Posts Tagged: "Rapid Litigation Management LTD v. Cellzdirect"

Finnavations v. Payoneer: A Case Study Into a Broken Patent System

If you innovate and invest more than $10,000 to obtain patent protection on your idea, do you trust a government-issued patent to be a valid one?  And if you believe you have a valid patent, would you trust that government’s judicial system to protect you from sanctions for believing in its validity? These underlying assumptions provide the foundation to any system. If you purchase and obtain title to a car, stock, or real estate, you expect that title to be valid. And you expect not to be penalized for believing in that title’s validity.     For patents, it’s quite the opposite. It has become so commonplace for government-issued patents to be invalidated after issuance, we hardly bat an eye. But with the development of Section 101 law, the patent system has turned down a twisted path—one that sanctions patent holders for believing their patent to be valid. In Finnavations LLC v. Payoneer, Inc., the U.S. District court for the District of Delaware unfortunately advanced our patent system down this path

Mayo/Alice ‘Directed to’ Inquiry and a Split Federal Circuit: Vanda Pharma v. West-Ward Pharma

In Vanda, Chief Judge Prost, one of the judges on the CellzDirect panel, dissented from the majority’s decision that found claims patent eligible for not being directed to a judicial exception in step one of the Mayo/Alice test. What differences between the claims in Vanda and those in CellzDirect led Judge Prost to dissent? Can these differences shed further light on the characteristics necessary for a claim to be found not directed to a patent-ineligible concept in step one?

The CAFC Split Non-precedential Decision in Exergen v. Kaz Raises Interesting Issues About Eligibility Determinations

In Exergen Corporation v. Kaz USA, No. 16-2315 (March 8, 2018), the Federal Circuit, in a split non-precedential opinion, affirmed a holding that Exergen’s claims directed to methods and apparatuses for detecting core body temperature were directed to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101… The majority held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that it was unconventional to use temperature scanning technology to measure arterial temperature beneath the skin… Judge Hughes dissented, arguing that the majority erred by relying on the natural law in determining inventiveness at step two… Judge Hughes seems to suggest that the correct step-two inquiry should be whether, assuming the natural phenomenon were known, it would have been conventional to combine that phenomenon with existing technology to practice the asserted claims.

How to Patent Software in a Post Alice Era

In a nutshell, if you are going to write a patent application in such a way that at the end of the it the reader is left wondering what the innovation is, what the problem being solved is, or the technical particulars on how the innovation actually solves the problem, you should not expect a patent. In other words, if you write your patent applications without actually defining the technological solution and how it is implementing the desired functionality you describe, and how that is an improvement, you will not get a patent because the claims will be patent ineligible. On the other hand, if you write your patent applications to describe (and claim) an invention that is adequately described so that someone of skill in the art will understand what is innovative (i.e., how and why), thick with technical disclosure and explanation as to how computer functionality is being improved, or even generic components are working in unconventional ways, then you will get a patent because your claims will be patent eligible.

Federal Circuit Provides Additional Insight on §101 Protections for Software Patents

In a September 13, 2016 decision relating to subject matter eligibility of software patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), and held that McRO’s patents were eligible for protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The disputed patent claims recited a method for “automatically . . . producing accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters.” The McRO patents identified that a problem in the prior art was that animators, even using the assistance of computers, had to manually manipulate the character model for lip movement. The McRO patents solved this problem by using rules to automatically depict more realistic synchronization of lip movements and speech.