CAFC Affirms Invalidation of Stanford Organ Transplant Rejection Test in Latest Patent-Eligibility Blow to Medical Diagnostics

“We have repeatedly held that applying standard techniques in a standard way to observe natural phenomena does not provide an inventive concept.” – Judge Lourie

medical diagnostics - https://depositphotos.com/118711776/stock-photo-gavel-and-stethoscope-on-background.htmlOn July 18, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision in CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc. affirming a summary judgment ruling of the District of Delaware, which invalidated claims from three Stanford University patents licensed by CareDx as patent  ineligible. The decision marks yet another blow to medical diagnostic testing, this time in the context of organ transplants, and the prospects of their developers for obtaining enforceable patent rights.

District Court Rejects Magistrate’s Recommendation that Claims Pass Section 101

There were three patents at issue before the Federal Circuit in this case, each sharing the title Non-Invasive Diagnosis of Graft Rejection in Organ Transplant Patients: U.S. Patent No. 8703652; U.S. Patent No. 9845497; and U.S. Patent No. 10329607. Each of these patents claims methods of detecting levels of donor cell-free DNA (cfDNA) in the blood of an organ transplant patient, as increased levels of donor cfDNA is an indicator that the patient’s body is rejecting the organ transplant. While each patent shares the same specification, the ‘652 patent claims multiplex sequencing to determine the amount of donor cfDNA in a transplant patients blood, the ‘497 patent recites high-throughput sequencing or digital polymerase chain reaction (PCR) diagnostic methods, and the ‘607 patent claims selective amplification of donor cfDNA by PCR before high-throughput sequencing.

As summarized by the Federal Circuit, the methods disclosed by representative Claim 1 from each patent include four separate steps for detecting donor cfDNA in a transplant patient:

     “1. ‘obtaining’ or ‘providing’ a ‘sample’ from the recipient that contains cfDNA;

    1. ‘genotyping’ the transplant donor and/or recipient to develop ‘polymorphism’ or ‘SNP’ ‘profiles’;
    2. ‘sequencing’ the cfDNA from the sample using ‘multiplex’ or ‘high-throughput’ sequencing; or performing ‘digital PCR’; and
    3. ‘determining’ or ‘quantifying’ the amount of donor cfDNA.”

CareDx, the exclusive licensee of the three Stanford patents, sued both Natera and Eurofins Viracor alleging that organ transplant rejection tests marketed by those firms infringed upon claims of the asserted patents. Both defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the asserted claims were invalid as directed to subject matter unpatentable under Section 101.

While a magistrate judge recommended that the claims were directed to a new and unconventional combination of steps to detect a natural phenomenon and should pass Section 101 muster, the district court ruled that the specification for each patent raised doubts about validity. After limited expert discovery on the Section 101 issues at play, U.S. District Judge Colm F. Connolly granted Natera and Eurofins’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the patent claims were directed to the detection of natural phenomena and that the shared specification included admissions that the claims only recited conventional techniques.

Federal Circuit: CareDx’s Patent Claims Are Analogous to Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom

On appeal, CareDx argued to the Federal Circuit that the technological advance claimed by the patents is not the discovery of a natural correlation between transplant rejection and levels of donor cfDNA in a transplant patient’s blood, but rather improved measurement methods that are superior to the existing prior art. CareDx also contended that the district court improperly conflated steps one and two of the Alice/Mayo patent eligibility test, and that its claimed next-generation sequencing techniques to identify and measure donor-specific single nucleotide polymorphisms are inventive breakthroughs that should survive step two of Alice/Mayo.

In affirming the district court’s Section 101 summary judgment ruling in favor of Natera and Eurofins, the Federal Circuit opinion authored by Circuit Judge Alan D. Lourie noted that “[t]his is not a case involving a method of preparation or a new measurement technique.” The Federal Circuit drew several parallels between the Section 101 issues in CareDx’s appeal and the appellate court’s 2015 decision in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. In that ruling, the Federal Circuit invalidated patent claims covering methods of detecting paternally inherited levels of cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) in maternal blood. The Federal Circuit held that the claims in Ariosa were directed to a natural phenomenon despite the recitation of steps involving amplification of the ccfDNA with the use of PCR techniques:

“Here, as in Ariosa, the claims boil down to collecting a bodily sample, analyzing the cfDNA using conventional techniques, including PCR, identifying naturally occurring DNA from the donor organ, and then using the natural correlation between heightened cfDNA levels and transplant health to identify a potential rejection, none of which was inventive. The claims here are equally as ineligible as those in Ariosa.”

