The problem with this analytical approach lies not in the two-step Mayo “algorithm,” but rather in framing the analysis in terms of subject matter eligibility under Section 101 rather than patentability under 103. Section 101 is intended to deal with the eligibility of the claimed subject matter for patent protection as a class (i.e., genus or sub-genus) of inventions, rather than the contribution of the particular invention (i.e., species) defined by the claim vis-a-vis the prior art. So why did the Supreme Court frame the inquiry in terms of patent-eligible subject matter, rather than proceeding directly to the question of obviousness?
In the latest decision (“Ultramercial-3”), the panel reached the opposite conclusion and affirmed the dismissal. This apparent turnaround was based on two intervening events: (1) the Supreme Court’s Alice decision in June; and (2) the fact that Chief Judge Rader was no longer on the court, and his place on the panel was taken by Judge Mayer. Much has, and will be, written about the first of these factors, so I would like to focus on the second, and in particular, the diametrically opposed views of Judges Rader and Mayer on a very important procedural issue; namely, whether the lack of patent-eligible subject matter should be a basis for dismissing a case at the outset based only on the “intrinsic” evidence, i.e., the patent itself and its prosecution history in the USPTO, without any discovery, expert testimony and/or claim construction.