Posts in US Supreme Court

In exercising this discretion the Supreme Court held that district courts should consider the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s position, but that the objective reasonableness was not the only factor, or even the predominant factor, for district courts to consider. Rather, the Supreme Court explained that district courts retain broad discretion to make an award even when the losing party advanced a reasonable claim or defense.

Essentially, the Supreme Court told the Federal Circuit that they needed remedial reading lessons. The statute is clear: “may” means district courts have discretion. The Supreme Court also seemed instruct the Federal Circuit to stop making stuff up that clearly isn’t found within the statute. It is truly ironic, even downright funny, how the Supreme Court can so clearly see that the Federal Circuit is not being true to the simple, easy to understand, straight-forward terms of a statute but at the same time lack the capacity to similarly see that they are themselves doing the very same thing. If intellectual honesty means anything the Supreme Court would hold themselves to the same standard and stop applying judicial exceptions to patent eligibility that enjoy no textual support in the statute.

The chance of a court tripling damages for patent infringement has significantly increased. The Supreme Court, Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., et al. and Stryker Corporation, et al. v. Zimmer, Inc., et al., granted district courts more discretion to award enhanced damages for willful patent infringement. However, the Court’s recent decision could have unintended consequences. The Supreme Court’s relaxation of the requirements for willful infringement could be a game changer for patent trolls.

Unfortunately, §102, §103, and §112 issues can and do get wrapped into the court’s §101 reasoning, thus resulting in opinions with no differentiation. In the end, courts are forcing a round peg into a square hole when they seek to turn the patentability test into a single factor test analyzed under §101. Such a reworking of the patentability test is contrary to what the Supreme Court said in Diehr, and it violates the statutes passed by Congress. In essence, the courts are legislating from the bench when they consider novelty, obviousness and description under §101. So if you are confused by why decisions are relying on §101 when other sections of the statute seem far better suited you are not alone.

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion with large ramifications for patent holders and potential infringers alike. Deciding the consolidated cases of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. and Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., the Court ruled that enhanced patent damages are appropriate to punish an infringer’s egregious, deliberate, or flagrant patent infringement. The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s Seagate test, which had provided an accused infringer with a complete defense to a charge of willfulness (and thus enhanced damages) if the infringer was able to construct, even years after the infringement began, a reasonable argument that the patent was invalid or not infringed, even where the infringer in fact had acted in bad faith. The Court also lowered the required burden of proof from clear and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence. At the same time, it seems clear that mere negligence is not enough to establish entitlement to enhanced damages. While the Supreme Court referred to the 180 years of enhanced damages jurisprudence since the Patent Act of 1836 as setting forth the appropriate approach, it may take several years of additional litigation for predictability to emerge from today’s decision.

Earlier today, in a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., the United States Supreme Court did what much of the patent world expected it would do, which is overrule the Federal Circuit’s “unduly rigid” test for the awarding of enhanced damages for willful damages put in place by In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F. 3d 1360, 1371 (2007)(en banc).

As the Supreme Court prepares to hear arguments for SCA Hygiene Products v. First Quality during the October 2016 term, another laches case, Medinol Ltd. v. Cordis Corp., awaits its chance to be heard before the Court. Medinol, similar to SCA Hygiene, presents the question of whether judges may use the equitable defense of laches to bar legal claims for damages that are timely within the express terms of the Patent Act.

Over the last ten years, one bad patent reform bill after another has been introduced and then pushed by a fantastic lobbying and public relations effort that has dumped hundreds of millions of dollars on Washington DC. eBay v. MercExchange is not the only legislation enacted by the courts in their effort to avoid Congressional meddling with their turf. Legislation was introduced related to damages, willful infringement, inequitable conduct and obviousness, all of which were enacted in whole or in part by the courts, presumably to avoid passage of the legislation in Congress.

Amici agree with Petitioner that this procedure was beyond Congress’s power to impose, and its underpinning rationale—that patents are a matter of administrative largesse, rather than the constitutionally protected property right—is constitutionally infirm. Amici write separately because this case presents an issue of enormous significance with far-reaching consequences for inventors, investors, and small-business owners. The institution of IPR review has made patents more expensive to obtain and defend, and has introduced uncertainty in patent rights that makes patents less valuable to their holders, less attractive to inventors, and less safe for investors. This devaluation of patent rights has measurably diminished the value of all patents.

This case presents an important constitutional question which the court below decided based on an incomplete analysis of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. In the case below, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that a patent is a “public right,” and that these Article I trial proceedings are not unconstitutional. Significantly, the Federal Circuit reached its conclusion without considering more than a century of precedent by this Court recognizing that an issued patent is a property right, at least for purposes of determining if a “taking” has happened. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882); see also Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting with approval James).

In March 2016, Vehicle Intelligence filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court arguing that the two-part Alice test is “a universal pesticide to kill and invalidate virtually all patents.” Vehicle Intelligence has posed the following questions: (1) whether the Mayo/Alice test states that use or application of an abstract idea is automatic, conclusive proof of preemption of the abstract idea; (2) whether the Mayo/Alice test requires that any patent which improves on technology existing in the prior art to be retaught in a vacuum in order to present inventive concepts to satisfy the second step of the Mayo/Alice test; and (3) whether a patent would satisfy the second step of the Mayo/Alice test by having independent claims that include multiple explicitly-stated inventive concepts.

Recent decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit regarding damages available in design patent cases highlight the court’s divergence from its damages jurisprudence in the utility patent context – specifically, the lack of an apportionment requirement between patented and unpatented portions of an infringing product. While this may make design patents increasingly desirable, the Supreme Court’s decision to review the issue now raises the possibility that the discrepancy will be resolved.

I represent MCM Portfolio LLC, which is seeking Supreme Court review of a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upholding the constitutionality of the inter partes review (IPR) procedures created by the America Invents Act (AIA). The petition is available here. Amicus briefs in support of the petition are being filed May 31. We argue that IPR violates Article III of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power in the federal courts, and also the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees a right to a jury in civil litigation.

A good argument can be made that a given panel of PTAB judges will construe claims in the manner that makes most sense to them, regardless of the legal rubric they are assigned. Indeed, we can draw a direct analogy from the experience following the Supreme Court’s decision in Teva v. Sandoz on the degree of appellate deference to be accorded to a district court’s claim construction. Notwithstanding decades of anticipation surrounding that issue, there has been little practical effect on the outcomes of litigations or appeals as a result of Teva. District court judges and Federal Circuit panels still approach claim construction issues in essentially the same way they did before. It seems likely that the use of BRI versus plain and ordinary meaning in inter partes review proceedings will also turn out to be much ado about nothing.

It seems difficult to reconcile the Respondent’s principal argument that two standards should still apply: that is, that the PTAB should be permitted to continue applying its policy-derived broad BRI standard for construing patent claim scope in Congressionally mandated “adjudicative” IPR proceedings while still using the lower preponderance of the evidence standard provided under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). The notion that the USPTO may “infer” such intent to also apply the BRI in the absence of any express guidance from Congress was weak, at best. Especially because having two such claim construction standards applied by Article III courts and the ITC on the one hand, and the USPTO’s unilateral application of an “examination” claim construction standard in an intended “adjudication” setting on the other hand, has already led to inequitable and presumably non-appealable results.