The Federal Circuit’s holding that the techniques involved in the patent claims asserted by CareDx were conventional techniques of immunology and molecular biology relied upon the Delaware district court’s findings regarding disclosures in the patents’ written description. Characterizations of the claimed techniques throughout the written description “confirm their conventionality,” the Federal Circuit found, citing several disclosures in the patents at issue noting that the steps of the claimed methods could be achieved with techniques that are well known in the art. The Federal Circuit also noted that CareDx’s appellate brief conceded that CareDx did not invent or discover the relationship between high concentrations of donor cfDNA and a higher likelihood of organ rejection by transplant patients.

No Procedural Issues with Alice/Mayo Application, Reconsideration of Summary Judgment

Further, the Federal Circuit disagreed with CareDx that there was any procedural impropriety as to how the Delaware district court conducted the two-step Alice/Mayo test. The district court’s discussion of claim language along with the conventionality of the claimed techniques, as conceded by CareDx, leading to the determination that the claims were directed to natural phenomenon, satisfied step one of Alice/Mayo, the Federal Circuit determined. The appellate court also disagreed with CareDx’s argument that determinations of conventionality are limited to step two of Alice/Mayo, citing several cases in which the Federal Circuit upheld invalidations under Alice/Mayo where the conventionality of the claimed techniques were assessed at step one of the test.

“We have repeatedly held that applying standard techniques in a standard way to observe natural phenomena does not provide an inventive concept,” Judge Lourie’s opinion reads. The Federal Circuit ruled that the methods in the recited steps of the patents at issue were already being performed by those in the art, and that nothing inventive results from the claimed combination of steps, a conclusion confirmed by the shared specification of the patents.

Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed procedural arguments that CareDx raised regarding the district court’s decision to reject the magistrate judge’s opinion as well as the court’s decision to backtrack from an earlier ruling denying summary judgment to Natera and Eurofins. The appellate court found that the district court provided sufficient reasoning in its summary judgment ruling to diverge from the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Further, while the district court initially denied summary judgment prior to limited expert discovery, the court was entitled to reconsider this earlier ruling once it determined that contradictions between CareDx’s extrinsic evidence and “numerous admissions of conventionality in the intrinsic record” eliminated the purported factual dispute between the parties.

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Author: billiondigital
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22 comments so far.

  • [Avatar for B]
    B
    July 22, 2022 10:58 am

    @ Paul

    Respectfully, you missed my point. I’m citing legislative language while you’re referring to the garbage an inept SCOTUS of 1972 spewed b/c they were too lazy and stupid to do anything but kiss a government agency’s posterior.

  • [Avatar for Paul Cole]
    Paul Cole
    July 22, 2022 04:44 am

    Erratum. I should have said 2106.03

  • [Avatar for Paul Cole]
    Paul Cole
    July 22, 2022 04:42 am

    @B

    A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. Gottschalk v Benson quoting Cochrane v Deener, see also the MPEP at 216.03.

    @ Anon
    The catastrophic sequence of drafting and judicial errors in Athena v Mayo demands a separate paper.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    July 21, 2022 06:00 pm

    Mr. Cole,

    I am well aware of your other works – which change nothing to your errors here.

    I “get” that your approach is NOT OF THE US – but even as you claim this to not matter, it clearly does. The approach your advocate is simply NOT the approach that should pass muster under the law as written by Congress and offering this up (merely) as a path forward does damage because it does not challenge the errant path FIRST taken by our Supreme Court (the progenitor of the Gordian Knot) and entirely ignores how HUGE that Gordian Knot continues to grow through the impossible-to-square number of cases on eligibility in the lower courts.

    IF you are not helping resolve THIS, then you are part of the problem.

  • [Avatar for B]
    B
    July 21, 2022 02:07 pm

    @ Paul Cole ” If you can identify a feature which is both novel and transformative and include it in one of the independent claims of your patent application, you stand a reasonable chance of avoiding section 101 objections.”

    Respectfully, there’s nothing in 101 requiring “transformative,” and it doesn’t matter what is in a claim. If the PTO wants to reject a claim under Alice-Mayo, the CAFC will affirm 100% of the time. I know this first-hand with independent claims that the PTAB declared had FOUR separate limitations that passed 102 and 103 and provided advantages that even the CAFC confirmed were advantages.

    There are several sleazy and dishonest judges on the CAFC, and the remaining judges will not call the sleazy judges out.

