Posts Tagged: "Phillips standard"

In its decision, the Federal Circuit noted that the PTAB is entitled to strike arguments improperly raised in a reply brief under 37 CFR § 42.23(b). However, the appellate court disagreed that Ericsson raised a new theory in its reply brief and thus the Board erred in not considering those portions of the reply brief. “The Board’s error was parsing Ericsson’s arguments on reply with too fine of a filter,” the Federal Circuit found. Ericsson’s petition for IPR described how a person with ordinary skill in the art would be familiar with the concept of interleaving. The CAFC further found that the PTAB’s error was exacerbated by the fact that the new claim constructions proposed by Intellectual Ventures after institution gave rise to the significance of interleaving in the proceeding. In light of this, the Federal Circuit found that Ericsson deserved an opportunity to respond to the new construction.

The proposed rule would adopt the narrower standard articulated by the Federal Circuit in Phillips v. AWH Corp., where the “words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Additionally, under the proposed approach, the Patent Office would construe patent claims and proposed claims based on the record of AIA proceeding, and take into account the claim language, specification, and prosecution history. In response to the Patent Office’s notice of proposed rulemaking, the New York Intellectual Property Law Association (NYIPLA) recently submitted comments endorsing the Patent Office’s proposed changes.

Congresswoman Lofgren is now opposing a rule change she previously endorsed as an original co-sponsor of a bill that would have changed the claim construction rule in exactly the same way proposed by Director Iancu… But how is adopting a rule that would have already been the law had Lofgren had her way possibly frustrate or disregard Congress? Of course, we aren’t supposed to ask that question. Once the “patent troll” boogeyman card is played everything else is supposed to fade away.

Congresswoman Lofgren seems quick to forget that she was one of the original co-sponsors of the Innovation Act when it was introduced into the House back in February 2015. Had the Innovation Act passed, it would have required patents challenged in IPR proceedings to be construed in the exact same manner that a district court would have required in a civil action to invalidate the patent. So, it seems Lofgren was for the Phillips standard and eliminating BRI before she was against it.

found it disturbing that the Director Iancu would circumvent the prerogative of Congress with recently announced proposed PTAB claim construction changes, though she admitted the decision wasn’t unlawful. She expounded for several minutes on issues of res judicata, which could tie the hands of the PTAB in light of district court or U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) decisions regarding patent validity. “[This] would completely blow up what we were trying to do as a Congress,” Lofgren said. “It looks to me that the people who disagreed with [the AIA] and lost in the Congress, they went to the Supreme Court, they lost in the Supreme Court, and now they’re going to you, and you are reversing what the Congress decided to do and what the Court said was permissible to do.”

Earlier today USPTO Director Andrei Iancu testified at an Oversight Hearing before the House Judiciary Committee. In addition to detailing forthcoming changes to post grant proceedings, Director Iancu fielded many questions on patent eligibility. “The issue is very significant. It is significant to the Office, to our applicants, and it is significant to the entire industry,” Iancu responded to Congressman Collins. “In some areas of technology, it is unclear what is patentable and what is not, and that can depress innovation in those particular areas. Our plan at the PTO is to work within Supreme Court jurisprudence to try and provide better guidelines. What we think is in and what we think is out, and provide, hopefully, forward looking guidance that helps examiners and the public understand what at least from the PTO’s point of view we think is right.”

“In our time together today we are going to try and take stock of the health of the American patent system,” Michel began. “It is important to remember that the patent system was founded in the Constitution… and although the world ‘right’ appears many times in the Bill of Rights, in the original Constitution the only ‘right’ mentioned is the patent right.”… Investment is being disincentivized by uncertainty created by the aforementioned three waves of changes to the system. We should be looking at the impact on the flow of money, Michel explained.

The Court held that the Board improperly continued to apply the BRI standard following the expiration. While the examiner properly applied the BRI prior to expiration, the BRI standard no longer applies the moment the patent expires – even if it means the Board applies a different standard than the examiner.

Congress can, and should, take at least four steps in restoring the health and vitality of our patent system: First, Congress should ensure that the patent grant is meaningful and valuable in the first instance. Second, Congress should reaffirm the exclusive nature of the patent grant. Third, Congress should clarify, and perhaps legislatively overrule, the cases addressing patent eligible subject matter, Alice, Mayo, and Myriad. Fourth, and finally, Congress should tread extremely carefully in the realm of so-called patent litigation reform.

A good argument can be made that a given panel of PTAB judges will construe claims in the manner that makes most sense to them, regardless of the legal rubric they are assigned. Indeed, we can draw a direct analogy from the experience following the Supreme Court’s decision in Teva v. Sandoz on the degree of appellate deference to be accorded to a district court’s claim construction. Notwithstanding decades of anticipation surrounding that issue, there has been little practical effect on the outcomes of litigations or appeals as a result of Teva. District court judges and Federal Circuit panels still approach claim construction issues in essentially the same way they did before. It seems likely that the use of BRI versus plain and ordinary meaning in inter partes review proceedings will also turn out to be much ado about nothing.

It seems difficult to reconcile the Respondent’s principal argument that two standards should still apply: that is, that the PTAB should be permitted to continue applying its policy-derived broad BRI standard for construing patent claim scope in Congressionally mandated “adjudicative” IPR proceedings while still using the lower preponderance of the evidence standard provided under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). The notion that the USPTO may “infer” such intent to also apply the BRI in the absence of any express guidance from Congress was weak, at best. Especially because having two such claim construction standards applied by Article III courts and the ITC on the one hand, and the USPTO’s unilateral application of an “examination” claim construction standard in an intended “adjudication” setting on the other hand, has already led to inequitable and presumably non-appealable results.

On one hand, logic dictates that the broader the interpretation of the claim, the more extensive the array of relevant prior art—and in turn the more likely that the claim will be held invalid in light of that prior art. On the other hand, evaluating whether the Board’s use of the BRI protocol in an IPR claim construction will lead to “different results” than the plain and ordinary meaning construction used by federal courts in claim construction is complicated by the relatively scant evidence on the subject, and the inevitable fact that this evidence is naturally dependent on particular prior art and invalidity and obviousness arguments specific to a particular patent. Even putting aside the question of what impact a different claim construction standard may have in an IPR, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies will not address several powerful differences between an IPR and district court litigation that impact whether a particular patent claim survives.

Unified Patents Inc. explained in its amicus brief in Cuozzo Speed v. Lee that “[t]he phrase ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ describes the same procedure applied in both the PTO and by the courts.” An inconvenient truth for Cuozzo — but a truth nonetheless. Gene attacked Unified Patent’s position here last Sunday as “false on its face” and “unequivocally incorrect.” Those pejoratives miss the point of Unified’s brief. Unified did not argue that the courts and PTO both apply BRI in name; indeed, Cuozzo would lose his semantic gripe if that were the case. Rather, Unified argued that peeling away the Phillips and BRI labels reveals that both standards employ the same procedure. On this point, Unified’s position is hardly controversial, and Unified is hardly alone.

In the Introduction to the Unified Patents’ brief the following statement is made: “The phrase ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ describes the same procedure applied in both the PTO and by the courts.” That statement is unequivocally incorrect. Federal district courts do not apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of an issued claim when performing a claim construction in patent litigation. Quite the opposite, district courts narrowly interpret claims in an attempt to find a true and correct construction of the claims. The law is unequivocally clear: district courts do not apply the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. It is so axiomatic that district courts use a different standard than does the USPTO when interpreting claims it is almost difficult to figure out where to begin to unravel this falsehood.