Posts Tagged: "Mandamus"

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) earlier this week shot down a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Amazon.com, Inc. asking the court to vacate an Order by Judge Alan Albright of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas denying Amazon transfer of a case to the Northern District of California. VoIP-Pal sued Amazon in the Western District of Texas, alleging infringement of its patents through the sale of Amazon’s “’communications platform,’ including the server structure, Alexa calling devices, and Alexa software applications running on those devices.” Amazon sought transfer to California, claiming that the middleware of the accused products was developed by employees based there. In its opposition, VoIP-Pal submitted evidence that “[t]echnical documentation relating to the work of the DeviceOS and Echo Platform Software teams is maintained at the Austin offices.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) today denied Hewlett Packard’s petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas to transfer its case to Massachusetts. Intellectual Ventures (IV) sued Hewlett Packard Enterprises (HPE) in the Western District of Texas, alleging infringement of a patent directed to data storage solutions assigned to IV. HPE moved for transfer, arguing that the development of the accused products occurred mostly in Massachusetts, but the district court denied the motion.

Yesterday, Chief Judge Orlando Garcia of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas issued an order that, in Garcia’s words, will “equitably distribute” new patent cases among 12 district judges. This order is an effort to address “the volume” of new cases assigned to the Waco Division’s Judge Alan Albright. Albright’s court is viewed as patent owner friendly and he has been under fire recently from both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and Congress on different fronts for his policies and procedures, which do tend more often than not to give patent owners their day in court.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) today denied VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.’s petition for a writ of mandamus asking it to direct a California district court to vacate its decision in favor of Twitter, Inc. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order on November 2, 2021, refusing to grant VoIP-Pal’s motion to dismiss Twitter’s request for a declaratory judgment that its products do not infringe VoIP-Pal’s U.S. Patent No. 9,935,872. VoIP-Pal’s patents relate generally to a system for routing communications over Internet Protocol networks, and the company has been engaged in litigation with Twitter, Apple, Amazon and others for several years now.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has become enamored with the power of the writ of mandamus to correct what they do not like, and they do not like patent owners filing patent infringement actions in Texas. Or, perhaps it is more accurate to say that while they might not mind patent owners filing patent infringement actions in Texas, they expect federal district court judges in Texas to order those patent owners off to other courthouses outside of Texas upon the request of defendants.

On March 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) granted Janssen Pharmaceuticals’ motion to dismiss Mylan Laboratories’ appeal and denied Mylan Laboratories’ request for mandamus relief, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Mylan’s appeal and that Mylan had failed to qualify for mandamus relief. In 2019, Janssen Pharmaceuticals sued Mylan Laboratories in district court for infringing U.S. Patent No. 9,439,906 (the ‘906 patent). In response, Mylan Laboratories petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) for inter partes review (IPR) of the ‘906 patent, raising four grounds for the unpatentability of certain claims, all based on 35 U.S.C. §103. In opposition to the institution of the IPR, Janssen Pharmaceuticals argued that the IPR “would be an inefficient use of Board resources,” due to two co-pending district court cases: the suit against Mylan Laboratories and another against Teva Pharmaceuticals, arguing “that both actions would likely reach final judgment before any IPR final written decision.”

The Court believed the time was now appropriate to address this issue through a writ of mandamus noting that several similar cases had now been heard in various district courts with conflicting results. The Court identified two issues that should be addressed: (1) whether a server rack, a shelf, or analogous space can be a “place of business,” and (2) whether a “regular and established place of business” requires the regular presence of an employee or agent of the defendant conducting business. Finding that a defendant must have regular, physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged “place of business,” the Court concluded that the Eastern District of Texas was not a proper venue for this case because Google does not have an employee or agent regularly conducting its business within the District.

The Federal Circuit recently elected not to decide en banc “whether servers are a regular and established place of business, such that venue is proper under 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b). In re: Google LLC, No. 2018-152 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2019) (Before Prost, Chief Judge, Newman, Lourie, Dyk, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna, Wallach, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, and Stoll, Circuit Judges) (Dissent by Reyna, Circuit Judge, joined by Newman and Lourie, Circuit Judges). SEVEN Networks, LLC’s (SEVEN) patent infringement suit against Google arose in the Eastern District of Texas. SEVEN alleged Google’s servers, stored in a third-party ISP’s facility, where the allegedly infringing activities occurred, were a regular and established place of business, such that venue is proper under 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b). The district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss for improper venue. As a result, Google petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss or transfer the case for improper venue. On appeal, the panel majority found mandamus relief inappropriate because “it is not known if the district court’s ruling involves the kind of broad and fundamental legal questions relevant to § 1400(b),” and “it would be appropriate to allow the issue to percolate in the district courts so as to more clearly define the importance, scope, and nature of the issue for us to review.”

Of the many lingering issues left in TC Heartland’s wake for domestic corporations, a Federal Circuit panel resolved several of them recently. In In re ZTE (USA), No. 2018-113, the court addressed two of the most common issues dogging appeals over the application of § 1400(b): whose law governs burden, and where does that burden lie. In In re Bigcommerce, No. 2018-120, the court addressed the territorial bounds mapped by the phrase “judicial district” in § 1400(b). Judge Linn authored both. 

After briefly parsing the statutory language of §1400(b) critical to the decision the Federal Circuit concluded that Judge Gilstrap’s four-factor test was not compliant with the statutory language. Judge Lourie simply concluded: “The district court’s four-factor test is not sufficiently tethered to this statutory language and thus it fails to inform each of the necessary requirements of the statute.”… “The fact that Cray allowed its employees to work from the Eastern District of Texas is insufficient,” wrote Judge Lourie as he shifted to the specifics of the case before the Court.

In a patent infringement case governed by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (“BPCIA”), the Federal Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to compel discovery in the district court. The Court also found that Amgen failed to meet the requirements for mandamus relief. Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2017) (Before Dyk, Bryson, and Chen, J.) (Opinion for the court, Dyk, J.)… When filing a BPCIA paragraph (l)(3) list of patents that could potentially be infringed by a biosimilar, all patents that could reasonably be infringed, based on available knowledge without discovery, should be included on that list. In an interlocutory appeal, the Federal Circuit lacks “collateral order” jurisdiction to compel a district court to order discovery concerning non-listed patents, nor is mandamus warranted, because relief is available on appeal from a final judgment.