Posts in US Supreme Court

On Monday, April 25, 2016, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, the first case in which the Supreme Court will decide issues relating to inter partes review (IPR) proceedings conducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). With the oral arguments now behind us, I once again reached out to a panel of experts who are closely watching the case to ask for their reactions. Once again, I posed the question: What do you expect the Supreme Court to do in Cuozzo? This time, with the benefit of having listened to the oral arguments, the reactions and predictions of our panel of experts follows.

Two cases making their way through the Federal courts may force the Supreme Court to consider the issue of what sorts of trademarks should be considered “disparaging,” and whether the government may lawfully prevent the registration of such trademarks… The Redskins appealed to the Fourth Circuit in August 2015 and the parties’ and amici briefs have been rolling ever since. As of April 25, 2016, the Redskins have petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review their case, skipping over the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal.

The use of a mathematical formula in a claim can trigger a 35 USC 101 rejection or invalidation of the patented claim. However, the role of mathematics in physics and in inventions has changed dramatically over the last 50 years. Computers are programmed to operate on the numbers to perform a defined task, such as filtering or demodulation, by performing calculations in a certain order and at a certain speed. Cellphones, DVD players, telephone sets, 3D printers, cameras, MRI machines and the like are in essence computers with an A/D and D/A converter and/or transducers.

Perhaps the best question of the entire oral argument was asked by Chief Justice Roberts: “So why ­­should we be so wedded to the way they do business in the PTO with respect to the broadest possible construction when the ­­point is not to replicate PTO procedures? It’s supposed to take the place of district court procedures.” Gannon’s response pointed to the difference in the burden of proof between the district court (i.e., clear and convincing) and the PTAB (i.e., preponderance). Chief Justice Roberts responded, “it’s a very extraordinary animal in legal culture to have two different proceedings addressing the same question that lead to different results.” Gannon replied that there are “multiple reasons” why different results could be achieved, to which Roberts said: “there’s a problem here, and so we should accept another problem that’s presented where we don’t have to do it.”

While I would never go into business handicapping the outcome of SCOTUS deliberations, I do have an opinion about what they should do in this case, at least on the claim construction issue. Judge Newman had it exactly right in her panel dissent and her concise dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. The “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard is useful during the examination phase, ensuring that no conceivably relevant art is overlooked and that the applicant’s opportunity to amend is well informed. But it’s silly, and ultimately damaging to the system, to apply the same standard in a post-issuance process that is directed at determining exactly what issued claims mean and where amendments are seriously restricted. Just as in district court, IPRs benefit from contested advocacy about the meaning of claim terms. In that adjudicative phase there is no place for the artificial construct of “broadest reasonable interpretation” in place of “most reasonable interpretation.”

If the Supreme Court’s recent track record in patent cases is a guide to the potential outcome in this case, it seems quite likely that the Court will not simply affirm the Federal Circuit’s decision. While the Government has set out some reasonably compelling points in support of its position, I believe the Court will agree in large part with Cuozzo and the overwhelming support of the many amici in the case that have set out significant problems and negative long term consequences to the patent system if the PTO’s current approach of using BRI in IPRs is not altered. I also believe the Court will reign in the PTO with regard to its position on reviewability of the PTAB’s institution decisions. A prohibition on judicial review in this context arguably would allow a U.S. government agency to exceed its explicit statutory authority granted by Congress.

On one hand, logic dictates that the broader the interpretation of the claim, the more extensive the array of relevant prior art—and in turn the more likely that the claim will be held invalid in light of that prior art. On the other hand, evaluating whether the Board’s use of the BRI protocol in an IPR claim construction will lead to “different results” than the plain and ordinary meaning construction used by federal courts in claim construction is complicated by the relatively scant evidence on the subject, and the inevitable fact that this evidence is naturally dependent on particular prior art and invalidity and obviousness arguments specific to a particular patent. Even putting aside the question of what impact a different claim construction standard may have in an IPR, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies will not address several powerful differences between an IPR and district court litigation that impact whether a particular patent claim survives.

Versata presented four questions to the Supreme Court, some very specific to CBM proceedings. In its amicus brief, Broadband iTV more generally asks the Supreme Court to revisit its patent-eligibility precedents, and clarify how computer-implemented claims can be found patent-eligible under Alice to correct the ongoing misapplication of Alice in the lower courts and by the PTAB. Since Alice, more than 100 patents and thousands of claims have been declared invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by the lower courts or PTAB using an overly broad interpretation of Alice. Thus, it is important for this Court to take up the issue of patent-eligibility once again and right the course.

