Posts in US Supreme Court

It is undeniable that the major destructive force in the patent system today is the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, over the last several years, the Supreme Court has become extremely active in the area of patent law. They have made decisions on a number of cases that have significantly altered the patent landscape and negatively affecting patent value. Without any legitimate statutory precedent or authority the Supreme Court is wrecking the U.S. economy just as sure as snow is white and water is wet. As a lawyer it is hard to watch the Supreme Court. I increasingly wonder how anyone could teach either patent law or constitutional law without simply acknowledging to the students that there is no rhyme or reason in the decisions of our High Court.

Simply stated, any patent decision from the Supreme Court that cites stare decisis lacks all intellectual credibility given how arbitrarily and capriciously they have ignored their patent own precedent and the patent statutes over the past decade. Obviously, this Supreme Court doesn’t understand the true definition of stare decisis. Given how frequently the Court disturbs well-established principles and precedent in the patent space the use of stare decisis in this case is nothing more than a complete and total cop-out. It also insults the intelligence of anyone who has even casually observed the Supreme Court on patent matters over the past decade.

While some companies continue to wait and see, we saw a dramatic shift in late 2014. The most sophisticated companies on IP matters used the uncertainty to their advantage. They hypothesized the market couldn’t get much worse, and since they would eventually need to engage in licensing discussions, they used the negotiation leverage they had during a slow market to get the best deal. Similar to a “buyer’s market” in real estate, the IP market was (and continues to be for some) a licensee’s market as many companies sit back and wait to see how the uncertainty will shake out.

The idea that the Supreme Court is at all capable of understanding — let alone deciding — issues of a technical nature is ridiculous. Yet their individual and collective lack of knowledge hasn’t prevented them from reaching misguided decisions in a variety of cases. Like an Emperor without any clothes the Supreme Court seems blissfully ignorant of their own ignorance. Indeed, you would have to go out of your way to find nine less qualified people to decide issues of a technological nature.

In both theories of indirect patent infringement (i.e., inducement of patent infringement and contributory infringement), the patent owner must show that the defendant knew its activities were infringing. If the defendant can prove that it did not have such belief then it is a valid defense to indirect infringement. In Commil, the defendant went a step further and contended that it was not liable for inducement of infringement, arguing that it is axiomatic that one cannot infringe an invalid patent and it had a good faith belief that the patent at issue was invalid. The defendant mixed infringement and invalidity together. In the opinion, the Supreme Court placed a wall between the theories of infringement and invalidity and held that the mental state of the defendant as to the patent’s invalidity has no bearing on whether it thought its acts were infringing.

The issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether a good faith belief of patent invalidity is a defense to a claim of induced infringement. In a 6-2 decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court ruled that belief of invalidity is not a defense to a claim of induced infringement. While it seems that the Supreme Court issued a reasonable decision in this case it is deeply troubling how little the Supreme Court actually knows about patent law. In addition to repeatedly discussing the validity of the Commil patent, rather than the validity of the patent claims, the Supreme Court also seemed to suggest that Cisco could have relied on a procedural challenge to the Commil patent that simply wasn’t available as an option at any relevant time during the proceedings.

There was a split in the circuit courts as to what effect a TTAB decision will have, and this depends heavily upon where the litigation is happening. The weight of a TTAB decision will vary depending on the jurisdiction, ranging from none at all to complete preclusion. Here, the issue was whether one mark was confusingly similar to another, which the Supreme Court determined was exactly the same as what was being litigated.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has had a very long love affair with de novo review, a standard whereby the reviewing appellate court can simply do whatever they want without giving any deference to the district court judge or the jury. It isn’t much of an exaggeration to say that the Federal Circuit does what they want, when they want, how they want, and they have rarely let the standard of review get in the way. That was until today. Assuming the Federal Circuit follows the Teva decision as they are supposed to and as they have mindlessly followed other recent Supreme Court decisions in Myriad, Mayo and Alice, the Federal Circuit’s application of the de novo review standard to everything will come to an abrupt end.

Truthfully, the Supreme Court decision in Alice can only be described as an intellectually bankrupt. The Supreme Court never once used the word “software” in its decision. The failure to mention software a single time is breathtaking given that the Supreme Court decision in Alice will render many hundreds of thousands of software patents completely useless. Ironically, at the end of the day, software patent claims written in typical, industry standard format will result in patent ineligible claims. Yet, at the same time, business methods are patentable. To call this bizarre and inconsistent doesn’t begin to scratch the surface.

Our Judicial Mount Olympus pays, at best, lip-service to Chakrabarty’s observation that, in enacting 35 U.S.C. § 101 in 1952, Congress chose the statutory classes (in Chakrabarty, referring specifically to “composition” and “manufacture” but which would be equally applicable to “apparatus” (i.e., machines) and “process”) to be given an “expansive” and “broad” construction. That command in Chakrabarty would suggest that rulings of patent-ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 would be the exception, not the rule. By contrast, this unending stream of patent-ineligibility rulings from the lower courts after Alice suggests a serious disconnect, showing no adherence to, or even observance of this command by Chakrabarty to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be “expansively” and “broadly” inclusive, but to be instead very restrictive. As former Chief Judge Rader might characterize it, this restrictive two-part test of Alice has made 35 U.S.C. § 101 not a “coarse screen,” but instead an extremely “narrow funnel.” In other words, the draconian two-part test of Alice was broken from the start.