  • [Avatar for Paul Cole]
    Paul Cole
    July 21, 2022 11:52 am

    @ Anon

    It may be worthwhile mentioning that I have been studying and abstracting decisions in the IP field since I founded the newsletter Intellectual Property Decisions in the UK the late 1970’s. The similar Anglo-American approach to the determination of the ratio decidendi in a case is summarised in Arthur Goodhart’s 1930 paper downloadable from http://www.horty.umiacs.io/courses/readings/goodhart-1930-ratio.pdf. It is not beyond the skill of a UK reader to understand US jurisprudence and identify the relevant rules from the case law. Arthur Goodhart qualified in the US but later became a Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford, 1931–51 and subsequently Master of University College, Oxford.

    It may be worth referring to the brief that I drafted for the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys in Athena v Mayo https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-430/121007/20191031162622133_19-430_Amicus%20Brief.pdf.

    In particular, as is apparent from the diagram for claims 7-9 of the patent then in issue at page 11 of the brief, the claimed subject-matter involved the creation of no less than three NOVEL molecular species, EACH of which would have QUALIFIED in its own right as patent-eligible under the headings “manufacture” or “composition of matter”. Apparent failure of the attorneys for Athena to point this out, and the absence from the court decisions of any diagram similar to that which I created demonstrates a marked failure of judicial comprehension which may have contributed to the unfortunate decision in that case.

    This unfortunate decision provides a further example of the need to identify positively eligible features in a claim and point them out in response to a section 101 challenge.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    July 21, 2022 08:13 am

    Mr. Cole,

    I find your answer to be less than genuine.

    While you state “My aim was not to provide a universal authoritative opinion on section 101.” you BOTH turn around and try to do exactly that AND you entirely miss the point put to you that you are opining on US law.

    While “the path” you offer may work (and again – and somewhat critically, may not), merely accepting the wrongly construed law and NOT pushing back is exactly the wrong thing to do.

  • [Avatar for Paul Cole]
    Paul Cole
    July 21, 2022 04:17 am

    @Anon 8.55 am yesterday.

    My aim was not to provide a universal authoritative opinion on section 101. Just a useful hint to friends and colleagues who draft patent claims. If you can identify a feature which is both novel and transformative and include it in one of the independent claims of your patent application, you stand a reasonable chance of avoiding section 101 objections.

    The horrible example is Mayo v Prometheus, where both the administration of thioguanine drugs and the determination of metabolite level were admitted to have been known on the face of the patent specification, and the two novel “wherein” features were no more than information and did not require any intervention by the hand of man. If you add the features that the determination was at intervals over a period of time and that the thiopurine dose is adjusted to maintain the metabolite within the therapeutically effective range.

  • [Avatar for Peter Kramer]
    Peter Kramer
    July 20, 2022 08:34 pm

    Using a particular “standard technique” to observe a *particular* natural phenomenon in which that particular natural phenomenon has never been previously observed by that particular technique is not, by definition, “a standard way to observe that phenomena”.

  • [Avatar for B]
    B
    July 20, 2022 03:46 pm

    @ Model 101 “ A lot of the judges are wrong megalomaniacs drunk with power.”

    Judge Taranto summed up the issue from his perspective, i.,e., the Supreme Court forces the lower courts “to live in a world where we’re forced into a two-part test looking for an inventive concept.”

    I gave him two outs – both constitutional violations – and said that the Supreme Court would take cert. and either provide clarity or end Alice-Mayo.

    I fed much of Alito’s Dobbs (leaked) decision to the CAFC. Judge Chen was basically phoning it in and Clevenger was unreadable, but Taranto seemed to be a true law nerd on the constitutional aspects (and I mean that as a big positive).

    Let’s see if the CAFC takes the offer.

  • [Avatar for Model 101]
    Model 101
    July 20, 2022 11:48 am

    Pro Say and B

    God bless you as well.

    Thanks

  • [Avatar for Model 101]
    Model 101
    July 20, 2022 11:45 am

    B

    Thanks for your kind words.

    I was at the Senate hearings too.

    A lot of the judges are wrong megalomaniacs drunk with power.

    They can’t see the forest beyond the trees.

  • [Avatar for Pro Say]
    Pro Say
    July 20, 2022 11:39 am

    Model 101, God bless your wife and your family.

    JurisIMprudence reins at the CAFC.

    Sickening. Just sickening.

  • [Avatar for B]
    B
    July 20, 2022 10:30 am

    @ Model 101 “My wife had an organ transplant in 2015. She gets tested regularly. The new organ failed about a year ago. She tells me that there was no test for organ health prior to the failure.”

    At the Senate hearing on patent eligibility, Sherrie Knowles gave a compelling testimony about a cancer cure that saved her life but that would be held patent ineligible (and thus would have never reached the market) under Alice-Mayo. I suspect that there are thousands upon thousands more just like it.

