Alice with Lion and Unicorn from “Through the Looking Glass,” published 1871.
Reading the merits briefs of Alice Corp., CLS Bank and many amici induces the strange feeling that there are multiple, parallel universes operating, and it is hard to know which one you are in. Are you in a universe in which Alice’s claims are for a software invention or a business method? Where software has always been patent eligible or has never patent eligible? Where the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is absolutely clear and consistent over the past 150 years or entirely murky and at odds with itself? Of course, it would be foolish to expect universal agreement on a topic that is controversial, and we expect nothing less than zealous advocacy from lawyers. Instead of summarizing the briefs individually, I’ve organized my analysis by topics, looking at particular issues and what various briefs argue, and whether those arguments hold up or not.
Framing the Debate: The Question Presented
The fractured views of the world begin with the question presented, and reflect how different parties frame the debate in very different terms. Alice’s merits brief presents the question before the Court as “whether claims to computer implemented inventions…are patent-eligible.” Putting the question this way allows Alice to place its inventions and claims in the larger context of all computer-implemented inventions, the subtext being that if the Supreme Court holds that computer-implemented inventions are patent eligible—which is a fair bet—then Alice’s patents should be valid. Further, phrasing it this way allows Alice to distance itself from pure business method claims from the invalid claims in Bilski v. Kappos.
There are numerous briefs listed on the ABA’s brief publication webpage for Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank that are filed in support of the respondent, most of which make specious claims about software patents blocking innovation, or which make arguments that claims that specifically recite computers, data storage units, devices and more are somehow abstract and imaginary. These arguments should be easy enough to dispose of as ridiculous on their face, but who knows how the Supreme Court will respond. Still, one would hope that the Supreme Court would notice that neither patents generally or software patents specifically have done anything to block innovation in the smartphone industry.
Whereas the Alice supporters feel that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s issuance of software patents are important for protecting and spurring innovation in many fields, the supporters of CLS Bank have largely responded that software patents hurt innovation. But that can’t be! One of the areas critics always say has been allegedly hamstrung by patents, the smartphones industry, is barely over 6 years old. Have patents stopped innovation of smartphones? Hardly. In fact, with every new version companies tout just how much more the phones do and how they are so far superior to the previous model. Thus, it is easy to see that those claiming that software patents block innovation simply ignore market reality and how the functionality of current devices (which is thanks to software) match up with previous generations of devices over the last 6 years. Corporate critics must also ignore their own marketing of new smartphones, which directly contradicts the ridiculous claim that software patents are preventing innovation. Still they make these and other specious arguments as if they are true.
Much of this negativism is based on the poor job the US patent examiners have done in weeding out those many patent applications where the so-called invention is just one of the almost infinite, but obvious, ways one can automate a manual or semi-automatic process or procedure. But there are also true inventions that use a computer as part, or all, of the implementation of the invention. There is no reason to throw out the baby with the bathwater. So it is of utmost importance that we examine the many falsehoods related to software patents.
In this new article I intend to provide facts about software and the software industry to debunk these misnomers, myths, misconceptions, and just pure misunderstandings about “software patents”.
Former CAFC Chief Judge Paul Michel filed an amicus brief in Alice v. CLS Bank.
In a few weeks, the Supreme Court of the United States will begin to hear arguments in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. This case involves the very basics of U.S. patent law, namely what is considered patent eligible, and will have wide-reaching effects in the American technological sector. The case before the Court will ask it to decide upon the patent eligibility of software based on the most foundational aspects of patent law: Section 101 of U.S. Code Title 35. If a category of innovation is not patent eligible under Section 101 it does not matter whether the invention is highly useful, new and non-obvious. In fact, an invention can even be pioneering and revolutionary and not deserve a patent if it is deemed patent ineligible under Section 101. Because a determination that an entire area of technological pursuit can be deemed patent ineligible under Section 101 historically that has been only infrequently used so as to not unnecessarily kill innovative developments in their infancy.
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has shown far more willingness to find things patent ineligible, which is a disturbing trend. In fact, In Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court conflated Section 101 with 102 to say that something that a patent claim that does not related to a law of nature was still nevertheless patent ineligible as a law of nature because the additional steps added that made it different than a law of nature were merely conventional. Up until Mayo such an analysis had been mandated by the Supreme Court to occur under Section 102. Indeed, the statute the Supreme Court ostensibly must follow requires novelty and conventionality to be addressed under 102. Thus, as the result of Mayo, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad, there is great concern about the future of patent eligibility because it seems the Supreme Court now seems to prefer to find inventions patent ineligible without the mandated statutory analysis under 102, 103 and 112.
Software innovations are ubiquitous in our country, in use by machines and systems from consumer devices on to basic utility grids. There are numerous individuals who are keenly interested in the outcome of this case, and many have volunteered to participate and provide their insight, opinions and arguments to the Supreme Court. With this in mind we wanted to share some of the most informative amicus curiae briefs that have been filed with the U.S. Supreme Court. We have already published articles about the IBM amicus brief, the brief filed by the Solicitor General and the Trading Technologies amici brief joined by another 45 companies. Now as a part of our ongoing coverage of this case, we’ll look at what several other interested parties have to say about the patentability of software, and how our country’s patent system should be treating this issue.
