Posts Tagged: "obviousness"

On December 27, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) Judge Jimmie Reyna authored an opinion affirming the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware’s finding that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,265,760 (‘760) and 9,339,499 (‘499), both titled “Treating Pain in Patients with Hepatic Impairment,” held by Persion Pharmaceuticals LLC,  were invalid due to obviousness. The CAFC found no reversible error in the district court’s decision and therefore affirmed.

In November, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion reversing the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (the PTAB or the Board) decision that claim 8 of IPR Licensing Inc.’s (IPRL) wireless communications patent—U.S. Patent No. 8,380,244 (the ‘244 Patent)—was unpatentable as obvious. The Board’s obviousness finding as to claim 8 was erroneous as it relied on a prior art reference that IPRL could neither anticipate nor rebut. Furthermore, its finding was, for the second time, unsupported by substantial evidence. See In re IPR Licensing, Inc. (Fed Cir. Nov. 22, 2019) (Before Newman, O’Malley, and Taranto, Circuit Judges) (Opinion for the Court, O’Malley, Circuit Judge).

On November 23, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reversed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB) ruling in a pair of inter partes review (IPR), which had invalidated all claims of two related patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 9,014,243 and 8,718,158. TQ Delta, the patent owner, appealed the PTAB’s holding that all claims of the challenged patents would have been obvious when viewed in light of the prior art references, including U.S. Patent Nos. 6,144,696 (Shively) and 6,625,219 (Stopler), asserted by Cisco System Inc. and the other appellees (collectively, “Cisco”). Admissibility of evidence, claim construction, and due process were among several other challenges raised by TQ Delta on appeal. Because the PTAB’s determination of obviousness was not supported by substantial evidence, the CAFC reversed.

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reviewed an appeal of the PTAB’s final decision that Game and Technology Co. Ltd.’s (GAT) Patent No. 7,682,243 (the ‘243 patent) was obvious over the prior art, and that inter partes review (IPR) was not barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). The CAFC held that the PTAB properly asserted that claims 1-7 of patent ‘243 were obvious in light of the prior art and that an IPR was not barred because the petitioner, Wargaming Group Limited (Wargaming), was not properly served with a complaint alleging infringement of the [‘243] patent over a year before it filed its petition for an IPR.

On November 13, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) heard an appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California in the case of Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. (Seirus). Columbia appealed the judgment from a jury trial holding claims 2 and 23 of U.S. Patent 8,453,270 (the ‘270 patent) invalid as anticipated and obvious. Seirus cross-appealed from a grant of summary judgment by the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, holding tSeirushat Seirus infringed U.S. Design Patent No. D657,093 (the ‘093 patent). The CAFC affirmed that claims 2 and 23 of the ‘270 patent were invalid, reversed the summary judgment decision against Seirus for infringement of the ‘093 patent and remanded for further proceedings on the design patent.

On October 23, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that Google failed to meet its burden of establishing that Koninklijke Philips’ patent claims at issue were unpatentable on either of two grounds: 1) anticipation by Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) International Application Publication No. 98/52187 (the Tucker invention), or 2) obviousness over Tucker in view of the prior art. n 2016, Google petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for inter partes review (IPR) of Claims 10-16 and 20-21 of U.S. Patent No. 6,772,114 (the ’114 patent) owned by Philips, entitled “High Frequency and Low Frequency Audio Signal Encoding and Decoding System.” In 2018, the PTAB issued a final written decision holding that Google had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 10-16, 20, and 21 of the ‘114 patent were unpatentable.

A petition for certiorari was filed on October 1 in the case of Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services asking the question: “Whether a new and specific method of diagnosing a medical condition is patent-eligible subject matter, where the method detects a molecule never previously linked to the condition using novel man-made molecules and a series of specific chemical steps never previously performed.” The petitioners hinge their argument throughout the brief on the novel beneficial utility of their claimed method…. However, benefit has not always carried the day in recent eligibility analyses….. Patent eligibility, considered to be the most important question facing the patent system, poses insidious problems under current jurisprudence to some of the most beneficial cutting-edge technology available today. What is most curious is that this problem apparently can be solved simply by reaching back to the foundations of modern patent law and the underlying requirement that inventions be “useful,” a term that has been baked into the statutory provisions since the first patent act.

In Knauf Insulation, Inc. v. Rockwool International, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s determination in an inter partes reexamination that certain patent claims for two of Knauf’s patents covering fibrous products and related methods and binder and fiber glass products were obvious. The Court also found that certain other claims of the two patents were not unpatentable as obvious, and Rockwool International cross-appealed that determination, but the Court held that Rockwool did not have standing to cross-appeal and thus dismissed it. The decision was not precedential, but some have commented that the Court’s holding with respect to Rockwool’s lack of standing for a cross-appeal could have significant implications.

