Posts in Guest Contributors

This article reviews the 50 years of controversy on software patents. Because there continues to be a cloud over computer-implemented inventions, the article makes the argument, through indisputable facts, that computer-implemented inventions are no different from inventions that have been patented since the beginning of the Patent System in 1790. Finally, the article reviews three innovative patented computer-implemented inventions and explains why the phrase “software patent” is meaningless.

In vacating the district court’s summary judgment order, the Federal Circuit noted first that statements made by Micron’s expert regarding what the anticipatory reference disclosed were not actually supported by the anticipatory reference itself… These kinds of procedural safeguards are commonly applied by other regional circuits, but have seemed to be missing from Federal Circuit case law of late, with the Federal Circuit seeming to be rather eager to address the substance of a given dispute. Perhaps with the overwhelming caseload now at the Federal Circuit, and its need to resort to both Rule 36 and non-precedential opinions, the court seems to finally be coming to terms with the fact that it is an appeals court and not a court of first instance that should always decide cases de novo.

The debate on royalty payments for standard essential patents has a surprisingly emotional, sometimes even hostile, undertone. Companies selling standards-based products have an obvious commercial interest in lower royalty rates, but for some participants in the debate the hostility goes deeper. Some people find the idea of having to pay royalties for the use of any standard objectionable and unreasonable.

The declines in productivity growth in recent years are undisputed. There is some controversy over the causes of these declines, particularly, the sources of the declines in technology investment. However, the arguments of the present article elucidating a decline in the patent system suggest a clear and potent explanation for the declines in technology investment and in productivity growth…. The tech cartel has been relentless in denying opportunities for patent holders to enforce patents. The three main ways for attacking patents include instituting IPRs in the PTO, constraining enforcement in federal court and limiting damages. Each of these must be retuned.

Based on the question presented in Lee v. Tam, the Supreme Court made clear that its grant of review is only as to the disparagement provision in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), but the outcome of this case will affect the other types of marks excluded by Section 2(a), such as marks that may be viewed as immoral or scandalous. Indeed, in a footnote in its en banc decision the Federal Circuit “recognized…that other portions of § 2 may likewise constitute government regulation of expression based on message, such as the exclusions of immoral or scandalous marks….”

Technology transfer is blocked in a weak patent system since companies employ the “efficient infringement” model. In a weak patent system, enforcement is expensive and burdensome, supplying the infringer with incentives to infringe. Rather than voluntarily license technology, incumbents engage in reverse hold out in which they ignore patents and refuse to deal with patent holders. When an entire industry engages in reverse hold out, that is, collective refusal to deal, which is enabled by a weak patent system with high barriers to enforcement, they exhibit anti-competitive behaviors. In fact, enforcement in the courts, as expensive as it is, is generally caused by the belligerence and refusal to deal by technology incumbents which force matters to the courts. Particularly in the absence of an injunction as a remedy for the patent holder, the patent holder can no longer possibly be considered a hold out because their patents cannot enforce an exclusive property patent right. In the pervasive business and political environment that enables the collective refusal to deal with patent-holding market entrants, with high transaction costs to patent enforcement and with reduced compensation from enforcement because of a reduction in patent remedies, there is no incentive to invest in innovation.

For accused infringers relying on invalidity defenses that were presented in an inter partes review (“IPR”) to fight willful infringement allegations in district court, the shift in IPR success rates can spell trouble. Evidence of an IPR in which all asserted claims were not petitioned or some of the challenged claims were not invalidated in a final written decision can undermine willful infringement defenses. And now that Halo v. Pulse has chipped away at the high-bar of the Seagate objective prong in favor of a fact-intensive evaluation, willfulness is more likely to be a centerpiece of jury trials. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 14-1513, 2016 WL 3221515 (U.S. June 13, 2016); In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 479 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). As a result, evidence regarding the strength of and reliance on IPR-presented defenses is more likely to come into the record at trial. Petitioner-defendants need to prepare early for the possibility that evidence of perceived IPR failures will be presented to jury to avoid being left with no admissible evidence disproving willful infringement. A well-prepared defendant can even turn the tables on the patent owner by using the perceived failures to its own advantage in front of the jury.

