Posts in Federal Circuit

In Williamson v. Citrix, the Federal Circuit overruled its own precedent that there is a “strong” presumption that claim limitations that do not use the term “means” are not means-plus-function limitations. This change has been decried by practitioners who purposefully avoid the word “means” in order to avoid means-plus-function treatment of their functionally claimed elements. Means-plus-function claiming is an opportunity to be embraced, not a trap to be avoided. Invoking §112(f) and the associated scope of a means-plus-function limitation is largely in the control of the patent drafter.

This week in the Federal Circuit Review: (1) Proposed rejections to claims added during Inter Partes Reexamination are not evaluated for substantial new question of patentability (Airbus S.A.S., v. Firepass Corp.); and (2) Likelihood-of-Confusion requires full consideration of strengths and weaknesses of existing mark (Juice Generation, Inc., v. GS Enterprises LLC ).

In general, the courts distinguish between functions and algorithms, and they require patent applicants to disclose algorithms to cure perceived deficiencies in functions. The problem with this line of reasoning is that both algorithms and functions under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) are composed of the same things: steps. So the result of the algorithm requirement is to simply make patent applicants “fix” one step by specifying more steps. Accordingly, if the algorithm requirement is taken to its logical conclusion, then each step would be fixed with more steps, and each of those steps would be fixed with even more steps, like Russian dolls. Instead, the courts do not take the algorithm to its logical conclusion and, instead, only require a single layer: the original step and the further steps (i.e., algorithm) for it. This is arbitrary, confusing for patent applicants and examiners, and a poorly calibrated solution to concerns about software patents.

In this issue of the Federal Circuit Review: (1) Personal Jurisdiction Remains Unchanged – Federal Circuit Declines “Stream-of-Commerce” Theory; (2) Court Denies Fee Award Under Octane But Recognizes “Troll”-Like Behavior is Relevant Consideration; (3) 35 U.S.C. § 324(e) Does Not Bar Judicial Review of Initial USPTO Determination That Patent is for a “Covered Business Method” (Versata I); and (4) 35 U.S.C. § 324(e) Bars District Court Review of USPTO Decision to Institute CBM Review (Versata II).

In three related decisions (most recently including a denial of rehearing en banc by a badly divided 6-5 decision issued concurrently with reissuance of the earlier panel decision) titled In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, the Federal Circuit has held: (1) claim construction in IPR proceedings is governed by the prosecution standard of “broadest reasonable interpretation,” rather than the adjudicatory standard applied in the district courts (i.e., claim terms have their “ordinary and customary meaning” per the 2004 Federal Circuit decision of Phillips v. AHW Corp.); and (2) the Federal Circuit lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR proceeding. Whether the AIA permits appellate review of improperly instituted IPR proceedings, the Administrative Procedures Act clearly permits such appellate review.

In this issue of the Federal Circuit Review: (1) Damages for Lost Profits May Not Be Based On Extraterritorial Services Performed by an Infringer’s Customers Under § 271(f); (2) Federal Circuit Invalidates Claims Under the On-Sale Bar for Commercial Exploitation of the Invention Before the Critical Date; and (3) The PTO’s 180-Day Filing Deadline of the Optional Interim Procedure for PTA Reconsideration Request Is Not Arbitrary and Capricious.

Former Finnegan, Henderson partner Kara Stoll has been unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate for a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. According to Politico, Stoll’s confirmation makes history because she is the first minority woman to serve on the Federal Circuit.

The Apple Pay mobile payment service created by the company should get an important security upgrade through the technology described within U.S. Patent Application No. 20150127549, which is titled Using Biometric Authentication for NFC-Based Payments. The electronic device claime includes a secure element with a payment applet and a processor which is configured to compare local authentication information for the device with stored authentication information. The processor also provides local validation information for the device to allow a payment applet to conduct a financial shopping center servicestransaction. This system relates to secure mobile payments and works without requiring a user to manually input authentication information for each transaction.

Last week the Federal Circuit scheduled oral argument en banc in THE SLANTS trademark case for the morning of October 2, 2015, taking up the question of whether §2(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)) can withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Writing separately after the panel decision, Judge Moore offered 24 pages of “additional views” on the matter, encouraging the Federal Circuit to “revisit McGinley’s holding on the constitutionality of §2(a),” noting that “the protection accorded to commercial speech has evolved significantly since the McGinley decision.”

In this issue of the Federal Circuit Review: (1) Bad Lawyering Is Not Misconduct For Awarding Attorneys Fees; (2) Continuing Applications Are not Entitled to Patent Term Adjustment for Delay in the Prosecution of the Parent Application.

In this issue of the Federal Circuit Review: (1) A Patent Owner Must Show They Are Entitled to Amended Claims In an Inter Partes Review, Including in View Of All Prior Art of Record, and Known to the Patent Owner; (2) Federal Circuit Reverses Every E.D. Va. Claim Construction on Appeal in TomTom v. Adolph Mobile Tracking System Suit; and (3) Federal Circuit Overrule the “Strong Presumption” Embodied in § 112 para. 6 for Functional Limitations Expressed Without the Term “Means.”

Partners Joe Robinson and Bob Schaffer have for some time published a Federal Circuit Review Newsletter. I have been a subscriber since they started publishing that newsletter just over a year ago. I pitched Joe and Bob with the idea of publishing their weekly newsletter on IPWatchdog.com. They liked the idea. Thus, I am pleased to announce that beginning Friday, June 26, 2015, IPWatchdog.com will publish the Troutman Sanders newsletter each Friday.

There can be little doubt of the exceptional importance of Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. to the intellectual property community, and to innovators as a whole. The issue of joint infringement has been the focus of much discussion in recent years by academia, the media, and industry. In its 2014 remand of this case, the Supreme Court suggested this Court would have the opportunity to “revisit the § 271(a) question if it so chooses,” 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2120 (“Akamai III”). The AIPLA, as amicus curiae, argues that the Federal Circuit should choose to do so by rehearing the case en banc because the single entity rule as set out by the Panel majority would make it nearly impossible for certain patent holders to enforce their patents against joint infringers.

The opinion focused on whether adequate structure corresponding to the “coordinating” function is disclosed in the specification. After determining that a special purpose computer is required to perform the function, the court searched for an algorithm for performing the function, but did not find one. The court rejected Williamson’s argument that the distributed learning control module controls communications among the various computer systems and that the “coordinating” function provides a presenter with streaming media selection functionality. The disclosures relied upon by Williamson were thought of by the court as merely functions of the distributed learning control module and opined that the specification does not set forth an algorithm for performing the claimed functions.

Functional claim language is increasingly being used by practitioners to capture the metes and bounds of an invention, especially in computer-implemented inventions. Sometimes using functional language in a claim limitation is unavoidable. Functional language does not, in and of itself, render a claim improper. However, as recently experienced in Williamson v. Citrix (en banc) and Robert Bosch, using functional language carries a significant risk of having the claim invalidated as indefinite following a determination that the claim invokes § 112(f) even when the patentee does not intend to have the claim treated under § 112(f).