-eligible claim is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decisions and that this definition can be a useful analytical tool while drafting claims.

Since the Alice decision, the U.S. courts have adopted different views related to the role of the preemption test in eligibility analysis. While some courts have ruled that lack of preemption of abstract ideas does not make an invention patent-eligible [Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. Sequenom Inc.], others have not referred to it at all in their patent eligibility analysis. [Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327] Contrary to those examples, recent cases from Federal Courts have used the preemption test as the primary guidance to decide patent eligibility. Inventive concepts enabled by new algorithms can be vital to the effective functioning of machine learning systems—enabling new capabilities, making systems faster or more energy efficient are examples of this. These inventions are likely to be the subject of patent applications. However, the preemption test adopted by U.S. courts may lead to certain types of machine learning algorithms being held ineligible subject matter.

As we concluded in Part I of this article, the courts are being called upon in The Chamberlain Group v. Techtronic Industries, Inc to respond to an emergency situation in which they must stop the Federal Circuit’s “directed-to” version of the Mayo-Alice test from expanding into, and negating, claims in every subject imaginable. As Chamberlain urges, the patent statute, whether in Section 101 or beyond, does not limit the universe of eligible claims to those where a court can dissect its claim elements into old or “conventional” ones and those that represent the claim’s “patentable advance.” On that point, too, the Patent Act and the Supreme Court have been in unison: You can’t do that.

The case of the “garage door opener,” The Chamberlain Group v. Techtronic Industries, Inc., has received its share of attention. Rightly so. The case, after all, spotlights not only the breadth of the Supreme Court’s Mayo-Alice test for assessing patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101; but also the Federal Circuit’s particular “directed to” definition for that test and the dissection of patent claims that has followed.
And it fairly asks, in a petition to the Supreme Court, that if a claim on a garage door opener is “directed to” an “abstract idea” and thus ineligible for patent protection—is any patent, or any technology, safe from the Mayo-Alice ineligibility test? Chamberlain says no. From the outset, its petition declares that its case therefore presents a “patent emergency,” one that the Supreme Court must review to stop the Mayo-Alice test—and the Federal Circuit’s “directed-to” version of it—from expanding into, and negating, claims in every subject imaginable.

On May 21, the U.S. Copyright Office published a report on Section 512 of Title 17 of the U.S. Code, which governs limitations on copyright liability to materials published online. Safe harbor provisions in Section 512, which were enacted as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), have allowed online service providers to operate tech platforms without facing liability for infringing content posted on those platforms. While the Copyright Office acknowledges that the careful balance intended to be struck by Section 512 has become unbalanced, to the detriment of rights holders, the report only recommends that Congress fine-tune certain aspects of Section 512 to restore this balance of competing interests.

On May 15, the Chamberlain Group Inc. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (CAFC) decision reversing a district court’s holding that Chamberlain’s claims covering a “moveable barrier operator” were patent-eligible under Section 101. If the Supreme Court grants review, it will consider whether the Federal Circuit “improperly expanded § 101’s narrow implicit exceptions by failing to properly assess Chamberlain’s claims ‘as a whole,’ where the claims recite an improvement to a machine and leave ample room for other inventors to apply any underlying abstract principles in different ways.”

In March, Chrimar Systems, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to decide: 1) whether the Federal Circuit may apply a finality standard for patent cases that conflicts with the standard applied by the Supreme Court and all other circuit courts in non-patent cases, and 2) whether a final judgment of liability and damages that has been affirmed on appeal may be reversed based on the decision of an administrative agency. On April 23, the Court requested a response from ALE USA, Inc., which had waived its right to respond earlier that month. As a result, the deadline for amicus briefs was reset and one more amicus, Baxter International, submitted its brief in support of Chrimar on May 22, followed by ALE’s brief in opposition to the petition on May 26.

As predicted following oral arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court today ruled that Marcel Fashion Groups, Inc. cannot preclude Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. from raising new defenses under federal preclusion principles, but left open the possibility that it may be appropriate to apply claim preclusion to defenses in certain circumstances. The opinion was authored by Justice Sotomayor. The Second Circuit decision was ultimately reversed and the case remanded, continuing the long battle between the two brands.

Late last month, TiVo won its second intellectual property battle with Comcast at the International Trade Commission (ITC) and is poised to win a third ruling this summer. The agency issued an exclusion order under Section 337 of the Tariff Act to prevent Comcast from importing digital video receivers that violate TiVo’s Rovi cable box patents. Now, unable to win on the argument that it did not infringe on TiVo’s patents, Comcast is trying again, this time attacking the ITC as an institution.

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al., v. Booking.com B.V., (Case No. 19-46) yesterday, in the High Court’s first ever telephonic hearing. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) urged the Supreme Court to reverse a judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that held BOOKING.COM to be a registrable trademark. The Respondent, Booking.com, argued that the primary significance test, rather than the Federal Circuit’s precedent in Goodyear Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., holds the answer to the question of how to distinguish between descriptive and generic names, and under the primary significance test, BOOKING.COM is a registerable trademark.

In Part I of this series we examined the mathematics exception to patentability and the historical underpinnings of its justification. In Part II, we will continue to examine the case history around patenting of mathematic principles.