EDITORIAL NOTE: A diverse group of 46 amici, spearheaded by Trading Technologies International, filed an excellent amici brief worth reading in Alice v. CLS Bank at the United States Supreme Court. The Summary of the Argument is republished here with permission. Charles J. Cooper is the Counsel of Record, but is joined on the brief by Vincent J. Colatriano and William C. Marra (both of Cooper & Kirk), as well as Steven Borsand and Jay Knobloch (both of Trading Technologies)
In keeping with the Constitution’s expansive grant to Congress of power to secure for “Inventors” exclusive patent rights to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, Congress has since 1790 broadly defined the subject matter of inventions eligible for patent protection. For nearly as long, this Court has applied exceptions, of its own making, to Congress’s designation of these “broad patent-eligibility principles.” Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). This case focuses on one of those judicial exceptions – the “abstract ideas” exception.
The Court granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether claims to computer-implemented inventions – including claims to systems and machines, processes, and items of manufacture – are directed to patent-eligible subject matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted by this Court?” Importantly, the patent claims in this case do not recite “a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it,”  Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Co. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939), and no court below entertained any evidence relating to whether the claims are novel and non-obvious under Sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act. Thus, the question here is whether computer-implemented inventions that are not directed to a scientific truth should be deemed ineligible even if such inventions are novel, non-obvious, and otherwise patentable. 
In a few weeks the United States Supreme Court will hold oral arguments in Alice v. CLS Bank. At stake in this case is the future of software patents. Half of the Federal Circuit de facto ruled that software is patent ineligible. Of course they could not come right out and say that because it would contradict both settled Supreme Court precedent and patent laws enacted by Congress and codified in Title 35 of the United States Code. Nevertheless, the undeniable position of half of the Federal Circuit was that software is not patent eligible because to these Judges none of the claiming techniques that are used to write software patent claims result in patent eligible subject matter being claimed.
In preparation for the oral arguments we are shifting through the briefs. I have already written about the IBM brief, see Supreme Court “Abstract Idea Doctrine” is Unworkable. We plan multiple articles leading up to the oral argument that discusses the various briefs filed, and complete coverage of the oral arguments. Today, however, I write about the brief of the United States Government filed by the Solicitor General, which is simply disingenuous.
Truthfully, to call the Solicitor’s brief disingenuous is being charitable. The logic, if you can call it that, necessary for the Solicitor’s arguments to be correct is extraordinarily tortured, not to mention circular and dependent upon itself for support. The premise of the argument made by the Government is simply false. The Solicitor tells the Supreme Court that the patent claims in question are to an abstract idea, which is flat wrong. But in a bizarre twist the Solicitor pivots to then say that what is covered is not an abstract idea but it is not necessary for there to be an abstract idea protected in order for the claim to be patent ineligible as an abstract idea. Sadly, I’m not making this up.
What follows is the Introduction and Summary of the Argument included in the IBM amicus brief filed at the United States Supreme Court in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International. While many attorneys contributed to this brief, as you will see them listed on the front cover, former Solicitor General of the United States Paul D. Clement is the Counsel of Record.
I think it is fair to say that the theme that comes through the loudest in the IBM brief is this: The abstract idea doctrine is unworkable. To that I say a resounding AMEN! If the Supreme Court cannot or will not tell us what an abstract idea is how can we any longer pretend that the jurisprudential path the Court has taken will lead to predictability? At least insofar as software is concerned there is a complete and total lack of predictability. There is also no uniform application of the law, which at least conceptually should raise concerns of disparate treatment of those similarly situated.
Below I provide additional thoughts on the IBM Summary of the Argument in the format of comments from the peanut gallery, or perhaps as a patent law equivalent to Mystery Science Theater 3000. In order to differentiate my thoughts/comments from IBM amicus brief, my comments are italicized, colored, indented and tagged with the IPWatchdog logo.
On January 6, 2014, I had an on the record conversation with Donald Chisum and Janice Mueller, both exceptional and well known patent scholars in their own right. Together Chisum and Mueller form the faculty of the Chisum Academy, which offers a three-day intense seminar that is limited to ten (10) participants.
In part 1 of the interview we discussed patent reform and started to discuss patent eligibility, particularly as it relates to software. We pick up the discussion there.
QUINN:In looking back, Justice Stevens’ decision in Bilski had pieces that would have made for a much easier régime to live under because he did say in one in particular area that the innovation in question in State Street was patentable because it was a device. I’m optimistic that we’re going to get something good out of the Supreme Court in CLS Bank. But having said that, I’m still worried, because it seems to me that they totally missed the boat in Mayo where they said we’re not going to follow the solicitor’s invitation to let sections 102, 103, or 112 invalidate that claim. That wasn’t really an invitation, that’s what the statute mandates and up until then Mayo that was always what the Supreme Court had mandated. So you just never know what you’re going to get from the Supreme Court, but I can’t imagine we’re going to get anything less intelligible than the Federal Circuit en banc decision in CLS Bank. Now Janice, you have spent a lot of time teaching patent law to students. How would you describe that decision to people who are new to this field?