Posts Tagged: "patent license"

Covenant Not to Challenge clauses are common in patent licenses, including licenses that are part of post-litigation settlements. clause is seen as a benefit bargained for under a license agreement and constitutes part of the consideration obtained by the licensor for the license. The intended effect of such a clause is to allow the licensor to make an estoppel argument in the event that licensee does challenge the patent, in spite of its agreement not to do so. However, the PTAB thus concluded that without an express grant from Congress, it did not have the authority to recognize contractual estoppel as a bar to an inter partes review.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC (2015) rejuvenates a 50-year-old rule that limits collecting patent royalties after a patent expires. On June 22, 2015, the Court upheld its per se Brulotte rule that bars a patent licensor’s collection of royalties for the use of a claimed invention beyond the expiration date of the underlying patent. The Court directly addressed criticisms of this rule, which originated in its Brulotte v. Thys Co. (1964) decision, and foreclosed any speculation about the continued viability of Brulotte’s bright-line rule in current practice.

While some companies continue to wait and see, we saw a dramatic shift in late 2014. The most sophisticated companies on IP matters used the uncertainty to their advantage. They hypothesized the market couldn’t get much worse, and since they would eventually need to engage in licensing discussions, they used the negotiation leverage they had during a slow market to get the best deal. Similar to a “buyer’s market” in real estate, the IP market was (and continues to be for some) a licensee’s market as many companies sit back and wait to see how the uncertainty will shake out.

Now more than ever succeeding is all about making better products and offering new and improved services quicker and more reliably than your competitors. Surprisingly, at a time when many major technology corporations are struggling to innovate, we see utter disdain for patent owners. Void from the discussion is any perspective on the real problems facing American companies – namely innovating to obtain a competitive advantage and set themselves apart from the competitors they have today and the competitors they will surely have tomorrow. Increased patent licensing, or outright acquisition of patents, will not only help, but will likely become essential for those companies who understand the importance of continually squeezing out innovation as fast and efficiently as possible.

Gulbrandsen’s chief complaint with the U.S. system centers around the fact that it has become enormously easy to challenge issued patents once they have been granted. In fact, organizations in pursuit of acquired technology are leveraging the kill-rate at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), to negotiate lower licensing payments. Threats are made that patents will be challenged in Inter Partes review, “so that you amend the license and reduce the fees,” Gulbrandsen explained. “So, immediately you know that devalues the patent and devalues the license agreement that you’ve got.”

To hear the rhetoric from lobbyists for some large tech companies you would think patent licensing is some sort of shady business, akin to extortion. Never mind the hypocrisy inherent in these same firms earning tens of millions of dollars annually licensing their own patents — most of which are never used in their own products — to other companies. The truth is that patent licensing is as American as apple pie, and always has been.

This patenting step is absolutely crucial for the commercialization of inventions. In the absence of a strong intellectual property system – specifically patents – most of those inventions will never see the light of day. Why is that? The answer is quite simple – the cost to develop those inventions to a marketable product are significant and in the absence of intellectual property protections that the patent system provides, no one will ever invest in the promise of an invention. Said another way, how many of you would invest in a company that will spend tens to hundreds of millions of dollars on a product knowing that a competitor will be free to offer the same product at a fraction of the cost since they invested substantially less in R&D?

Universities are dependent upon the U.S. patent system and the capacity of that system to protect the legitimate intellectual property rights of individual university inventors and large companies alike. This system drives U.S. innovation and our economic competitiveness in the world. Patents provide universities with the means to ensure that many discoveries resulting from research are transferred to the private sector where those discoveries can be turned into innovative products and processes that power our economy, create jobs, and improve quality of life.

Fortunately, a new study showing that academic patent licensing contributed more than $1 trillion to the U.S. economy over eighteen years blows the stuffing right out of that straw man. We can only hope Congress gets the message before it turns the patent system into a weapon to squash inventors.

The U.S. economy is full of intermediaries everywhere you look. But for some reason we have demonized the intermediaries in the market for innovation. Think of it this way. Most people buy their groceries at a grocery story. That grocery store does not grow any of the vegetables, raise the meat, nor catch the fish. It is simply an intermediary. Now I can see why from the point of view of a manufacturer the PAE may be a nuisance. But from the inventor’s point of view the PAE is a valuable intermediary.

In a case located at the intersection of bankruptcy and IP law, the Third Circuit ruled that, under the terms of a contract, Walt Disney Studios Motion Picture Production and its affiliates did not acquire a perpetual worldwide license to use patents to convert conventional films into 3D.

They found that citations were elevated for licensed patents. Moreover, most citations occurred after the patent was licensed. That licensing of patented technology increases its diffusion and relevance more broadly is supported by Drivas et al. (2014), who found that citations by non–licensees to patents exclusively licensed (either by geographic area or field of use) by the University of California increased after the licenses were executed. These are objective empirical indicia – not subjective responses of accused infringers to selective surveys.

There are a variety of problems with this paper, the conclusions reached and the methodology. Perhaps the largest problem is that Professors Feldman and Lemley rely on subjective evidence rather than volumes of objective evidence that contradict the self-serving responses from those who are licensing rights they are already infringing. What else would you suspect from a homogenous subset of individuals who collectively don’t like the patent system very much? Collective bias seems a far more likely answer as to why there is “near unanimity,” as the Professors claim. Even so, how is it possible that any group could ever achieve near unanimity about anything? The fact that there was near unanimity demands one to question whether there is a bias or flaw in the survey, yet no such inquiry seems to have been made.

LES is focused on licensing standards, which will also define best practices to separate patent owners with good behavior from bad behaviors. The committees also contemplate establishing template documents for transactions. The overall idea is that these standards, best practices, and template documents will become the foundation for an accreditation process. And so, yes, we absolutely encourage anyone to join the discussion as it’s being framed now but all participants need to recognize that to meet the standards and accreditation requirements you are going to be accountable yourself to the standards that are defined by these programs.

At the heart of the Patent Utility is an advanced semantic search engine that identifies the technologies that are relevant to any individual business or entity. The analytical processes behind the semantic search engine will capture text-based information about a company both from publicly available sources and the company itself. This information will typically include product specifications, description of core technologies, identification of key competitors, and research and development priorities. The information is then processed and analyzed against the entire active U.S. patent database, which currently stands at 2.3 million patents and millions of pending applications. The process cross-references the company’s products, components, services, materials, methods and processes with specific patents and claims in the U.S. patent database. The more closely the patent claims relate to a company’s information, the more relevant the patent containing those claims is.