Posts Tagged: "Justice Alito"

In a previous essay, I discussed a U.S. Supreme Court case that had nothing to do with patent law, but that patent practitioners may wish to note. That discussion pertained to a decision indicating that constitutional arguments ought to be preserved before an administrative agency?such as the United States Patent and Trademark Office?even if the agency lacks the jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions on their merits. In this essay, I turn to one of the most humorous Supreme Court decisions in recent years. Even though this case seems far removed from patent law, it may hold a serious lesson for patent practitioners.

On the morning of Tuesday, December 4th, the U.S. Supreme Court held oral arguments in the case of Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceutical USA (transcript of oral arguments here). This case asks the nation’s highest court to determine whether the sale of a patented invention which required the purchaser to keep the invention confidential (i.e.: a “secret sale”) qualifies as invalidating prior art under the on-sale bar found in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)… Justice Samuel Alito said that the most serious argument for Jay to deal with was the plain meaning of the new statutory language under the AIA; if “on sale” meant on sale publicly and privately, then the “or otherwise available to the public” language wouldn’t make much sense in the context of the statute.

In WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that patent owners may recover lost foreign profits under §271(f)(2) when the infringing party exports parts from the United States for assembly in foreign countries, so long as the relevant infringing conduct occurred in the United States.

Justice Gorsuch seems the most likely, based on his questions, to support the petitioner’s position that there is a constitutional infirmity surrounding IPR proceedings. Chief Justice Roberts also seemed to have substantial concerns with respect to IPR proceedings. Perhaps somewhat predictably, Justice Breyer and to a lesser extent Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, seemed through their questions to view IPR proceedings as just another opportunity for the Patent Office to make sure the correct determination has been reached at the time the patent was granted by the Patent Office. Justice Kennedy overall seemed more in line with the thinking of the liberals on the Court, Justice Ginsberg asked difficult questions and seemed difficult to predict how she might rule. Justice Thomas characteristically remained silent, although his judicial philosophy would be typically in line with Justice Gorsuch. Justice Alito asked only a few questions of the petitioner’s counsel, Allyson Ho, which focused on whether the Constitution requires a Patent Act and whether Congress could put limitations on the grant of “these monopolies.”

After a streak of six patent decisions uniformly overruling the Federal Circuit, and for the first time all term, the Supreme Court finally handed the Federal Circuit a win this week. In its landmark ruling in Matal v. Tam (formerly Lee v. Tam), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the restriction on the registration of marks that “disparage” under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote unanimously for the eight justices in holding that Section 2(a)’s prohibition on disparaging registrations violates “a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”

The Supreme Court heard oral argument on the cloudy Wednesday morning of January 18, 2017. Although the Justices posed tough questions and intricate hypotheticals to both sides, the tone of each Justice’s questions and their individual jurisprudences indicate an even 4-4 split, with Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor favoring the USPTO, and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts favoring Tam. Of course, oral argument is often shaky, at best, when predicting the outcome of a case, especially one with such potential for a drastic overhaul of a body of law… Although no one can know for certain the outcome of Lee v. Tam, one consequence that appears very likely is that, if the Court does rule in favor Tam, it would strike the entirety of Section 2(a), not just the portion prohibiting disparaging marks that forms the central issue of the case. John C. Connell, counsel for Tam, went so far as to call that result “inevitable” in response to Justice Ginsberg’s question on the topic.

In a strong reversal of the Federal Circuit, the US Supreme Court held in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v First Quality Baby Products, LLC, No. 15-927 (March 21, 2017), that delay by a patentee will not give rise to a laches defense during the statutory six-year damages period under 35 U.S.C. § 286. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 7–1 majority opinion, extending the court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (2014), which held that laches is inapplicable for copyright infringement, a provision similar to Section 286 of the Patent Act… The Supreme Court noted that its determination regarding laches does not preclude a defense based on equitable estoppel…

The fact that laches cannot be used as a defense to a patent infringement action brought during the statute of limitations is most definitely a pro-patent decision. Presently patents are much weaker than they have been at any time over the last 36 years. But patent law has always swung like a pendulum, and this low point will not last forever. Thus, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in SCA Hygiene, patent owners would do well to consider forgoing patent enforcement. Instead, allow infringement to accrue and then sue for infringement in several years when the law may be quite a bit more favorable. After all, patents can last for 20 years, the statute of limitations is six-years, and without a laches defense available to infringers you will be able to seek damages going back six years from whenever you choose to sue.

On Tuesday, March 21st, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, a case which looked at the issue of whether and to what extent the defense of laches may bar a claim for patent infringement brought within the six-year statutory limitations period, as defined by 35 U.S.C. Section 286. In a 7-1 vote, the Supreme Court decided that the equitable defense of laches cannot be invoked against claims for infringement occurring during the statutory period.

In last week’s Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Elecs. decision, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit’s Seagate standard for awarding enhanced damages in patent cases under Section 284, finding the Federal Circuit’s two-part test “impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.” Slip Op. at 9. The Supreme Court’s decision, which vacated and remanded, means that the award of treble damage may very well be reinstated in that case, and reversals of enhanced patent damages rulings – both awards and denial – may become less common.

Perhaps the best question of the entire oral argument was asked by Chief Justice Roberts: “So why ­­should we be so wedded to the way they do business in the PTO with respect to the broadest possible construction when the ­­point is not to replicate PTO procedures? It’s supposed to take the place of district court procedures.” Gannon’s response pointed to the difference in the burden of proof between the district court (i.e., clear and convincing) and the PTAB (i.e., preponderance). Chief Justice Roberts responded, “it’s a very extraordinary animal in legal culture to have two different proceedings addressing the same question that lead to different results.” Gannon replied that there are “multiple reasons” why different results could be achieved, to which Roberts said: “there’s a problem here, and so we should accept another problem that’s presented where we don’t have to do it.”

Simply stated, any patent decision from the Supreme Court that cites stare decisis lacks all intellectual credibility given how arbitrarily and capriciously they have ignored their patent own precedent and the patent statutes over the past decade. Obviously, this Supreme Court doesn’t understand the true definition of stare decisis. Given how frequently the Court disturbs well-established principles and precedent in the patent space the use of stare decisis in this case is nothing more than a complete and total cop-out. It also insults the intelligence of anyone who has even casually observed the Supreme Court on patent matters over the past decade.

There was a split in the circuit courts as to what effect a TTAB decision will have, and this depends heavily upon where the litigation is happening. The weight of a TTAB decision will vary depending on the jurisdiction, ranging from none at all to complete preclusion. Here, the issue was whether one mark was confusingly similar to another, which the Supreme Court determined was exactly the same as what was being litigated.