The Subcommittee is Chaired by Congressman Darrell Issa (R-CA), who has been an outspoken advocate for the need for more patent reform in order to provide relief from those he believes are abusing the patent litigation system — those sometimes called patent trolls. Indeed, from the start of the Thursday’s hearing, the debate regarding patent infringement at the ITC was couched in the language of the patent troll debate. For example, during his opening statement Congressman Issa rather imperiously stated: “for purposes of my opening statement ‘plaintiff’ and ‘troll’ will be interchangeable.” Issa, himself a patent owner, was forced to litigate against companies that pirated technology covered by his patents. As a patent owner forced to sue at numerous infringers, it would seem that Congressman Issa believes that patent owner and inventor Issa was a patent troll.

Unified Patents Inc. explained in its amicus brief in Cuozzo Speed v. Lee that “[t]he phrase ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ describes the same procedure applied in both the PTO and by the courts.” An inconvenient truth for Cuozzo — but a truth nonetheless. Gene attacked Unified Patent’s position here last Sunday as “false on its face” and “unequivocally incorrect.” Those pejoratives miss the point of Unified’s brief. Unified did not argue that the courts and PTO both apply BRI in name; indeed, Cuozzo would lose his semantic gripe if that were the case. Rather, Unified argued that peeling away the Phillips and BRI labels reveals that both standards employ the same procedure. On this point, Unified’s position is hardly controversial, and Unified is hardly alone.

In the Introduction to the Unified Patents’ brief the following statement is made: “The phrase ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ describes the same procedure applied in both the PTO and by the courts.” That statement is unequivocally incorrect. Federal district courts do not apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of an issued claim when performing a claim construction in patent litigation. Quite the opposite, district courts narrowly interpret claims in an attempt to find a true and correct construction of the claims. The law is unequivocally clear: district courts do not apply the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. It is so axiomatic that district courts use a different standard than does the USPTO when interpreting claims it is almost difficult to figure out where to begin to unravel this falsehood.

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in the Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee on April 25, 2016, with a decision expected sometime before the end of June… [S]ome of the Federal Circuit judges have shown signs that their position on these questions are not as rigid as previously thought. This is not unprecedented – for example, when the Supreme Court was on the verge of considering the patent fee-shifting statute of 35 U.S.C. § 285 in the Octane Fitness case, Judge Rader was seen criticizing the Federal Circuit’s established test in a concurrence to the Kilopass Tech. Inc. v. Sidense Corp. case. The current Federal Circuit may also be recognizing that the present understanding of PTAB jurisprudence may be soon changing.

Rather than use the word ‘conflate’ to describe the mongrel mixture of patentability requirements the Supreme Court undertook in Mayo, the Eli Lilly brief characterizes the analysis employed by the Supreme Court as including a separate, implicit ‘threshold test’ for patentability that is applied even before consideration of the statutory patentability requirements. Eli Lilly hypothesizes that this ‘implicit exception was imposed to assure that patents cannot validly protect—or preempt access to—laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.’

2015 is the second straight year in which the list of top plaintiffs has been led by eDekka LLC, a patent holding company, which at times has been accused of exhibiting trolling behaviors… Atop this list was the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (N.D. Cal.), which between 2005 and 2015 has awarded more than $2.1 billion in compensatory damages over the course of 2,169 cases filed. Following behind them was the U.S. District for the Southern District of California (S.D. Cal.), U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.), and followed in fourth place by E.D. Tex. Median damages for cases terminating between 2000 and 2015 showed a different story, however, as that list was topped by the District of Delaware, which had a median award of $10.46 million in 40 cases with damages. The Eastern District of Texas follows in second with a $7.68 million median damages award and in third is the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (E.D. Va.), with a median award of $2.98 million. After that, there’s a steep drop and every other district is showing a median damages award of less than $1 million.

On Monday, March 21, 2016, the United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Samsung Electronics v. Apple, Inc., which relates to how much Samsung owes for infringing Apple design patents. The question accepted by the Supreme Court is: “Where a design patent is applied to only a component of a product, should an award of infringer’s profits be limited to those profits attributable to the component?”