Judge Lourie withholds criticism of Supreme Court, explains no judge likes to be reversed

Judge-Lourie-1

Judge Alan Lourie of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The annual meeting of the American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association opened earlier this morning with an opening plenary session that included remarks from Michelle Lee, Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and the presentation of the AIPLA Excellence Award, which this year was presented to Judge Richard Lynn of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The luncheon speaker was Judge Alan Lourie of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Outgoing AIPLA President Sharon Israel, who will conclude her term of service tomorrow, introduced Judge Lourie, who she clerked for years ago after graduating from law school. Prior to introducing Judge Lourie, Israel noted that there were nine (9) Federal Circuit Judges in attendance. Later Judge Lourie would joke that the turnout was probably to make sure that his remarks did not veer off course.

The topic of Judge Laurie’s speech was, generally speaking, about his time on the Federal Circuit and the changes he has witnessed over the years. Laurie would explain that many mark the passage of time based upon the service of the Chief Judge. Laurie has served on the court during the tenure of seven (7) different Chief Judges, all of who strived to make the court a collegial body. Lourie, however, explained that he viewed the history of the court as being divided into two distinct segments. The Federal Circuit that existed with Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, and the Federal Circuit that has evolved since the death of Judge Rich.

Judge Lourie’s speech became particularly interesting toward the end when he began speaking about the Supreme Court.

“For many years, as you all know, the Supreme Court wasn’t much interested in patent cases,” Judge Lourie explained. “But they did take cases from outside the Patent [area].” He would go on to explain that earlier in his tenure the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in an Indian case and a government employee relations case, both cases where he authored the panel majority opinion. “That was a new experience. No judge likes to be reversed,” Lourie said.

“As this group knows, I had further opportunity to see Supreme Court reversals in patent cases,” Lourie explained. “That has led to a lot of uncertainty in the law when they decided cases related to patent eligibility… the myriad case involving breast cancer patents. I wrote the majority opinion in that case which the Supreme Court unanimously reversed.” Judge Lourie would go on to say that the week following the reversal he received the outstanding public service award from the New York Intellectual Property Law Association. With the audience laughing loudly he wondered whether the Association regretted the decision. Being unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court in Myriad is and will remain a badge of honor in my opinion. Judge Lourie gets patent eligibility, and he gets the science.

“In any event, that decision and its subsequent case of Prometheus v. Mayo, which I also wrote, which was similarly reversed on, fueled the recent revolution and uncertainty in the law of patent eligibility, which began with Bilski.”

Judge Lourie would go on to talk about “the German word schadenfreude, which means taking pleasure in the misfortune of others.” Lourie would rhetorically ask whether he should take pleasure in the criticism of the Supreme Court. Taking the high road he said that he would not take any pleasure in the criticism, instead taking the blame for himself, saying that perhaps he didn’t write those opinions as persuasively as he could.

“In light of the Supreme Court’s continuing interest in our cases commentators have said the Supreme Court has disciplined our court or that it has cutback of patent rights. I will leave those critiques to others, at least for now,” Lourie explained, suggesting that at some point he would be prepared to say more. Still, Lourie explained, “the Supreme Court is at the top of the judicial heap, and we have got to follow it’s precedence as best we can.”

I have no doubt that Judge Lourie disagrees with the path the Supreme Court has charted on patent eligibility. I also have no doubt that Judges do not like to be reversed. But there is a difference between following precedent and channeling the Supreme Court, as the Federal Circuit seems to be doing. It is clear that the Supreme Court does not like patents, and only a slim exaggeration to say that the only valid patent is one that the Supreme Court hasn’t considered. Increasingly, the Federal Circuit seems to be starting with the presumption that the patents claims they consider in certain technology areas are not patentable. In my opinion that is both unhelpful and inappropriate.

The Supreme Court is simply not technically sophisticated enough to handle patent issues, and the Supreme Court’s precedent is all over the place. They contradict their own previous rulings without overruling previous decisions. They paint with the broadest of brushes, make ridiculous and incorrect statements of law about poorly written claims on disclosures that are thin at best. The overbroad statements of the Supreme Court should not be blindly followed and applied to cases dealing with innovations of a wholly different character.

To hear Judge Lourie say that no Judge likes to be reversed and the Supreme Court precedent must be followed certainly rings true; that is what we have been witnessing in the area of patent eligibility. But at what point will the Federal Circuit stand up and say the obvious – that much of the broadest overstatements by the Supreme Court are dicta that deserve no deference. When will the Federal Circuit stand up and acknowledge that the sweeping commentary of the Supreme Court, which often deals with issues not before the Court (i.e., patent trolls) must necessarily be limited to the peculiar facts before the Court? When will the Federal Circuit recognize that the Supreme Court is ignoring the Statute?

