Posts Tagged: "obvious"

Here we go again! Another patent whose claims have been invalidated at the Federal Circuit—predictably, another medical diagnostic patent. Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2019). This is getting old, tired and fundamentally ridiculous. The statute, which is all of one-sentence long, specifically lists discoveries as patent eligible. So why are discoveries being declared patent ineligible? To the extent these decisions are mandated by the Supreme Court, they directly contradict the easy to understand and very direct language of the statute. The Federal Circuit is wrong, period. Perhaps they are so close to these cases and trying so hard to do what they think is right that they have lost perspective, but these rulings are fundamentally saying that discoveries are not patent eligible. We are told repeatedly that they are mandated by Supreme Court precedent. Obviously, that cannot be correct. The statute says: “Whoever invents or discovers… may obtain a patent…” Clearly, Congress wants discoveries to be patented, and in our system of governance, Congress has supremacy over the Supreme Court with respect to setting the law unless the law is unconstitutional. 35 U.S.C. 101 has never been declared unconstitutional, so discoveries must be patent eligible, period. It is time to face the facts—the Supreme Court has considered only bad cases, with bad facts, where there was really no innovation presented in the claims, or even in the patent application as a whole. These decisions have absolutely no meaning or proper application with respect to any inventions, let alone inventions of monumental complexity such as true artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, or new medical diagnostics that allow risk-free testing of common ailments, where previously existing tests required potentially catastrophic risk.

While the claims-in-suit had previously survived validity challenges in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and in a District of Delaware case, Aly credited additional testimony and evidence in this case with leading Judge Pallmeyer towards finding that the claimed advance was inherent to the invention in the prior art. “In IPR, there’s a limited record so there’s not a lot of testing to examine, and two tests were submitted in the Delaware case,” Aly said. While that could have been enough, he noted that, in the Fresenius Kabi case, multiple companies had done more than 20 tests, all of which showed that the claimed advances were inherent to the stable product.

The Federal Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Timothy Dyk, Evan Wallach and Richard Taranto determined that the PTAB’s decision to uphold patent claims challenged by WhatsApp as nonobvious wasn’t supported by substantial evidence and that the PTAB didn’t properly consider expert testimony provided by WhatsApp… Here the prior art references that supplied all of the claim limitations and the Federal Circuit found that testimony from expert witnesses on both sides supported the idea that video and multimedia content was better at conveying more powerful messages than text or still photos.

Today the flash of creative genius test has reared its ugly head once more, this time as a consideration under a patent eligibility inquiry and 35 U.S.C. 101 instead of under an obviousness inquiry and 35 U.S.C. 103. Today, thanks to the Supreme Court’s unintelligible Alice/Mayo framework, one must ask whether significantly more has been added to a patent claim such that the claim does not merely claim an abstract idea, law of nature or natural phenomenon. This final step in the Alice/Mayotest is referred to by the Courts as the hunt for the inventive concept. It is difficult not to notice the similarity between this hunt for the inventive concept that takes place when reviewing a claim under 101 and the supposedly defunct flash of creative genius test Congress attempted to write out of patent law in 1952.

Perhaps Rovi will take the opportunity to test the waters with the newly created Precedential Opinion Panel (POP), which is intended to bring uniformity between examination procedures and the PTAB at the USPTO. USPTO Director Andrei Iancu has promulgated new Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and new claim interpretations rules will soon be in effect at the PTAB. A patent litigator by training, Director Iancu seems very interested in the PTAB giving other tribunals that have previously considered validity matters due consideration, something the PTAB has rarely, if ever, done. With the creation of the POP, and new SOPs that give the Director the authority to make decisions of the PTAB precedential at his discretion, this string of Rovi cases could present a very interesting test case on whether the PTAB actually will provide deference to tribunals that have previously considered validity issues, or whether the PTAB with its lower threshold for invalidity will continue to be the court of last resort for infringers who have lost elsewhere. 

he U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued a final office action in an ex parte reexamination of a patent owned by Google self-driving car development subsidiary Waymo. As a result of the reexamination, Waymo stands to lose 53 of 56 claims, including all 20 of the patent claims originally issued. The patent in question had been asserted as part of the company’s well-known infringement suit filed against Uber.

