Posts Tagged: "eastern district of virginia"

Denying TC Heartland Changed the Law on Venue Ignores Reality

On May 22, 2017, in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, LLC, 137 S.Ct. 1514 (2017), the Supreme Court held that patent venue is controlled exclusively by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which restricts venue in patent cases to (1) where the Defendant resides, or (2) where the Defendant commits an act of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. The decision was immediately hailed by commentators as a significant break with past precedent… Despite the common perception of practitioners that the TC Heartland decision changed the law of venue in patent cases, the majority of district courts to address this issue have come to the opposite conclusion, finding that the decision merely reaffirmed existing law and could not excuse the failure to raise the defense earlier. The reasoning of these decisions is questionable, as is the refusal of these courts to recognize how dramatically TC Heartland changed the landscape for patent litigation.

Is HTIA’s general counsel John Thorne a patent troll?

John Thorne was VP and deputy general counsel for Verizon during its legal battle against former American cable television company Cablevision where Verizon asserted a series of patents it owned… A closer look into the patents renders some interesting information about the patents Verizon asserted and the company’s legal strategy in the case. Two of the eight patents asserted by Verizon in the District of Delaware weren’t originally invented by Verizon, Bell Atlantic or other any other of Verizon’s predecessor companies; they were acquired from outside entities… And haven’t we been told by the likes of Unified Patents that all patent owners who enforce their patents are patent trolls? One would have to assume if Unified is being logically consistent they would have extraordinary problems with Verizon’s activities particularly here where the patents used to sue Cablevision were acquired and not the subject of in-house innovation.

What TC Heartland v. Kraft Food Group Brands Means for Patent Infringement Suits

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party waives its right to assert a defense of improper venue when it fails to raise the defense in a pleading or with other Rule 12 motions.  Importantly, however, that waiver only takes effect if the defense was “available” to the party at the time of filing either the pleading or motion.  Many circuits, including the Federal Circuit, interpret that requirement by recognizing an intervening law exception to the waiver of a defense, whereby an intervening change in law makes available a defense that had not previously been available.  Does the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland constitute a change in the law?  Was the defense of improper venue unavailable until May 22, 2017?

PTAB Appellants Must Pay USPTO’s Attorneys’ Fees Regardless of Outcome of Appeal

In Nantkwest v. Matal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Eastern District of Virginia’s denial of the USPTO’s request for attorneys’ fees in connection with Nantkwest’s district court appeal of the PTAB rejection of its patent application. At issue was the correct interpretation of Section 145 of the Patent Act, namely the language “[a]ll of the expenses of the proceeding.” The Court held that Section 145 of the Patent Act requires the appellant to pay the USPTO’s attorneys’ fees, regardless of the outcome of the case.

Diverging Viewpoints on Venue Change Following T.C. Heartland

In two recent decisions following T. C. Heartland, district courts have applied two different methodologies in resolving motions to change venue… In the first decision a trial judge in the Eastern District of Virginia denied the venue motion, filed three days after T.C. Heartland but also on the eve of trial.  Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc. (June 7, 2017)… In the second decision, a district court in the Southern District of Ohio applied the standards in § 1400(b) and transferred the action because neither of two defendants resided in the district and neither had a permanent and continuous presence in Ohio.