I have been critical of Judge Lourie in particular over the past few years. As his jurisprudence has evolved it has become clear he is very concerned about not getting reversed by the Supreme Court. But someone needs to stand up and explain that the emperor is not wearing any clothes. District Court and Appellate Judges all took an oath to follow the law, and when the Supreme Court jets in to address a case here or there they are at best giving a 20,000 foot perspective, not some nuanced guidance that will or should apply with metronome like bureaucratic precision to all cases without regard to the underlying facts and technology.

Regardless of what the Supreme Court writes about discoveries not being patent eligible, the law says the contrary. When I was starting my career as a litigator District Court judges in particular seemed to understand exactly what to do when the Supreme Court make a grossly exaggerated statement like that. Clearly, 35 U.S.C. 101 says that discoveries are patent eligible, so when the Supreme Court says that discoveries are not patent eligible it is either dicta that deserves no precedential weight or they are rather inartfully describing something else, but those words cannot mean what Justice Thomas wrote because it directly contravenes the clear and explicit terms of the statute.

There are always ways for Judges to distinguish cases, limiting them to their particular facts, but the Federal Circuit seems unwilling. Judge Lourie no doubt has forgot more patent law than the Supreme Court will ever know. Hopefully at some point he will not abstain from telling us what he really thinks about the Supreme Court’s patent eligibility cases. It would be wonderful for him to do that in a written opinion that might force the Supreme Court to come to terms with the damage they have caused.

Share

Warning & Disclaimer: The pages, articles and comments on IPWatchdog.com do not constitute legal advice, nor do they create any attorney-client relationship. The articles published express the personal opinion and views of the author as of the time of publication and should not be attributed to the author’s employer, clients or the sponsors of IPWatchdog.com.

Join the Discussion

22 comments so far.

  • [Avatar for Sean Hogle]
    Sean Hogle
    November 14, 2015 06:30 pm

    I agree with the idea that patent eligiblity should be legislated. The process and result would be more legitimate and easier to defend.

    I predict that the result of such a process would be to basically affirm the line the US Supreme Court has drawn on patent-eligibility, or even move it in farther in the direction of less being eligible, and that would be a welcome outcome.

    The Supremes were and continue to be a necessary corrective to a court that lost its way many times over.

  • [Avatar for Chuck]
    Chuck
    October 27, 2015 01:51 am

    Anon @13 identifies the way to solve this problem correctly, IMO.

    If the Supreme Court is making an absolute mess of patent law, upsetting decades of well-established precedent, and contradicting the relevant statutory language, then the proper remedy is *not* for lower courts to distinguish away what are clearly intended to be broad, generally applicable statements of law on the grounds that “the Court only decided a case based on the facts before it, nothing more.” That way lies Cooper v. Aaron.

    Rather, if the Supreme Court lacks the institutional capacity to comprehend patent law, use the legislative branch to divest them of jurisdiction over patent appeals, and have the Federal Circuit be the court of last resort in patent matters. (Query whether a “patent court” should be separated from the rest of the functions of the Federal Circuit; I see no reason why, for example, the Supreme Court might be incompetent to hear Indian trust appeals, even though that’s usually a Federal Circuit thing.)

    But that’s the way to do it: a clear-as-day statement from the other two branches of government that the system is broken, not chipping away and distinguishing by lower-court judges. Chipping away and distinguishing is how you end up with the Supreme Court making overbroad statements in response.

  • [Avatar for Gene Quinn]
    Gene Quinn
    October 26, 2015 01:54 pm

    Bart-

    I’m pretty sure he does as well.

    I, on the other hand, apparently do not. If you don’t like the editing then by all means please feel free not to read. This is a free resource for readers. We/I do strive to do the best we can.

    Just out of curiosity, do you complain when the Wall Street Journal, NY Times, POLITICO or others make mistakes?

    -Gene

  • [Avatar for Bart Funkrich]
    Bart Funkrich
    October 26, 2015 09:34 am

    I’m pretty sure that Judge Lourie knows the past tense of “lead” is “led”; who is editing these posts?

  • [Avatar for step back]
    step back
    October 25, 2015 01:17 pm

    Gene ends the above post by talking about the damage that the Supremes have done.

    The greatest damage they have done is that to the institution of the SCOTUS and to the reputation of SCOTUS.