There are several major statutory rejections that an applicant can receive during the course of patent prosecution at the USPTO, each one corresponding to the relevant section of the Patent Act: § 101 (subject matter), § 102 (novelty), § 103 (non-obviousness), § 112(a) (specification), and§ 112(b) (definiteness). Any application can receive any one of these rejections, but some are more common than others, especially when considering technology center and the type of technology involved. For example, § 101 rejections are very common in TC 3600 due to the presence of the§ 112(a) Alice-heavy e-commerce art units, while fairly simple inventions are more likely to receive § 102 rejections. In addition to prevalence based on technology type, the type of rejection an applicant can receive can also depend upon where their application is in the prosecution process. When it comes to first final rejections, § 103 rejections are the most common.

In re: Natural Alternatives, LLC, 2015-1911 (opinion and errata) is a non-precedential but still notable case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that finds the claims of a patent that was in reexamination to be patentable, despite the examiner and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board finding that the claims were obvious. While the examiner had cobbled together various references to make an obviousness rejection, the examiner failed to set forth “sufficient facts” supporting his position that the prior art disclosed the limitations of Natural’s claims in a manner that renders the claimed invention obvious.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to review a Federal Circuit ruling that held unconstitutional a law prohibiting registration of trademarks that “may disparage” people or groups. In a case involving an Asian-American dance band’s bid to register its name THE SLANTS as a trademark, the court will consider whether the bar on registering disparaging marks in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), violates the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. In the meantime, the Court is expected to rule soon on the Washington Redskins’ cert petition in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 15-1874, challenging a decision of the Eastern District of Virginia upholding the PTO’s cancellation of the REDSKINS trademarks under that same provision.

Customers, myself included, are used to the customer-centric technologies experienced in other ‘digitized’ sectors like publishing or music – these have had to adapt to the digital revolution early. Customers now want that experience replicated in the FS sector. Banks, for example, are beginning to take notice, investing significant amounts of money in IT upgrades: Australia’s Commonwealth Bank invested over AUD $1.1 billion in an end-to-end IT transformation project to replace its aging core banking system and Barclays has been promoting customer-centric technologies like the mobile payments app PingIt for many years.

The distinctive character is one of the universally accepted criteria for registration of a sign as a trademark. This criterion is derived from the main function of a trademark, i.e. to distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. This requirement is set out in Article 6quinquies (B) (2) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and in the national laws of the countries that are parties to this Convention. Ukraine and the European Union (the “EU”) are no exception. Both in Ukraine (Article 6(2) of the Law of Ukraine “On Protection of Rights to Trademarks”) and in the EU (Article 3(1) of the EU Directive to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks), signs which are devoid of any distinctive character may not be registered as trademarks.

Over the past 25 years, I have patented innovations relating to digital watermarking, content recognition, deep packet inspection, rights management, and related technologies. Today digital watermarking is found on billions of files moving around the Internet every day. This technology protects musicians, artists, writers, and developers from having their work illegally copied. How ironic it is that for the past decade, I have been forced to file many legal challenges to protect my own intellectual property. With the passage of the America Invents Act of 2011, Congress sharply tilted the playing field in favor of large corporations that decide to infringe patents owned by small businesses and inventors like me.

The Federal Circuit dismissed Husky’s appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s determination of whether assignor estoppel barred institution of an inter partes review for two reasons. First, Husky’s appeal did not fall into any of the three categories of challenges that were reviewable by the Federal Circuit: there were no constitutional concerns at issue, the question of assignor estoppel did not depend on other less closely related statutes, and there was no question of interpretation reaching beyond § 314(d). Second, Husky’s challenge only implicated the question of who may ask the Board to evaluate the validity of a patent, not the Board’s authority to invalidate a patent.

Under the doctrine of inherent disclosure, it is not necessary for an earlier application to explicitly describe the later patent. There is adequate written description to support a later patent where it is undisputed that the invention inherently described in an earlier application was the same subject matter included in the claims of the later patent.