Posts Tagged: "doctrine of equivalents"

On March 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) vacated and reversed the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant Munchkin, Inc. (Munchkin) for noninfringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,899,420 (the ‘420 patent) and 6,974,029 (the ‘029 patent), held by plaintiffs Edgewell Personal Care Brands, LLC and International Refills Company, Ltd. (collectively Edgewell). Edgewell manufactures and sells the Diaper Genie, a diaper pail system with two main components: 1) a pail for collection of soiled diapers; and 2) a replaceable cassette within the pail that forms a wrapper around the soiled diapers. The ‘420 and ‘029 patents relate to improvements in the cassette design. Edgewell filed suit against Munchkin for infringement of these patents for selling refill cassettes marketed as being compatible with Edgewell’s Diaper Genie. Edgewell appealed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Munchkin for noninfringement of both patents.

The doctrine of equivalents allows a patentee to raise a claim of infringement even when each and every element of the patented invention is not identically present in the allegedly infringing product/process. The doctrine is aimed at preventing an infringer from gaining the benefit of a patented invention by making insubstantial changes. Disclosure-dedication doctrine is a bar to the doctrine of equivalents. Under the disclosure-dedication doctrine, when a patentee discloses subject matter but does not claim it, the patentee dedicates the unclaimed subject matter to the public and cannot recapture it through the doctrine of equivalents. The public can then practice the unclaimed subject matter without fear of infringement.Eagle Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC, No. 2019-1924 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2020) (“Eagle Pharm”) is the most recent Federal Circuit case involving this doctrine. In Eagle Pharm, the Federal Circuit considered whether a patentee can avoid dedication on the ground that the disclosure occurred in an embodiment distinct from the claimed invention. The court answered the question in the negative.

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a precedential public opinion affirming the District Court for the District of Delaware’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement for Donghee America, Inc. and Donghee Alabama, LLC (Donghee). The CAFC held that the summary judgment ruling was consistent with the claim construction and supported by the facts on the record. A sealed opinion was delivered on November 21.

The plaintiff, Plastic Omnium Advanced Innovation and Research (Plastic Ominum), owns two patents for blow molding plastic fuel tanks, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,814,921 (‘921) and 6,866,812 (‘812). The patents outline a system to manufacture the tanks in a manner that allows accessory components to be installed without damaging or removing part of the tank’s wall. The ‘812 patent describes a method in which a hollow plastic tube, called a parison, is extruded, formed, and then cut by a blade at the exit of the extruder. The dispute arises out of the ‘921 patent’s description of an “extruded parison” limitation.

On November 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed a decision of the District of Nevada granting summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Pharma Tech Solutions, Inc. (Pharma Tech) sued LifeScan, Inc. (LifeScan) for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,153,069 (the ‘069 patent) and 6,413,411 (the ‘411 patent). The patents are directed toward home use, blood glucose monitoring systems for individuals with diabetes. Previous monitoring systems determined blood glucose concentration from the Cottrell current drawn and measured from a patient’s oxidized blood sample. The specification of the ‘069 and ‘411 patents claims to improve on these systems by “eliminating several of the critical operator dependent variables that adversely affect the accuracy and reliability” of the previous systems. The invention performs multiple Cottrell current measurements (opposed to just the one) and converts these into analyte concentrations. It then compares the results for better accuracy, notifying the user if the results fall outside of an acceptable range of each other to indicate a system error. Ultimately, the CAFC found that because LifeScan’s meter does not convert diffusion limiting current readings to analyte concentration measurements and then compare the measurements to detect errors, and because Pharma Tech is barred in its infringement argument by prosecution history estoppel, LifeScan did not infringe Pharma Tech’s ‘069 or ‘411 patents.

Whenever a company finds itself in the cross-hairs of a cease-and-desist letter or patent infringement lawsuit, a license may not be a viable option. That is often the case when the patent holder is a competitor intent on enforcing a patent against its rivals… The lesson to be taken away is that the efficacy of a design-around is likely to depend on how significant the change is in terms of the claimed invention’s novelty and/or functionality. One should also consider the possibility of incorporating changes that make use of long-standing prior art techniques, methods or elements, especially any that were cited by the patent examiner, in response to which prior art the patentee either amended its claims or distinguished its invention from such prior art during the course of prosecution. 