    This Supreme Court garbage must end

    Best of luck to you and your wife

  • [Avatar for Anonymous]
    Anonymous
    July 20, 2022 10:24 am

    This seems quite simple. The claims recite a process (101 eligible), i.e., to measure or determine a physical condition of the human body. The claims do not pre-empt other processes for measuring the body condition. (Pre-emption being a rationale for the patentability exception.) If the process is conventional, 102/103 precludes patentability.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    July 20, 2022 10:20 am

    OT – but thought that I would drop a bookmark in regards to the UK DABUS case (the link is to the detailed decision):

    https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/j200008eu1.html

  • [Avatar for B]
    B
    July 20, 2022 09:36 am

    “We have repeatedly held that applying standard techniques in a standard way to observe natural phenomena does not provide an inventive concept.”

    Judge Lourie wouldn’t know an “inventive concept” if it jumped up his posterior and exploded. “Inventive concept” is a meaning garbage term that judges use when they want a capricious veto of a patent but lack the intellect to address inventiveness under 102/103.

  • [Avatar for concerned]
    concerned
    July 20, 2022 08:56 am

    Model 101:

    I am sorry to hear about your wife’s condition and wish for a very positive future outcome for her and you.

    My process helps people with disabilities giving them more income and better health insurance coverage. In addition, some people may come off a waiting list and receive services.

    I just do not think those in authority really care about solving problems and helping people based on the level of effort to reject patents.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    July 20, 2022 08:55 am

    Mr. Cole,

    Please stop commenting on US Patent law in your manner of misrepresenting that law.

    To wit, your, “Given that the obtaining, genotyping and sequencing steps appear to be conventional and that the allegedly novel step should have an eligible character,” misapplies the US Rule of “claims as a whole,” and instead applies a piece-part eligibility – or perhaps even worse, attempts to find some partial claim item as a “Point of Novelty” AND that point sounding in satisfying 35 USC 101 – on its own.

    This IS the mess of current US eligibility jurisprudence, and your advocacy simply is not helpful in resolving that mess.

    Any sense from you of “compliance with the positive provisions of section 101” is simply ill-begotten.

    There are two and only two “positive provisions of section 101:”
    1) that the invention fit into at least one of the statutory categories; and
    2) that the invention have utility in the patent sense.

    ALL ELSE – and I do mean all – simply are not positive provisions of section 101 – as written by Congress.

    One is NOT ‘enabled’ to go on a hunt for parts of a claim, assert those parts to be “THE” point of novelty, and then apply eligibility as if only those parts existed in the claim.

    You should know better.

  • [Avatar for Model 101]
    Model 101
    July 20, 2022 06:59 am

    Shows me how the judges don’t understand how great this technology is.

    My wife had an organ transplant in 2015. She gets tested regularly. The new organ failed about a year ago. She tells me that there was no test for organ health prior to the failure.

    She is suffering badly right now.
    Today and every day.

    As an inventor myself, this one hits me hard.

    101 is big tech political garbage.

  • [Avatar for concerned]
    concerned
    July 20, 2022 06:15 am

    “MPEP 2106.03 defines a process as “”a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, 676 (1972)”

    My process takes an ineligible benefit determination by professionals and experts and identifies the errors and omissions that lead to an eligible benefit determination via a series of acts. The errors and omissions do not correct themselves in a natural process.

    I am still fighting for my patent 8 years later because the authorities are not “wowed” enough on how this solution was accomplished. Yet the solution was accomplished in a new and novel way that escaped millions of people, plus met the law as written by Congress. The eye has been completely taken off the ball, the creation of trees has blinded the patent process of the forest.

    The MPEP and case law are designed to capriciously lead to any outcome the authorities want via a series of acts that are not in the natural state. I could ask for a patent on this particular process that capriciously invalidate patent applications/patents, however, said process is not new, but useful to them, for the last 8 years. On the preceding thought, the USPTO would rightfully reject the application.

  • [Avatar for Paul Cole]
    Paul Cole
    July 20, 2022 04:37 am

    It would be interesting to consider the case for positive eligibility.

    MPEP 2106.03 defines a process as “”a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, 676 (1972)”

    Given that the obtaining, genotyping and sequencing steps appear to be conventional and that the allegedly novel step should have an eligible character, the question arises whether the determination or quantification step is sufficiently transformative to bring the claimed subject-matter within the scope of section 101. Arguably no relevant transformation occurs and the positive case for qualifying subject-matter is not satisfied.

    It is a remarkable feature of all these cases that compliance with the positive provisions of section 101 is not considered.