    We now know them to be puppets of and suck ups to the so called “friends” of the Court (the amici) where the “friends” sit com consists of the corporate high and mighty who want to undo that which the Constitution granted to inventors, namely, to becoming secured by exclusive rights in their respective discoveries.

    See again, Art. I sect 8 clause 8.

  • [Avatar for Night Writer]
    Night Writer
    October 25, 2015 12:41 pm

    Your point about a current controversy is a good one. The lower courts really should have to make a finding of fact that the claims “do not promote” and were therefore unconstitutionally granted. I watched Robert Bork’s confirmation hearings (which he lost) and were about 30 years ago. I think those hearing were a turning point in American jurisprudence. You should watch them. Bork drives home (by the way, I went to school with his son) the point that as soon as you create something that isn’t tied to the Constitution that there are no bounds to it. Here, abstract was created and now is used in lower courts with no findings of fact that would justify a finding that the grant of the claims were unconstitutional. Instead they go back to a findings of fact by the SCOTUS that anything that fits the method in Alice is unconstitutional. It was what Bork was talking about in his confirmation hearings.

    (Biden, by the way, is the one that burnt down Bork.)

    (And, Anon, as to some of the other problems on the other blog, consider that Mark Lemley has had a profound affect on who is hired and promoted at the top tier law schools. It is not a good idea to go against Mark Lemley if you are in academia.)

  • [Avatar for Night Writer]
    Night Writer
    October 25, 2015 12:34 pm

    Anon maybe you missed me typing: “The power exerted in Alice is surely outside the bounds of what the SCOTUS was granted by the Constitution.”

    It is simply stunning what the SCOTUS did in Alice. It is interesting too that the courts consistently attempt to couch their opinions as if Alice is statutory interpretation. Each tribunal should include “unconstitutional” in their holding.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    October 25, 2015 11:52 am

    step back,

    As you are more than likely to have noticed, I dare a lot of things. 😉

    Being grounded in law, history, and facts gives me that “audacity.” Being able to back up what one says tends to do that.

  • [Avatar for step back]
    step back
    October 25, 2015 10:26 am

    Anon @13

    How darest thou to question the omniscient wisdom of Little Anthony and his loyal side kick Clarence the Clown!

    http://patentu.blogspot.com/2015/10/aw-shucks-judge-double-dashes-down.html

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    October 25, 2015 09:08 am

    Night Writer,

    Your Con Law exercise remains flawed.

    To wit:
    1) The Constitutional clause is a grant of authority – not a substantive issue of that authority
    2) The Court’s authority is constrained to the here and now – to a present case or controversy, and they are not allowed to provide prospective, future, conjectural basis as a foundation for their attempt at what plainly amount to statutory writing.
    3) Combining 1) and 2), look at the words the Court “scrivens” with:

    “may”
    “might tend to”

    They are NOT even making findings of fact, because one CANNOT make a finding of fact for a mere possible FUTURE event.

    I cannot stress this highly enough.

    The cleanest view here that removes the Court from their “mashing of the wax nose of patent law” is the fact that they have acted ultra vires and have attempted to rewrite statutory patent law with their imprimatur of what they view as “should” be patent eligible. But lest you forget: what is eligible is a matter of statute: an authority setting mechanism beyond the judicial branch. The top of that branch does not have the authority to set that statutory item under ANY guise. Let alone one that itself violates precepts of Con Law.

    Also note the subtle but pernicious base assumption that the Court cannot do anything that violates the Constitution because they are (merely) the highest level of the judicial branch, and that “what they say, (somehow) must go, and go uncontested.”

    It’s almost as if people are eager to place the top of the judicial branch ABOVE the Constitution.

    We are indeed on dangerous ground here – and ground well recognized by those that wrote the Constitution: look at the Federalist papers warning of a too-powerful judicial branch.

    There is but one path forward: remove the ability of the Supreme Court to hear patent appeals. Reformulate the current Article III Court (they have become a mere bullied puppet of the Supremes) and set the non-original-to-the-Supremes limit on patent appeals to that lower Article III court.

    In this manner, the “philosophical” mashing of the patent law nose of wax is avoided while the Article III review mechanism mandated by Marbury is maintained.

    Enough is enough.

  • [Avatar for Night Writer]
    Night Writer
    October 25, 2015 08:39 am

    (Sorry for the three posts). But, I’ve noticed that most commentators seem to write about Alice as if it is a statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. 101. It is not. It is a finding of fact by the SCOTUS and a finding that granting claims that are “abstract” as defined by the method prescribed in Alice to be unconstitutional.