Power Integrations, Inc. owns U.S. Patent Nos. 6,212,079 (“the ‘079 patent”) and 6,538,908 (“the ‘908 patent”). Power Integrations sued Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation and Fairchild (Taiwan) Corporation (collectively “Fairchild”) for infringement. A jury found Fairchild literally infringed the ‘079 patent and infringed the ‘908 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury subsequently awarded damages of $140 million, applying the entire market value rule in calculating damages. Fairchild appealed. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgments of infringement, but concluded that the entire market value rule was inappropriately used in this case to calculate damages.

Nalco asserted that the only difference between its patented method and the Chem-Mod Process was the location of the injection. The district court dismissed Nalco’s complaints for failure to state a claim, including its Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”) at issue in the present appeal… The Federal Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge O’Malley, rejected Defendants’ argument that Nalco’s direct infringement claims were implausible and instead agreed with Nalco that the resolution of its claims depended on the construction of the terms “flue gas” and “injecting.” Resolution of this claim construction dispute was inappropriate at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of the proceedings.

Crafting a proper hypothetical claim is a prerequisite to whether a theory of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents would also ensnare the prior art. The burden to present a proper hypothetical claim cannot be shifted, and a hypothetical claim cannot be broader for the alleged range of equivalents, and not otherwise narrower.

The UK Supreme Court recently addressed the extent to which under the European Patent Convention 2000 (“EPC 2000”), a patentee may obtain protection against products or processes that are not covered by the literal meaning of the claims. In doing so, the UKSC modified what had been previously seen as the established approach of the UK courts towards ‘equivalents’. In particular, while not disapproving the test, the Court has chosen to reformulate the three “Improver” questions that, since 1990, have been in common usage for aiding determinations as to what might constitute patent infringement… The UKSC has concluded that subsequent to the Improver decision, which was then reinforced by the judgment in Kirin-Amgen, there has been a tendency by the UK courts to place “..too much weight on the words of the claim…” and what the patentee might have anticipated or intended. Instead, the UK courts should have focused on whether, on a basis of fact and expert evidence, the variant is a true equivalent of the invention as described in the patent.

The Federal Circuit found that the specification explicitly supported the district court’s claim construction, which precluded a finding of infringement. Two passages specified the meaning of, and provided context for, a claim term that referred to the relative location among certain claim elements. A “relative location” claim term is often read in light of, and by relying on, the written description. Because the district court’s claim construction was proper, the Court found the grant of summary judgment of non infringement was proper.

The Federal Circuit held that it is not the case that a patent must spell out a claim element’s function, way, and result, for the doctrine of equivalents to apply. It looked to what the claim element’s function in the claimed composition is to one of skill in the art, which it held may be determined by looking at extrinsic evidence. The Court found no error in the district court’s finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. In applying the two part test (constructing a hypothetical claim that covers the accused device and comparing that claim to the prior art), the district court correctly determined that the hypothetical claim properly included the disputed excipients, i.e. Glenmark’s excipient.

Akzo appealed from the decision of the district court (Chief Judge Leonard Stark) to grant summary judgment to Dow, which found that Dow did not infringe the claims of U.S. Patent 6,767,956, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Dow also cross-appealed from the district court’s conclusion that the claims of the ’956 patent were not indefinite. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court on both appeals.

Wi-LAN argued that even if they could not prove direct infringement, a structure that performs the steps in the reverse order should properly be found to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Curiously, the Federal Circuit disagreed despite finding the Wi-LAN argument to have merit. Exactly how the Federal Circuit came to the determination that there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict on the doctrine of equivalents is unclear.

Advanced Steel sued X-Body Equipment for infringement of a method of loading shipping containers with bulk material. The “proximate end” of the claimed transfer base, for moving loaded material, was disputed by the parties. X-Body successfully argued on summary judgment that the piston-and-cylinder for its container packer was not connected to the proximate end of its transfer base, but instead was connected at a point on the bottom of the container packer. Under the district court’s construction of “proximate end” (which means “the extreme or last part lengthwise”), there was no literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.