Posts Tagged: "§ 101"

George Santayana is attributed with the aphorism: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This is modern § 101 in a nutshell. Every horror we in the patent community are now experiencing under Alice/Mayo isn’t new, but a repeat of a drama played out long ago… Every great horror story has a monster… In the patent world, the monster is “invention.”

Contrary to Judge Taranto’s position, not only does the McRO claim not produce a physical improvement to a display (contrast In re Allapat), but as can be seen above a display is not even recited in the McRO claim.  Judge Taranto’s position is as best an assertion that a physical display somehow works better because of the content displayed is subjectively more appealing.  However, a colorized version of The Maltese Falcon does not improve the intrinsic qualities of a generic display.  Similarly, the intrinsic qualities of a Kindle reader are not improved based on the quality of an author’s style of writing.

Narrowly construing the § 101 eligibility exception for abstract ideas is not only suggested by Supreme Court guidance, but also could potentially allow for increased coherence and consistency while simultaneously serving to solicit further Supreme Court guidance on eligibility. Even if the bright-line eligibility prohibition is construed narrowly, § 101 can still serve to police claiming at a level of abstraction that results in overbroad claiming.

There is an alternative route is available to stay true to Supreme Court eligibility jurisprudence: Apply the Supreme Court’s standard approach of narrowly construing statutory exceptions to narrowly construe the implicit statutory exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101 for abstract ideas… In accordance with Supreme Court guidance regarding construction of statutory exceptions, the implicit statutory exception for abstract ideas should be construed “narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision” of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739 (citing Phillips, 324 U. S. at 493).  To do otherwise would risk “frustrat[ing] the announced will of the people.” Phillips, 324 U. S. at 493.

Particularize the claims.  This helps overcome the “abstract” part of a 101 rejection. Put details into the claims to define the steps performed in the software and hardware to a granular degree.  Don’t claim a result; claim the steps performed in accomplishing the result. That is, define the software computer program and hardware in discrete steps. Define what’s going on in each step of the computer program code. Go to the level of a software design engineer that annotates their code, to inform others as to what’s going on in the code.  If there is an algorithm claimed, particularize the claims to include the steps performed in implementing the algorithm.

This assertion is a mischaracterization of Alice Corp., which never held that the intermediated settlement claims at issue in Alice Corp. were abstract because of the risk hedging claims in Bilski were abstract.  Instead, the Supreme Court stated “that there is no meaningful distinc­tion between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here” because “[b]oth are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as we have used that term.”  That is: the claims in Bilski and Alice Corp. were comparable only because the underlying business methods were undoubtedly long-prevalent in the business community.  To hold otherwise is to ignore the vast bulk of both the Bilski and Alice Corp. decisions.

Repeatedly during his remarks and the question and answer period, Director Iancu explained that there will be more to come from the USPTO on patent eligibility and PTAB reforms, hopefully with several weeks he explained… “I certainly agree it is important to have certainty of patent rights,” Iancu explained. “The boundaries of a patent cannot possibly depend on the happenstance of which tribunal will review that patent years down the line…”

It’s been over eight years since the Supreme Court issued its Bilski v Kappos decision, over six years since the Supreme Court issued its Mayo v. Prometheus decision and over four years since the Supreme Court issued its Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank decision.  In case anyone missed it, each of these three landmark cases was decided based on evidence on the record.  Thus, the Supreme Court not only contemplated the need for evidence when determining patent eligibility for abstract ideas of man-made origin, but wholly embraced the practice. Yet despite the Supreme Court’s trio of evidence-based holdings, it was February of this year before a single three-judge Federal Circuit panel definitively ruled on the evidence issue in Berkheimer v. HP, and it was the end of May before a majority of the Federal Circuit signed on to the idea that determining whether a man-made something is well-understood (or well-known), routine and conventional is an issue of fact that should be based on objective evidence. That’s the better part of a decade of the Federal Circuit wandering the desert.

After several years in which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) did not seem to have an official position on the issue, and many Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) panels took a position that was clearly at variance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the PTO recently seems to be acquiescing to principles that the patent bar has been urging for years: (a) the PTO is subject to the same Administrative Procedure Act obligations as any other agency, and therefore cannot make factual findings without substantial evidence, and (b) there’s no carve-out for factual findings underlying § 101 subject matter eligibility rejections.

The same factual analysis required in Berkheimer under step 2B should apply to fundamental economic practice analysis of claims under step 2A. The questions have similar factual underpinnings in both steps. Applicants, when faced with economic based claims and particularly blockchain-based claims, should argue that whether a claim is directed to a fundamental economic practice is a fact question that has three parts. (1) The claims should be directed to a “fundamental” economic practice; (2) The claims should be directed to practice it has been “long” practiced in the system of commerce; and (3) The claim should be directed to a “prevalent” practice in our system of commerce. Each of these fact questions requires supporting evidence which should fall in the same four categories outlined in the April 19, 2018 Memorandum.

While the subject matter of the speech was similar, this speech by Director Iancu was different. It was much more direct and forceful than any of his previous speeches. Iancu asked how inventors are supposed to know where to focus energy and effort without knowing what is patent eligible. That is an excellent question. One that Congress and the Courts should take to heart and thoroughly consider. Very real damage has been done to the U.S. patent system as the result of unnecessary uncertainty and an overly restrictive view of what is patent eligible in the U.S.

This case and the passage above merely confirms what we have long known to be true. The magnitude of the innovation does not matter. Whether there is an innovation does not matter. Certain advances, certain innovations, are simply not patentable in America. No longer is “anything made by man under the sun” patent eligible.

Director Iancu: “But for our purposes what I know for a fact is that in order to incentivize American innovation whether it’s artificial intelligence, DNA processing, or anything else we need to have a robust predictable reliable intellectual property system here at home. And I do worry that the current state of Section 101 in patentable subject matter weakens the robustness of our IP system in the affected areas. And if industry cannot predict in a relatively reliable way whether their investments will be protected from an intellectual property point of view I think that will result in less investment, less growth, fewer jobs created in the affected industries. So I do think it is critically important for our economy. And again whatever industry we’re talking about and whatever industry we want to grow it’s critically important to have a strong reliable and predictable intellectual property system.”

In accordance with the above discussion, particularly point (a), the client should be apprised of the necessity of fully fleshing out the inventive aspects of the technical implementation (i.e. the fuzzy logic). The client, however, may not know what the technical implementation is or what technical problems may need to be overcome. At this point, there may be no harm in filing a provisional patent application to capture the earliest priority date for the client. The next step under point (b) is to work with the client to develop a plan for implementation. Actual technical implementation can be expensive, but it is a very effective way to reveal technical problems that have to be solved. Technical implementation always (in our humble experience) reveals unforeseen technical problems. At some point, what is readily available may need to be modified or customized to serve the specific needs of the new business application, particularly as that application is scaled up. This is where patentable innovation occurs.

The patents discussed below are all landmark inventions and were conceived by inventors inducted into the National Inventors Hall of Fame (NIHF). Would these ground-breaking inventions, that helped set the course of humanity, be patentable today? … The point is that at first blush it’s not readily clear whether these patents would be found subject matter eligible, demonstrating that the uncertainty created by the Supreme Court with respect to patent subject matter eligibility has few bounds – even impacting the most celebrated inventions of our most honored inventors… If we cannot determine with reasonable certainty how all of these inventions would fare if judged under recent Supreme Court case law, then no one can truly teach Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 101.