Posts Tagged: "Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act"

Innovator (or “reference”) biologic drug makers and small-molecule drug makers face differing legal obligations with respect to public patent disclosures. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, reference small-molecule drug makers are required to provide to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) a list of the patents covering the active ingredients, compositions, formulations, and methods of treatment for their approved reference drug products, which the FDA in turn is required to publish in its “Orange Book.”  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (c)(2). The publication of such patents in the FDA Orange Book thus gives all generic drug applicants advance notice of the patents to be asserted by a reference drug maker in future Hatch-Waxman litigation.

As we turn the page to 2021, we expect at least two major cases to be resolved that could have long-lasting effects on where and how Hatch-Waxman and Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) cases are litigated. Specifically, the future of skinny labels is in doubt, and available venues for Plaintiffs could be significantly narrowed. The number of new drugs eligible for generic competition will also rebound in 2021, but only time will tell if the global pandemic affects the overall number of generic filings. While there are many more Hatch-Waxman and BPCIA developments to watch this year, these are a few that we will be following closely.

High prescription drug prices and their impact on costs borne by the government in Medicaid, Medicare Part D and other federal programs, is a front burner topic in Washington. The President has committed to reducing the price of prescription drugs, and pressured drug companies to hold the line. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has proposed two regulatory initiatives—price disclosure in drug advertising and foreclosing rebates from manufacturers to pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs)—aimed at pushing prices down. Some Democrats have urged more sweeping actions, such as having the government negotiate Medicare drug pricing as a single buyer or regulating drug prices by reference to an international index based on government-negotiated drug prices abroad. These proposals cannot solve the drug pricing problem. The Administration’s proposals merely tweak the status quo and put no effective restraint on new drug prices. Jawboning by the Executive has had a minimal impact. Disclosure of manufacturers’ list prices, unless accompanied by numerous and inherently confusing caveats highlighting the difference between those prices and the co-pay an insured consumer must bear at retail, is potentially misleading and, in any event, has no direct impact on prices. Eliminating rebates, as HHS’s rulemaking acknowledged, will inevitably raise health insurance costs now partly paid for by rebates while manufacturers’ pricing power remains unabated. The Democrats’ call for government power buying or price regulation would impact drug prices but also require politically sensitive government determinations about the “worth” of prescription drugs to patients—a significant step on the road to government-allocated health care. 

While part one of this two-part series on intellectual property (IP) due diligence focused on a life science company’s own IP portfolio, part two will address a company’s understanding of how it fits into the market by considering its freedom to operate, as well as its competitors’, and the interplay of patent and regulatory exclusivity as it relates to the company’s product. Patent and regulatory exclusivity—two areas that can provide the most value and protection to a life science product—are very interrelated. Simply identifying when a key patent naturally expires is not sufficient, because regulatory exclusivity could possibly extend the company’s ability to keep competitors off the market or allow competitors to speed up entry in certain situations.

In the case, Amgen v. Sanofi, the Court vacated an injunction Amgen obtained against a competing drug to its new PCSK9-inhibitor.  The Court’s decision turned on a finding that the jury was improperly instructed on the criteria for invalidating a patent directed to an antibody for lack of written description.  Thus, will the precedent recently established in Amgen’s PCSK9 case doom the validity of its patents covering Enbrel®?  There are likely two ways that the decision in Amgen v. Sanofi made a validity challenge to Enbrel®’s patents easier.

In a patent infringement case governed by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (“BPCIA”), the Federal Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to compel discovery in the district court. The Court also found that Amgen failed to meet the requirements for mandamus relief. Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2017) (Before Dyk, Bryson, and Chen, J.) (Opinion for the court, Dyk, J.)… When filing a BPCIA paragraph (l)(3) list of patents that could potentially be infringed by a biosimilar, all patents that could reasonably be infringed, based on available knowledge without discovery, should be included on that list. In an interlocutory appeal, the Federal Circuit lacks “collateral order” jurisdiction to compel a district court to order discovery concerning non-listed patents, nor is mandamus warranted, because relief is available on appeal from a final judgment.

