Jeremy Doerre

Narrowly construing the § 101 eligibility exception for abstract ideas is not only suggested by Supreme Court guidance, but also could potentially allow for increased coherence and consistency while simultaneously serving to solicit further Supreme Court guidance on eligibility. Even if the bright-line eligibility prohibition is construed narrowly, § 101 can still serve to police claiming at a level of abstraction that results in overbroad claiming.

It seems clear that the Supreme Court did not intend to categorically prohibit patenting of everything which can be characterized as an abstract idea at some level because the Court indicated that there are at least some abstract ideas that are sufficient to confer patent eligibility: namely, inventive concepts.  The Court’s bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature and mathematical formulas clearly was not intended to categorically prohibit patenting of everything which can be characterized as an abstract idea because such a bright-line extension would bar patenting of inventive concepts, which by definition are capable of characterization as abstract ideas but which the Court explicitly acknowledged are sufficient to signal eligibility.