    This means, by the way, according to Constitutional law (no cite now sorry) that Congress cannot pass a law to change Alice. Alice stands forever or until the SCOTUS changes it (or the Constitution is amended or Congress removes the SCOTUS from patent jurisdiction.)

  • [Avatar for Night Writer]
    Night Writer
    October 25, 2015 08:28 am

    Mr. Heller, you make this Hotel Security argument over and over and over again. I am beginning to think that your vast presence on these blogs is nothing more than a business card.

    But, here is a challenge for you: give us three claims that you believe required 101 to invalidate the claim rather than 102, 103, 112. One goes into witch trial territory when they characterize an element of a claim as XXX. Stick to patent law. Find the elements of the claims in the prior art and make combination arguments. Anything else is politics.

  • [Avatar for Night Writer]
    Night Writer
    October 25, 2015 08:25 am

    Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are “`”the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”‘” Myriad, supra, at ___, 133 S.Ct., at 2116. “[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. Mayo, supra, at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 1923; see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress “shall have Power … To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”).

    That from Alice is the problem. What happened?

    (1) The SCOTUS made a finding of fact that anything that is abstract “might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it” and is thus unconstitutional.

    (2) The SCOTUS also created a test in Alice saying anything that fits the test is abstract.

    One should pause and realize that each time a claim is invalidated under Alice that the tribunal has found that the claim was granted unconstitutionally.

    The power exerted in Alice is surely outside the bounds of what the SCOTUS was granted by the Constitution. If for no other reason, the SCOTUS has made a clear finding of fact.

  • [Avatar for Edward Heller]
    Edward Heller
    October 24, 2015 03:11 pm

    David, We seem to agree that Bilski was and is the problem by defining ineligible subject matter as “abstract” without defining that term in any way.

    The only thing really new in Alice was that we learned that the mere recitation of clearly eligible subject matter in the claim was not going to be “enough” if that clearly eligible subject matter was old and conventional.

    It is still a wonder that from Benson through Alice no majority Supreme Court 101 opinion ever discussed Hotel Security, a case that set the roadmap for how to decide cases with mixed subject matter, some eligible, some not: invention, had to be in the eligible — a simple, but very clear proposition of law that we should have been following since Benson.

    Finally, it is also amazing to me that the PTO for so long did not take the lead on this issue but simply granted claims that included old and generic, but eligible subject matter. What in the world?

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    October 24, 2015 01:47 pm

    The problem you have ARP, is not whether the Federal Circuit will want to or even attempt to hold the Supreme Court decision in Mayo narrowly.

    The problem is that the Court simply did not set any limits to its decision, and that the District Courts can – and will, and have used the Supreme Court decision to the unlimited reach that the words of the decision have.

    There just is no legal reasoning present to force any desired “narrow” version on the lower courts.

    And even for argument’s sake the Federal Circuit so attempted to do so – we both know that the Supreme Court will (and has) simply smacked the Federal Circuit back down with a “that’s not what we meant – try (or guess) again.”

    The notion by you of “must be construed narrowly” and by a certain Mr. Cole of “should” be construed narrowly – will (and has) faltered in reality.

    A different path is needed.

  • [Avatar for A Rational Person]
    A Rational Person
    October 24, 2015 01:12 am

    David Stein@6

    The problem is that if the Mayo holding is taken broadly, virtually no method claim would be patent eligible. For example, virtually every method claim in chemistry or biotech in the history of US patents is an application of a natural law and/or involves the use of conventional steps.

    Therefore, because the the Supreme Court has provided no guidance as to what is patent eligible, to me the only logical thing for the Federal Circuit to do would be to limit the holding of Mayo to its facts.

    Also, by the Supreme Court’s own admission, the Mayo holding applies to a judicial exception to a statute and, it is a generally principle, that judicial exceptions are supposed to be construed narrowly.

    The Federal Circuit judges could even state in their decisions that to apply Mayo broadly would contradict the concept that a judicial exception cannot swallow the rule or statute, so Mayo must be construed narrowly.

  • [Avatar for David Stein]
    David Stein
    October 23, 2015 05:46 pm

    Although the Federal Circuit may be required to follow Supreme Court precedent, it doesn’t mean that the Federal Circuit judges calling out in their opinions the inconsistencies between the Supreme Court’s opinions and the statue.

    Like “steering by the bright star of ‘reasonable certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of ‘insoluble ambiguity?'”