42 U.S.C. § 262(l) of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA) regulates “biosimilars,” biological products that are highly similar to FDA-approved biological products. Section 262(l) has two notification requirements that are important to this case… The second question addressed by the Court was whether the applicant must provide notice after the FDA licenses its biosimilar, or if it may provide notice before the FDA licenses its biosimilar. The Court concluded that an applicant might, but does not have to, provide notice to the manufacturer of the biologic before obtaining a license from the FDA.

The Court’s Sandoz v. Amgen decision gutted a statute that had been carefully crafted to facilitate timely resolution of patent disputes and avoid delaying market entry of biosimilar products. In holding that a biosimilar applicant cannot be compelled through federal law to engage in the patent dance, the Court effectively gave biosimilar applicants a license to hide the ball. Given the complexity of biologics and biosimilars, it can be very difficult for an innovator company to reasonably determine which of its patents might be infringed by the biosimilar. Now, potentially meritorious patent infringement questions could be kicked far down the road. This could lead to delayed launch of the biosimilar product, possibly through a decision not to launch at risk or possibly by way of injunctive relief outside the BPCIA.

Modeled after the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA seeks not only to encourage competition in the field of biologics but also to promote innovation by, among other things, providing twelve years of market exclusivity to pioneer biologics… Like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA also sets out a process for identifying disputes over patent infringement and managing any ensuing litigation once an applicant seeks a biosimilar license… To streamline the first wave of litigation, the BPCIA mandates that following the biosimilar applicant’s receipt of the RPS’s detailed statement on infringement, the parties negotiate in good faith to select patents for litigation from the lists initially provided by the RPS and the biosimilar applicant. [§ 262(l)(4)].

Two recent Federal Circuit opinions provide some answers to the issues presented by complaints alleging non-compliance with the BPCIA. In Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that an aBLA filer’s participation in the patent dance is not mandatory under the BPCIA. 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Where an aBLA filer elects to forego the patent dance by failing to provide the aBLA and the biosimilar manufacturing information to the RPS, the only remedy available to the RPS lies in a declaratory judgment action for patent infringement, as expressly contemplated by § 262(1)(9)(C). In addition, the court concluded that an aBLA filer who did not engage in the patent dance was required to provide a notice of commercial marketing and that such notice could be effectively given only after the FDA had approved the aBLA. The court’s ruling left open the question whether an aBLA filer who participated in the patent dance was required to provide a notice of commercial manufacturing. This decision is on appeal to the Supreme Court, which has yet to decide whether it will hear the issue.

The Supreme Court is currently considering whether to review Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., the Federal Circuit’s first decision regarding the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA). Although the Federal Circuit does not technically have any input into the Supreme Court’s grant or denial of certiorari, it nonetheless took the opportunity last week to bolster one of the challenged holdings: that a biosimilar applicant cannot provide its biologic competitor with 180 days’ notice of intent to commercially market a biosimilar product until that product is licensed. Specifically, in the course of ruling in Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc. that a biosimilar applicant must provide such notice even if it participated in the BPCIA’s so-called “patent dance,” the Federal Circuit addressed a primary criticism of its earlier decision, namely, that permitting only post-licensure notice effectively extends by 180 days the twelve-year exclusivity term of the biologic product. The solution suggested by the panel, however, is far from a legal certainty.

This statute tried to mirror the Hatch-Waxman statute for small molecules, including both an abbreviated drug approval process and a mechanism to address any patent claims during drug approval. However, because of the differences between these two types of drugs, stemming from the increased complexity in manufacturing and patent protection, unique provisions were included in the BPCIA. Unfortunately, as Judge Lourie of the Federal Circuit put it, the BPCIA could win a “Pulitzer prize for complexity or uncertainty.” And, it is these new provisions that could prove the downfall of the BPCIA, at least as it currently exists.