David Wanetick is a world-renowned authority on the issue of intellectual property valuation. His clients include law firms; emerging, mid- and large-sized companies; national laboratories; technology transfer offices; inventors; venture capitalists and private equity firms. The valuations David performs are primarily conducted in the context of negotiating licensing agreements, mergers and acquisitions, patent sales, capital raises and litigation support. He developed and runs the Certified Patent Valuation Analyst designation.
David is the author of The Strategic Negotiator: A Manual for Negotiating at the Elite Level. For more than 20 years, David has negotiated licensing transactions, spin-offs, capital raises, joint-ventures, and exits alongside and against Fortune 500 companies, government entities, universities, commercial bankers, private equity firms and venture capitalists. David is the Chief Executive Officer of The Institute for Strategic Negotiations, which maintains the world’s largest library of negotiating courses.
With a worldwide pandemic, a gyrating economy, an erratic stock market, turmoil in many of America’s largest cities and a high-stakes election, 2020 has been a tumultuous year. Apart from the obvious anxiety they cause, such events may trigger force majeure clauses in joint-development agreements and licensing agreements. To what extent should licensees compensate licensors who terminate licensing agreements based on instances of force majeure?
Why in the world would the federal government want to be an active participant in invalidating patents that the USPTO grants? Does the federal government believe that an insufficient number of patents are challenged through inter partes reviews, that there is insufficient gang tackling (which occurs when another petitioner requests joinder using a near-photocopy of the original petition), or that there are insufficient serial attacks on the same patents? To put the last issue in other words, does the federal government really believe that nine attacks against some patents are needed?
It is irresponsible for adults to give children who fail to complete their work credit based on the excuse that the children could have, should have, would have completed their assignments. It is much more inequitable for the U.S Patent Office to deprive inventors of the credit they deserve (in the form of patent allowances) because some conjured up combination of disconnected individuals—who have little, if any, temporal or linguistic ability to communicate with one another—could have, should have, would have eventually produced the claimed invention.
Having produced a non-obvious, non-abstract invention and playing by the patent office’s rules is no guarantee of a patent granting. Some examiners have refused to issue patent applications regardless of the merits because doing so would run the risk of them losing their jobs if they received further negative reviews from the Patent Quality initiative. All patents run the risk of expensive oppositions from well-funded competitors.