Posts Tagged: "§ 315"

Service Starts § 315(b) Time-Bar Even If Complaint Involuntarily Dismissed Without Prejudice

In Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. the Federal Circuit ruled the time-bar for filing a petition for inter partes review in Section 315(b) begins to run as soon as a complaint for infringement is served in district court, regardless of whether the complaint is involuntarily or voluntarily dismissed or is ultimately successful on the merits. There are no exceptions to the statutory time limit for filing a petition for inter partes review in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

En Banc Federal Circuit Reverses Achates, Time-Bar Determination is Appealable

Inter Partes Review proceedings (IPRs) are subject to statutory timing provisions. The Court, sitting en banc, reviewed whether PTAB decisions determining whether an IPR was timely filed are appealable. More specifically, the Court considered whether the bar on judicial review of institution decisions, under Section 314(d), applies to the Board’s time-bar determinations, under Section 315(b)… Time-bar determinations by the patent office are reviewable by the Federal Circuit.

Federal Circuit says IPR time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable

Today, the Federal Circuit reversed Achates, and ruled that time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable. “We find no clear and convincing indication in the specific statutory language in the AIA, the specific legislative history of the AIA, or the statutory scheme as a whole that demonstrates Congress’s intent to bar judicial review of § 315(b) time-bar determinations,” wrote Reyna in the majority opinion, which included Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Newman, Moore, O’Malley, Wallach, Taranto, Chen and Stoll. The lack of such a clear and convincing indication from Congress coupled with the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency actions lead the majority to hold that time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable.

What Petitioners and Patent Owners Need to Know About the Scope of IPR Estoppel

In the recent case of Intellectual Ventures v. Toshiba, Judge Robinson noted that “the Federal Circuit has construed the language quite literally” in the use of the word “during.” The term is spelled out as “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonable could have raised during that inter partes review” in § 315(e)(1). The judge noted that while extending the logic of non-instituted grounds as not being able to be raised “during” an IPR proceeding to prior art references that were never presented to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board at all “confounds the very nature of this parallel administrative proceeding, the court cannot divine a way around the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in Shaw.” Thus, she did not estop Toshiba from presenting the grounds never presented to the PTAB in a pair of orders in December and January, and heavily implied that the Federal Circuit should weigh in to clarify the issue.