Hindsight bias, the phenomenon that things seem more predictable and obvious after they have occurred, is one of the most widely-studied “decision traps” in psychology… Patent litigation plays right into such human limitations, which affect judges and jurors alike. Patents are often litigated many years after the invention was made, and very often those who are accused of patent infringement will argue that the invention was obvious at the time it was made and a patent was applied for… And we accept a surprising amount of other conjecture in this analysis. For example, judges and jurors are told about a contemporaneous hypothetical person that – despite having only ordinary skill in the relevant technology – would have had super-human knowledge of all then-existing technical information, was fluent in every language under the sun, and would have done insane things to access information sources.

Join Gene Quinn, founder and president of IPWatchdog.com, for a free webinar discussion on responding to obviousness rejections and convincing examiners there is more to the claimed invention than the sum of its parts. Joining Gene will be John White, patent attorney and procedure expert.

The Federal Circuit reversed the District of Delaware’s decision to invalidate Orexo’s opioid treatment patent as obvious because obviousness was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, the Court pointed to the absence of a teaching in the prior art that citric acid could serve as a carrier particle for the drug agonist.  The Court also noted that the lower court improperly discounted evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness.

The focus of the appeal is the need for clarity with respect to hopelessly irreconcilable caselaw on the issue of single reference obviousness… Decisions from the Federal Circuit have created an irreconcilable split within the Federal Circuit itself regarding the proper approach to obviousness determinations, American Vehicular Sciences argues. Indeed, many commentators (ourselves included) have noticed that now more than ever on a variety of issues the outcome of a decision at the Federal Circuit is completely dependent on the panel assigned to the case. While that has been a criticism of the Federal Circuit for some time, it increasingly seems outcomes are arbitrary, capricious and wholly unpredictable— at least until you know who the judges are who will decide the case.

MPEP 2141 actually cites to Arendi, but then quotes the case entirely out of context. This is a worrisome problem that can be found in many parts of the MPEP, which makes the MPEP a useful reference tool to find relevant cases, but as useful as an opponent’s brief when it comes to accurately characterizing the holdings of decisions. For example, MPEP 2141 actually cites Arendi for the proposition that common sense can be used to supply a missing limitation from the prior art in an obviousness rejection. That, however, is the exact opposite proposition for which the case actually stands.

The idea that all software is obvious is a theoretical argument that doesn’t just border on the scattological, it wades right into the sewer. Consider artificial intelligence. If AI, which requires the use of software algorithms, is supposed to augment human intelligence and provide us with answers to questions we can’t figure out without the use of AI, how is that at all obvious? What about IBM’s Watson cognitive computing platform? … When the highest court in the land incorporates such backward-minded patterns of thought which allows them to say that “At its most basic, a computer is just a calculator capable of performing mental steps faster than a human could,” the U.S. patent system must be a relative paradise to Duda and other anti-patent Luddites who believe that software inventions cannot and should not be patentable at all.

In Praxair Distribution v. Mallinckrodt Hospital Products, Praxair petitioned for inter partes review of claims 1-19 of the ’112 patent, which the Board instituted. The Board held that claims 1-8 and 10-19 would have been obvious over four prior art references. However, claim 9 survived. Praxair appealed from the Board’s decision regarding claim 9, and Mallinckrodt cross-appealed regarding claims 1-8 and 10-11. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision holding claims 1-8 and 10 unpatentable as obvious. Judge Newman concurred in judgment of unpatentability of claims 1-11, but disagreed with the Court’s view of the “printed matter doctrine” and its application to “information” and “mental steps.”

The PTAB found the claims in question obvious for two reasons. First, in its primary ruling the PTAB held that there was no prosecution disclaimer, finding the “single entry” limitation of the claims to include text selection by a user, which was clearly within the prior art. The PTAB reasoned that claims these claims were not limited by the prosecution record, but to do this the PTAB had to ignore both the patent examiner’s Reasons for Allowance and the argument made by the applicant in the Remarks. Rather inexplicably, citing Sorensen v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 427 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the PTAB ruled that it is up to the applicant to disclaim scope, not the examiner. But such a rationale simply ignored the facts on the record, namely that the reason the examiner explained the claims were allowed was precisely because of the argument made in the Remarks. Therefore, it was the applicant that specifically gave up that claim scope, as required to establish a prosecution disclaimer.