Posts Tagged: "en banc rehearing"

LKQ En Banc Argument Suggests CAFC Could Soften Test for Design Patent Obviousness

An en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) today heard arguments from LKQ Corporation, the U.S. government and GM Global Technology Operations in a case that could change the test for assessing design patent obviousness. The judges seemed interested in tweaking the existing “Rosen-Durling” test but struggled with getting the parties to clearly articulate a replacement approach that wouldn’t be potentially just as bad. The so-called Rosen-Durling test for design patent obviousness requires that, first, under In re Rosen (C.C.P.A., 1982), courts identify a prior art reference “the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design.” Next, under Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir., 1996)), if such a reference is identified, the court must consider whether it can be modified based on other references to come up with “the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.”

Amicus Tells CAFC to Deny Cellect Petition and Prevent Patent ‘Double Dipping’

On December 28, agricultural tech developer Inari filed an amicus brief  with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) urging the appellate court to deny a petition for rehearing en banc of the court’s August ruling in In re Cellect. Inari’s brief highlights that the Federal Circuit’s application of the obviousness-type double patenting (ODP) doctrine to legislatively-prescribed patent term adjustments (PTA) is critical to the success of companies like Inari who build upon technologies once patent protections expire.

All Parties in Arthrex Want the Full Federal Circuit to Render a Better Decision

On December 16, the U.S. Government, Arthrex, Inc., and Smith & Nephew, Inc. each submitted petitions for rehearing and/or rehearing en banc asking the full Federal Circuit to reconsider its October 31 ruling in Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew, Inc, which made Patent Trial and Appeal Board  (PTAB) judges “inferior officers” under the U.S. Appointments Clause, in order to skirt the problem that they had been unconstitutionally appointed under the America Invents Act. Many have criticized the quick-fix approach. The case stems from Arthrex, Inc.’s appeal from the final written decision of the PTAB holding certain claims of its U.S. Patent No. 9,179,907 unpatentable as anticipated. On appeal, Arthrex argued that the appointment of the PTAB’s Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) by the Secretary of Commerce violated the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court somewhat surprisingly agreed and remedied the problem by simply “severing any ‘problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact,’” as outlined in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board.

Mandamus Relief Denied: Federal Circuit Avoids Clarifying TC Heartland in In re Google LLC

The Federal Circuit recently elected not to decide en banc “whether servers are a regular and established place of business, such that venue is proper under 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b). In re: Google LLC, No. 2018-152 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2019) (Before Prost, Chief Judge, Newman, Lourie, Dyk, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna, Wallach, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, and Stoll, Circuit Judges) (Dissent by Reyna, Circuit Judge, joined by Newman and Lourie, Circuit Judges). SEVEN Networks, LLC’s (SEVEN) patent infringement suit against Google arose in the Eastern District of Texas. SEVEN alleged Google’s servers, stored in a third-party ISP’s facility, where the allegedly infringing activities occurred, were a regular and established place of business, such that venue is proper under 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b). The district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss for improper venue. As a result, Google petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss or transfer the case for improper venue. On appeal, the panel majority found mandamus relief inappropriate because “it is not known if the district court’s ruling involves the kind of broad and fundamental legal questions relevant to § 1400(b),” and “it would be appropriate to allow the issue to percolate in the district courts so as to more clearly define the importance, scope, and nature of the issue for us to review.”