Posts in Federal Circuit

Digital video recording (DVR) development company TiVo recently settled a patent infringement litigation, which it had filed last year against South Korean electronics giant Samsung. The settlement includes an intellectual property licensing agreement which will be in force for at least five years which will allow Samsung to continue providing DVR technologies in the U.S. market. TiVo first filed suit against Samsung last September in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (E.D. Tex.). The patent infringement complaint alleged that set-top boxes produced and marketed by Samsung to television service providers offered DVR technology which infringed upon a series of four TiVo patents.

The Federal Circuit denied appellant SAS’s petition for rehearing en banc from a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, without an explanatory opinion. Judge Newman dissented. Without discussing the facts of the case, she undertook to review the statutory provisions for inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings under the America Invents Act (“AIA”). According to Newman, the Court should have granted the petition, in order to correct the Patent Office position that “the final order of the [Patent Trial and Appeal] Board need not address every claim raised in the petition for review.” According to Judge Newman, a review of the statutory provisions of the AIA makes it clear that, if the PTAB decides to institute review, it should do so for all of the challenged claims, not just some of the challenged claims.

The ’510, ‘984, and ‘797 patents were each held eligible for similar reasons. Again, the court found that even if the claims were directed to an abstract idea, they would be eligible under step two of the Alice framework. The Court again relied on the unique and unconventional distributed architecture found in the specification and construed into the claim in the previous proceeding. This architecture allowed for load distribution – a technological and unconventional solution to a technological problem. While the ‘984 claims contained generic components and functions, the overall ordered combination of the limitations were unconventional and solved the technological problem.

In EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., No. 15-1237, 815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the Federal Circuit reversed a jury verdict and ordered judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”)—without further proceedings in the district court—on an unarticulated claim construction that was raised by neither party below or on appeal. Specifically, the case presents the issue: “Whether the Federal Circuit erred in ordering entry of judgment as a matter of law on a ground not presented in a Rule 50 motion in the district court, even though the ground presented a purely legal question.”

In reaching its decision, the CAFC ignored the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). The claims in dispute are unlike the claims in Alice, which merely applied conventional computer functionality to a financial problem. Here, TDE’s claims are materially the same as Diehr’s claims and solve technological problems in the industry using existing sensors in a novel implementation to improve the drilling process itself… TDE plans on filing its Writ on January 13, 2017 and any amicus will be due no later than 30 days later, i.e. February 10, 2017.

Amdocs (Israel), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., Appeal No. 2015-1180, is a precedential case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that reverses a judgment on the pleadings that certain asserted software claims directed to gathering network information were patent-ineligible. In so doing, Step One of Alice/Mayo is not clarified at all, because the majority accepted “for argument’s sake” the district court’s view of the disqualifying abstract ideas, and in each instance then explained why the claims seen in their entirety are not disqualified under Step two… The Federal Circuit concluded that the claim is “much closer to those in BASCOM and DDR Holdings than those in Digitech, Content Extraction, and In re TLI Commc’ns. The Court explained that even if it were to agree that claim 1 is directed to an ineligible abstract idea under step one, the claim is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’

In 2013, Cardiocom, LLC (“Cardiocom”), a subsidiary of Medtronic, Inc. (“Medtronic”), sought inter partes review of two patents owned by Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc. (“Bosch”). The Cardiocom petitions were denied in January 2014. Medtronic later sought another inter partes review of the same two patents, without naming Cardicom as an interested party… Section 314(d) bars review of questions regarding the application and interpretation of statutes “closely related” to the decision whether to institute an IPR, including reconsideration of the Board’s decision to institute.

A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s rejection of all pending claims as obvious in an appeal arising from a method for treating or preventing influenza by oral inhalation of zanamivir. The teaching here seems to be that references can be combined to show that it would have been obvious to zero in on one of a few options disclosed in the prior art. Judge Newman filed a dissenting opinion.

While TecSec had urged the panel to reassign the case to a different judge on remand in part because the district court judge repeatedly held against TecSec, raised dispositive issues sua sponte, had been reversed on appeal for many of those issues, and had pre-judged a § 101 issue that has not yet been raised, reassignment is only appropriate in exceptional circumstances. “Here, reassignment is governed by Fourth Circuit law, which applies a three factor test for reassignment: 1) whether the judge would be reasonable expected to have substantial difficulty putting her views that were held to be incorrect out of her mind; 2) whether reassignment is necessary to preserve the appearance of justice; and 3) the degree of waste of judicial resources and duplication if the case were reassigned. See United States v. Guglielmi, 929 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1991). Nothing in this case merits reassignment on remand.”

Claim differentiation does not broaden claims beyond their meaning in light of the patent as a whole, and cannot override clear statements of claim scope found the specification and prosecution history… Disavowal can occur when the specification plainly describes “the present invention” as having that feature. Here, the specification states that an important characteristic of the present invention is a “reduction in upper width … resulting from the extended short seals.” Disavowal can also occur when the specification distinguishes or disparages prior art based on a specified feature. The specification did that here, by stating that prior art bags are difficult to secure over trash receptacle lips and explaining how the described short seals solve this problem.

The Court reasoned that the claims were limited to straightforward steps that a skilled artisan could perform mentally and that the inventors admitted to doing so. The claims, on their face, do not call for computer implementation, and Synopsys did not advance a claim construction requiring a computer. Additionally, complex details in the specification are insufficient to transform broad claims from an abstract idea into patentable subject matter. Given the breadth of the claims, the Court declined to decide if a computer-implemented version of the invention would be patentable under § 101.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that this evidence did not demonstrate a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer in claim scope. The Court emphasized that disavowals must be evaluated in the context of the entire prosecution history. Thus, the term “cells derived from a vascularized tissue” included both parenchymal (organ) and non-parenchymal cells. The file history statements did not amount to an unmistakable disclaimer of non-parenchymal cells, in light of the full prosecution history and the claim language pending at the time of the alleged disavowal.

Using new or improved rules applied by a computer may be patent-eligible, and improving the operation of the computer itself may be patent-eligible, but using a computer to implement old practices is not patentable under § 101. Further, claiming a combination of data sources, or limiting claims to the computer field, does not transform an otherwise abstract idea into “something more” that is patent-eligible.

The Court found substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of infringement. While Samsung’s expert offered conflicting testimony, a reasonable jury could have credited Apple’s expert. Thus, there was no error in the district court’s conclusion that substantial evidence supported the jury verdict of infringement… Note that the underlying dispute in this case does not concern design patents that were also asserted against Samsung, and which are currently being reviewed by the Supreme Court.

The U.S. government weighs in on Life Technologies’ side because “the application of U.S. patent law to participation by U.S. exporters in foreign markets also raise issues concerning the competiveness of American companies abroad and the respective roles of the United States and other nations’ patent laws.” The government argues that the Federal Circuit has not given a workable definition to determine when a component is sufficiently important or essential as to be “a substantial portion of the components.” The government also argues that, in legislating § 271(f), Congress’s purpose was to outlaw evasion of a U.S. patent by conduct that tantamount to manufacturing the patented invention in the U.S. for export. The government argues that there is no clear expressed Congressional intent for § 271(f) to reach supplying a single staple article: when the product is made abroad except for such a staple article, Congress left that predominantly foreign conduct to be regulated by foreign law. Finally, the government argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality requires the courts to assume both that “legislators take account of the legitimate interests of other nations” and “foreign conduct is generally the domain of foreign law.”