Posts Tagged: "justice kagan"

To the casual observer, the Supreme Court’s January 23 decision in Helsinn v. Teva may seem like no big deal. In just a few pages of text, the Court informs us that Congress did not change the established meaning of “on sale” prior art when it rewrote Section 102 of the Patent Act in 2011. Move along, nothing to see here, right? More than a few commentators seem to assume that we’ll simply return to the pre-America Invents Act (AIA) status quo, and that sales of an invention, whether public or private, will just continue to trigger a familiar statutory one-year clock for filing a patent application. But nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the impact of private sales (and of non-public commercial uses) on the patentability of later-filed patent applications will be significant, and very different from pre-AIA law. Patent applicants and owners of patents that were issued under the AIA have every reason to worry about traps for the unwary.

On January 8th, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com [Case No. 17-571 (Jan. 8, 2019)] to settle a longstanding circuit split on the copyright registration prerequisite to a copyright infringement suit… The Justices gave little indication as to how convincing they found either party’s policy arguments. The first rule of statutory interpretation, however, is that if the plain meaning of the text is clear, the inquiry ends. Here, at least two of the Justices acknowledged that the term “registration” is flexible, so the issue may end up turning on how far outside the four corners of Section 411(a) the Court is willing to look to determine its meaning.

In WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that patent owners may recover lost foreign profits under §271(f)(2) when the infringing party exports parts from the United States for assembly in foreign countries, so long as the relevant infringing conduct occurred in the United States.

Justice Gorsuch seems the most likely, based on his questions, to support the petitioner’s position that there is a constitutional infirmity surrounding IPR proceedings. Chief Justice Roberts also seemed to have substantial concerns with respect to IPR proceedings. Perhaps somewhat predictably, Justice Breyer and to a lesser extent Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, seemed through their questions to view IPR proceedings as just another opportunity for the Patent Office to make sure the correct determination has been reached at the time the patent was granted by the Patent Office. Justice Kennedy overall seemed more in line with the thinking of the liberals on the Court, Justice Ginsberg asked difficult questions and seemed difficult to predict how she might rule. Justice Thomas characteristically remained silent, although his judicial philosophy would be typically in line with Justice Gorsuch. Justice Alito asked only a few questions of the petitioner’s counsel, Allyson Ho, which focused on whether the Constitution requires a Patent Act and whether Congress could put limitations on the grant of “these monopolies.”

Justices Kagan and Ginsburg seemed skeptical. Indeed, Congress has already passed a general venue statute that defined residency “for all venue places – all venue purposes,” as Justice Ginsburg put it. Justice Kagan chimed in, questioning the propriety of overturning the broader rule, which she called “the decision that the practice has conformed to” and the “practical backdrop” against which Congress was legislating. Next, Justice Breyer noted the many arguments and briefs discussing the Eastern District of Texas, but which he felt were not relevant.

The Supreme Court heard oral argument on the cloudy Wednesday morning of January 18, 2017. Although the Justices posed tough questions and intricate hypotheticals to both sides, the tone of each Justice’s questions and their individual jurisprudences indicate an even 4-4 split, with Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor favoring the USPTO, and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts favoring Tam. Of course, oral argument is often shaky, at best, when predicting the outcome of a case, especially one with such potential for a drastic overhaul of a body of law… Although no one can know for certain the outcome of Lee v. Tam, one consequence that appears very likely is that, if the Court does rule in favor Tam, it would strike the entirety of Section 2(a), not just the portion prohibiting disparaging marks that forms the central issue of the case. John C. Connell, counsel for Tam, went so far as to call that result “inevitable” in response to Justice Ginsberg’s question on the topic.

Perhaps the best question of the entire oral argument was asked by Chief Justice Roberts: “So why ­­should we be so wedded to the way they do business in the PTO with respect to the broadest possible construction when the ­­point is not to replicate PTO procedures? It’s supposed to take the place of district court procedures.” Gannon’s response pointed to the difference in the burden of proof between the district court (i.e., clear and convincing) and the PTAB (i.e., preponderance). Chief Justice Roberts responded, “it’s a very extraordinary animal in legal culture to have two different proceedings addressing the same question that lead to different results.” Gannon replied that there are “multiple reasons” why different results could be achieved, to which Roberts said: “there’s a problem here, and so we should accept another problem that’s presented where we don’t have to do it.”

Simply stated, any patent decision from the Supreme Court that cites stare decisis lacks all intellectual credibility given how arbitrarily and capriciously they have ignored their patent own precedent and the patent statutes over the past decade. Obviously, this Supreme Court doesn’t understand the true definition of stare decisis. Given how frequently the Court disturbs well-established principles and precedent in the patent space the use of stare decisis in this case is nothing more than a complete and total cop-out. It also insults the intelligence of anyone who has even casually observed the Supreme Court on patent matters over the past decade.