The Federal Circuit granted a mandamus petition filed by Google and ordered a Texas federal court to transfer a patent infringement case to a federal court that covers Silicon Valley as requested by Google. This extraordinary remedy was delivered in the form of a non-precedential opinion authored by Chief Judge Prost and joined by Judge Lourie. Despite the Federal Circuit’s designation of the decision as non-precedential the Court should be prepared for the onslaught of mandamus petitions that will now be filed given that they have shown a willingness to step in and re-weigh transfer factors de novo.
In a December 22, 2016 decision, the Federal Circuit vacated a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“The Board”) in two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. The Court reversed the Board’s decision that the claims at issue were unpatentable for anticipation and obviousness… The broadest reasonable interpretation of a patent claim does not extend to a legally incorrect interpretation. When the claim as a whole expressly excludes a particular result, a claim term cannot be interpreted so broadly as to encompass that result.
Earlier today the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Group LLC. In deciding to hear this patent venue case the Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement actions… Ultimately, the question that the petitioner really wants the Supreme Court to address is whether the Eastern District of Texas, which is home to 20-25% of all patent litigations because it is perceived to be patent owner friendly, is a proper venue for patent owners to be choosing. If the Supreme Court issues a ruling that strikes down current patent venue rules there would be no need for patent venue reform efforts to continue in Congress. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court were to affirm the Federal Circuit in this case calls for legislative venue reform would likely become deafening.
While TecSec had urged the panel to reassign the case to a different judge on remand in part because the district court judge repeatedly held against TecSec, raised dispositive issues sua sponte, had been reversed on appeal for many of those issues, and had pre-judged a § 101 issue that has not yet been raised, reassignment is only appropriate in exceptional circumstances. “Here, reassignment is governed by Fourth Circuit law, which applies a three factor test for reassignment: 1) whether the judge would be reasonable expected to have substantial difficulty putting her views that were held to be incorrect out of her mind; 2) whether reassignment is necessary to preserve the appearance of justice; and 3) the degree of waste of judicial resources and duplication if the case were reassigned. See United States v. Guglielmi, 929 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1991). Nothing in this case merits reassignment on remand.”
what is particularly interesting about this case is that Smith, who had prevailed at the district court and was awarded about $322,500 in damages, thought he could not challenge the correctness of a claim construction made by the district court. While Smith could not have filed a cross appeal in this case concerning the claim construction, Smith could have asserted ‘alternative grounds in the record for affirming the judgment.’ Because Smith did not raise any such alternate grounds on appeal, the Federal Circuit could not address the correctness of the district court’s claim construction.