Posts Tagged: "enhanced"

Judge Awards Enhancement of Damages to $268 Million in Cochlear Implant Patent Case

“While the jury’s $130 million verdict is significant and may sound large in the abstract, it may not be enough without enhancement to deter infringing conduct given the context of this case,” Judge Olguin wrote. Evidence presented at trial shows that the infringing products sold by Cochlear generated $1.8 billion in revenues. Cochlear had publicly stated in a 2016 annual report that the jury’s verdict won’t disrupt Cochlear’s business or U.S. customers.

Stryker receives treble damages as part of $248.7M award after 2016 remand from SCOTUS

The final judgment and permanent injunction follows the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last June in Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer Inc. (consolidated with Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.) to vacate and remand a previous decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Fed. Cir.)… The damages awarded to Stryker in the final judgment entered into the W.D. Mich. court include $70 million in lost profits; pursuant to Section 284 findings of willfulness, this lost profits award is also trebled to $210 million in the final judgment.

Halo v. Pulse and Stryker v. Zimmer: SCOTUS Finds Seagate Test Objectively Unreasonable

In rejecting the objective prong of Seagate, the Court rejected the notion that a defendant may escape the specter of enhanced damages by asserting a defense that the defendant was unaware of at the time the infringement occurred. For example, the Court pointed out that under the Seagate test, “[t]he existence of . . . a defense insulates the infringer from enhanced damages, even if he did not act on the basis of the defense or was even aware of it.” Halo at 10. But, as the Court stated, “culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. Moreover, in response to an argument by Pulse based on the Court’s earlier Safeco decision, the Court held that “[n]othing in Safeco suggests that we should look to facts that the defendant neither knew nor had reason to know at the time he acted.” Id. at 11.