    Or: “put simply, the problem is that no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract?'” (Linn, quoting from Lemley in the CLS Bank Federal Circuit opinion… probably the only thing Lemley’s ever written that I can back 100%.)

    As chaotic as the period post-Bilski was, at least the fractious decisions raised the visibility for just how horrid this area of law had become. And we’re starting to see that manifestation again, with Plager’s comment about § 101 challenges becoming a “plague” on the patent system – indeed, it’s quite telling that backpressure is becoming visible only 14 months after Alice.

    But there’s a difference between pointing out the inconsistency / unworkability / capriciousness of Alice, and… damage control.

    Gene is suggesting that the Federal Circuit recharacterize Alice as a much more limited or conservative holding. As much as I’d like that result, I do not think think that it is a good option. I believe that the patent community tried that with Bilski v. Kappos – i.e.: as long as the claims recite some kind of computing hardware, even as minimal as a processor or a memory device, § 101 is satisfied. That was clearly not sufficient for the Court, and both Mayo and Alice Supreme Court opinions are written as a broad reformulation of § 101.

  • [Avatar for A Rational Person]
    A Rational Person
    October 23, 2015 04:28 pm

    David Stein@4

    “Hmm. Is that really the job of the Federal Circuit? – to decide when its interpretation of the statute is more accurate than that of the Supreme Court?”

    Although the Federal Circuit may be required to follow Supreme Court precedent, it doesn’t mean that the Federal Circuit judges calling out in their opinions the inconsistencies between the Supreme Court’s opinions and the statue.

    Also, given that the Supreme Court has failed to define the terms “abstract” and “significantly more” and given the fact these terms are not part of 35 USC 101, the Federal Circuit would be well within its rights to interpret Alice and Mayo much more narrowly than they have done. The only real guidance that the Supreme Court has provided on interpreting these two terms is how the Supreme Court applied them in the particular factual situations of Alice and Mayo.

  • [Avatar for David Stein]
    David Stein
    October 23, 2015 02:21 pm

    When will the Federal Circuit stand up and acknowledge that the sweeping commentary of the Supreme Court, which often deals with issues not before the Court (i.e., patent trolls) must necessarily be limited to the peculiar facts before the Court? When will the Federal Circuit recognize that the Supreme Court is ignoring the Statute?

    Hmm. Is that really the job of the Federal Circuit? – to decide when its interpretation of the statute is more accurate than that of the Supreme Court?

    There needs to be some recognition, at higher levels of government, that the Court is way out of its league. Collectively, these nine justices have zero technical degrees, zero experience in patent law (as prosecutors, examiners, or litigators), and zero experience in the technology industry. So on what basis does this group assume the mantle of fundamentally altering the application of patent law to technology, purportedly on behalf of the technology industry?

    Like a petulant child with a dangerous weapon, the Supreme Court needs to have this toy taken away. The Federal Circuit can’t adequately function by mitigating and apologizing for the Court’s poor behavior – indeed, that only masks the problem that 42 years old since Gottschalk, the law of § 101 – the cornerstone of our entire patent system – is more turbulent than ever.

    The patent community should be working toward a rewrite of § 101 that takes the issues out of the Court’s feckless pontification and distortion.

  • [Avatar for Edward Heller]
    Edward Heller
    October 23, 2015 02:18 pm

    Before Rich. After Rich.

    Absolutely.

    Rich held a pall over both the C.C.P.A. and the Federal Circuit. Clearly, he was simply a great patent lawyer, and he inspired enormous respect with his colleagues.

    But, he also had agenda’s flowing from the controversies surrounding the ’52 Act. He guided the development of patent law in a direction consistent with the patent bar’s legislative effort that he chaired in commenting on Federico’s draft.

    One of things Judge Rich tried to do is find a statutory basis for pre-’52 case law. In particular, if case held something unpatentable for “101” purposes, he uniformly was of the opinion that such issues were for the new “103.” This is the source of his resistance to Benson and Flook. Also, this is the identified reasons for his overturning, in State Street Bank, of Hotel Security — the case that had held that business methods were not statutory, and that invention had to be in the means.

    We all know what happened to patent law after State Street Bank. It is also clear that Alice restored the essence of Hotel Security, provided we get a good definition of “abstract” beyond calculating price or adjusting risk.

  • [Avatar for Edward Heller]
    Edward Heller
    October 23, 2015 02:07 pm

    Gene, the Court in Myriad held that products of nature are not “new” compositions.

  • [Avatar for David]
    David
    October 23, 2015 01:05 pm

    More hubris from the patent bar.