As I noted in part one of my talk at the IPWatchdog Patent Masters Symposium, the validity statistics for SEPs do not look very good at first glance. Thus, according to a 2017 PricewaterhouseCoopers study, plaintiffs in U.S. courts (ignoring patent type) have on average a 33% chance of success—only a 27% chance in the case of telecommunications patents. This chance of success is probably overstated for Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), based on the easy availability of prior art. Indeed, according to RPX’s 2014 study, in the United States, SEPs are likely to be less than half as successful as non-SEPs.In my talk, I pointed to the high invalidation rates in Europe to buttress my point that, at first glance, SEPs seem particularly vulnerable to validity challenges. Thus, in Germany, a supposed nirvana for patent assertion, the authors of the study “Patent Paper Tigers” reviewed the case law of the German Federal Patent Court and the German Federal Court of Justice in nullity matters in the period from 2010 to 2013 and found that: The nullification rate of all Senates of the German Federal Patent Court is 79.08% in total; and the nullification rate at the German Federal Patent Court regarding Software and Telecom patents which are (currently) of particular relevance from an economic point of view is 88.11%. Returning to the point made in the first part of my talk, having noted that most SEP nullification comes from obviousness, and not novelty, there should be no public interest exception to my argument that: unprovoked—that is, without first having made a FRAND offer or counteroffer—serial nullification of SEPs is contrary to the duty to negotiate in good faith and should remove a party’s defense against an injunction to SEPs.

Now, there is a flaw in this theory, and that is that, in the past few years, third parties have emerged that will—for their members or other contracted entities—kill patents.

The Federal Circuit recently affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court decision holding that Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc.’s (“Actavis’s”) generic Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) product infringed claims of patents owned by Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals (“Nalpropion”) and that the asserted claims were not invalid. The Court found that the district court did not err in finding that Nalpropion’s U.S. Patent No. 8,916,195 (“the ’195 patent”) was not invalid for lack of written description, but that the district court did err in finding that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,375,111 (“the ’111 patent”) and 7,462,626 (“the ’626 patent”) were not obvious in view of the prior art.

The case of Celgene Corp. v. Peter, Nos. 2018-1167 et al. (Fed. Cir. July 30, 2019) has drawn attention for its decision that inter partes review (IPR) may be applied to invalidate pre-AIA patents without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of taking property without just compensation. Matthew Rizzolo and Kathryn Thornton, among others, have addressed the constitutional aspects of the decision. I will address the lesser issues decided by the Federal Circuit panel before it could reach those constitutional aspects. In particular, the Federal Circuit panel upheld the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB’s) conclusion that the claims in question were obvious. And, perhaps focusing upon the sparkling constitutional issue, the panel first had to address the mundane issues of obviousness; and in disposing of the obviousness issues, the panel set forth an analysis that is unclear at best and is in its present form arguably inconsistent with precedent and public policy.

When obviousness of a patent claim is at issue, some experts may opine along these lines: “Therefore, the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” Whether such is common practice or not, testimony of this sort ought not to be allowed. Such testimony should be objected to and stricken as irrelevant. In cases involving a jury, a motion in limine ought to be used to prevent such testimony from coming before a jury. Experts are fact witnesses that are, like all fact and other witnesses, allowed to testify to what they saw, what they heard, and what they did. Unlike other witnesses, however, expert witnesses are further allowed to express opinions within the fields of their expertise. Experts’ expertise comes from having specialized knowledge, education, training, or experience.

Have you ever worked with a lay inventor who had a hard time dealing with obviousness under U.S. patent law? Many patent lawyers have. It is one of the greatest ironies in patent law: obviousness is not obvious. Lay people struggle with the concept of patent-related obviousness all the time. It is easy to understand their confusion. As lay people see it, an inventor can create and claim something that has never before been patented by anyone, has never been sold by anyone, has never been built by anyone, and has never even been publicly described by anyone; and can nevertheless be denied a patent “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” (This is a quotation from the post-AIA statute, 35 USC § 103(a), though language in the pre-AIA statute 35 USC § 103 is similar, obviously.)

Last week, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, held an oversight hearing on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) with Director Andre Iancu as the sole witness. A particular inquiry from Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) regarding the USPTO’s allegedly lax examination quality under 35 U.S.C. § 112 caught my attention. She remarked [at 1:33:30]:  “Theranos, the blood testing company whose founder is being investigated for fraud, was granted nearly 100 patents based on an invention that didn’t work; and it concerns me that a patent application for an invention that doesn’t work gets approved.”  She generally questioned examiners’ attention to Section 112 requirements. Rep. Lofgren’s statement was no doubt primed by information from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in the Ars Technica blog post titled “Theranos: How a broken patent system sustained its decade-long deception.” In this article, the author, who was introduced as holding the “Mark Cuban Chair to Eliminate Stupid Patents” at EFF, declares with no evidence or proof, that the “USPTO generally does a terrible job of ensuring that applications meet the utility and enablement standards.” The article cited no study, identified no patent, nor any claim to any “invention that didn’t work.” This outrageous, baseless allegation is outright reckless and irresponsible.

The Federal Circuit recently reversed a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) finding claims of a patent owned by PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC to be invalid.  Apple, Inc. (Apple) petitioned for inter partes review (IPR), and the Board found certain claims of the patent to be invalid as obvious in light of two references.  The Federal Circuit reversed, holding the Board provided insufficient evidence to support a finding of inherency.  Pers. Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 2018-1599, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 6919 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2019) (Before Moore, Taranto, and Chen, Circuit Judges) (Opinion for the Court, Chen, Circuit Judge).