Posts Tagged: "APJ"

In early August, patent owner Smartflash filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court to appeal a case stemming from covered business method (CBM) review proceedings carried out at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Smartflash is asking the Supreme Court to decide whether PTAB administrative patent judges (APJs) are principal officers of the United States who are subject to the terms of the Appointment Clause, whether CBM review of patents disclosed prior to passage of the America Invents Act (AIA) violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and whether undisputed evidence that an invention is not unduly preemptive is relevant to answer questions of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. At issue in this petition are a total of 30 CBM reviews petitioned by Apple, Samsung and Google against Smartflash, which were instituted by APJ panels at the PTAB.

On August 22nd, an order was entered in the inter partes review (IPR) proceedings currently ongoing between between VoIP-Pal and Cupertino, CA-based consumer device giant Apple Inc. The order removed the panel of administrative patent judges (APJs) that had been adjudicating the IPR, replacing them with Deputy Chief APJ Scott Boalick and Vice Chief APJs Jacqueline Bonilla and Michael Tierney. This is the second time the panel of APJs has been completely changed in this particular IPR proceeding. Originally, the panel had consisted of APJs Barbara Benoit, Lynne Pettigrew and Stacy Beth Margolies. Although no explanation was provided (as is typical with the PTAB) the panel was changed a few weeks after we reported that APJ Margolies had previously represented Apple in patent infringement proceedings in U.S. district court.

If this practice of phantom expanded panels, with APJs not identified on the record or to the parties, is legal then IPR panel assignments are nothing more than a farce. Any APJ, including Chief Administrative Patent Judge Ruschke, can actively participate in the deliberative process of any IPR without ever disclosing that fact to the public or to the parties. So, in effect, all IPR panels may be secretly stacked!

The USPTO has provided us with a comment from Chief Judge David Ruschke, who defends APJs of the PTAB as having extensive legal and technical experience. The problem is this view is simply not consistent with the data. While APJs may be technically competent, there is little doubt many on the PTAB were appointed when they simply did not have extensive legal experience… PTAB judges preside over administrative trials, which have all the trappings of litigation (i.e., motions to dismiss, discovery, discovery disputes, hearings, testimony, depositions, constitutional rulings, jurisdictional matters, questions of contract interpretation and privity, and much, much more. No matter how much Ruschke and others do not want to acknowledge the truth, it is perfectly accurate to say that patent agents and patent examiners have absolutely no experience in that world. They simply can’t, unless they are engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.

This study uncovered several shocking revelations. First, 12.64% of PTAB judges were appointed with less than 5 years of experience prior to their appointment as APJs (i.e., 5 years or less removed from graduating from law school), while some PTAB judges were appointed with as little as 2 years of experience. Indeed, 7.47% of APJs had 4 or less years of experience when they were appointed to the PTAB… There were zero federal district court judges appointed with 10 years or less experience, while 46.55% of PTAB judges were appointed with 10 years or less experience… This would mean that 46.55% of PTAB judges were appointed while they were still at best senior associates. Worse, 4.60% of PTAB judges were appointed with 3 or fewer years of experience, which means those 4.60% of PTAB judges were appointed at a time when they were only at a junior associate level.

Hiring senior associates to be Administrative Patent Judges was a mistake, hiring so many senior associates from the same firm was an even bigger mistake. Making it clear that their job was to kill patents at all costs was inexcusable. Interpreting the rules at every turn to be disadvantageous to patent owners is un-American, violates fundamental notions of fairness of procedure, and tilts the balance so heavily toward challengers that it has become more feared by patent owners than any government agency or body. In short, the PTAB has destroyed the U.S. patent system and the value of U.S. patents. In my opinion, the only solution for the very serious transgressions of the PTAB is to disband this runaway tribunal.

The USPTO admits that the Director does not have statutory authority to adjudicate an issue after a panel has been chosen, but argues that the Director can assert administrative authority to intentionally select Judges that will rule diametrically opposite to those Judges originally assigned to the case, thereby stacking any panel the Director chooses to achieve the result the Director wants in any case… This admission by the USPTO is both stunning and scandalous for at least two reasons. First, the Administrative Procedure Act, which applies to the PTAB, demands decisional independence, which obviously is not happening when the Director of the USPTO can stack a panel to achieve a particular desired outcome.

While the Patent Office likes to tout statistics that assert most patent claims challenged in IPR are not invalidated, those statistics are simply not credible. When reporting its statistics the Patent Office ignores the reality that once an IPR is actually instituted few claims are actually adjudicated to be patentable. The Office is also grossly misleads when they characterize claims not subject to a final written decision as “remaining patentable.”… Recently I’ve heard a story from a former PTAB judge who explained that institution of IPR challenges is far more likely when there are multiple petitions filed against the same patent because it makes it easier for PTAB judges to meet their production quota. If that is not proof that the PTAB is hopelessly broken I don’t know what is.

Presently the USPTO has a panel of three APJs decide whether to institute a trial, and then normally has the same three-APJ panel conduct the trial, if instituted. Under the proposed pilot program the single APJ making the IPR institution decision would be on the panel conducting the IPR trial, joined by two other APJs not associated with the IPR institution decision. Regardless of efficiencies, having a single APJ make institution determinations is fraught with due process concerns because decision whether to institute an inter partes review is not appealable.