Posts Tagged: "101 rejections"

Bahr explained a number of things, including the reason the USPTO has not updated patent eligibility guidance to address the pro-patent decision of the Federal Circuit in BASCOM v. AT&T. Many in the industry have been critical of the fact that the USPTO, which has been otherwise quick to provide guidance with respect to important precedential decisions, did not provide examiners with guidance in this case which found the software claims at issue patent eligible. Bahr explained that the USPTO did not think the case changed anything they had previously told patent examiners, which is why no further guidance had been issued.

On Wednesday, August 24, 2016, at 2pm ET, I will be hosting a free webinar discussion on how to overcome Alice rejections. I will discuss the companies that are most successful at overcoming Alice rejections and what they are doing to be successful. We will also provide an update on secondary review and the off-the-record advice we received from an examiner in a 3600 art unit.

One particularly disconcerting and largely unpredictable aspect of Alice is how it has been used to render games patent ineligible. This type of Alice-creep is particularly disconcerting because it ignores the primary concern of the Supreme Court in Mayo. Much of the 101 patent eligibility mischief we now experience can be traced back directly to Mayo v. Prometheus, where the Supreme Court ruled that conventional steps are not enough to transform a law of nature into a patent eligible process… Given that the Alice framework is really the Mayo framework applied to abstract ideas instead of laws of nature, why should Alice ever be used to deal with a process that a patent examiner acknowledges is new, non-obvious and appropriately described? It would seem that Alice simply has no relevance in such a circumstance.

Enfish bothers me. The Federal Circuit decision puts forth some great phrases, but I am concerned that Enfish will not be as useful as hoped in overcoming §101 Alice rejections. The patents at stake in Enfish appear to have been written with a confident view of the prior art and of the invention. So, if a specification does not confidently emphasize the “invention,” its “benefits over” conventional prior art, and “disparage” the prior art, will examiners and judges continue Step 1 characterizations at “such a high level of abstraction”? Is Enfish merely much ado about nothing?

On May 6, 2016, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office released new life science examples on subject matter eligibility (Examples 28-32, consecutively numbered after the previously released USPTO examples). Examples 28 and 30 illustrate the application of the “markedly different” and “significantly more” analysis to nature-based products. Examples 29 and 31 illustrate the USPTO approach to the eligibility analysis of diagnostic claims, which has been much anticipated. Finally, Examples 32 and 33 illustrate the use of a streamlined eligibility analysis. At first glance, the new life science examples, which identify most of the presented hypothetical claims as patent-eligible, provide several teaching points for achieving patent-eligibility in commonly encountered situations in the life sciences area.

Earlier this month, attorneys and patent practitioners from all over the nation, and far corners of the globe, descended upon Bethesda, Maryland for the 31st Annual Intellectual Property Law Conference of the American Bar Association (ABA). A panel of three distinguished practitioners, Tim Bedard of Visa, Eric Sutton of Oracle, and Gene Quinn, debated The Post-Alice Landscape. The presentation included…

The use of a mathematical formula in a claim can trigger a 35 USC 101 rejection or invalidation of the patented claim. However, the role of mathematics in physics and in inventions has changed dramatically over the last 50 years. Computers are programmed to operate on the numbers to perform a defined task, such as filtering or demodulation, by performing calculations in a certain order and at a certain speed. Cellphones, DVD players, telephone sets, 3D printers, cameras, MRI machines and the like are in essence computers with an A/D and D/A converter and/or transducers.

Showing a bowl of spaghetti on one of his first few PowerPoint slides set the tone. The law as it applies to software patent eligibility is a tangled mess. “The Supreme Court has continually taken cases in this area and rather than clarify they have continued to hang on,” Schecter explained referencing the fact that the Supreme Court seems committed to the belief that their 101 jurisprudence is consistent and reconcilable. Of course, that is not the case. “There are too many cases that conflict with each other.” He is right. Schecter would go on to say that we are at a point where a legislative fix seems necessary.

Although categorizing abstract ideas could be helpful, the use of categories expands the risk of overbreadth, especially when the categories have little definition, include sub-categories, and lack negative examples. The PTO should refine the categories of “judicial descriptors,” and do so both negatively and positively, to avoid overbroad application of Alice by examiners. The use of “judicial descriptors” not supported adequately by court decisions has the potential to do great mischief in the area in which I practice frequently, i.e., software and Internet-related patent applications.

Addressing the problem would be responsive to the overwhelming bulk of commenters who expressed opinions on the PTO’s most recent July 2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility (Section 101), who have agreed that the PTO has been applying Alice too vigorously and has been making more rejections than warranted, and that the excess rejections are reflected in the statistics. Examiners would welcome such efforts, because they would better know whether and when to make Alice-type abstract idea rejections under Section 101, in contrast with current guidance, which allow them to find reasons to make such rejections in virtually all cases. A more systematic approach to consideration of such rejections might look like this…

It is poor patent policy to have broad areas of technology deemed patent-ineligible entirely, or ineligible without the high cost of attorney time to argue, and likely appeal, amorphous Alice-type rejections. This is particularly so as to technology that is central to the United States economy. Invention is central to U.S. economic might, and as our economy moves away from the “old line” manufacturing strength of the past, the U.S. has become especially strong in fields dependent on software technology and business methods. Strengths of the current U.S. economy include social media, the Internet, and the service economy, especially financial services. We are also strong in biotech. Yet those are precisely the fields most heavily damaged by Section 101 Alice-type rejections.

The plaintiff moved to strike the re-asserted invalidity defense under §101 as not made with good cause and as unfairly prejudicial. The defendant argued that the change was made in view of the Supreme Court’s §101 decision in Alice v. CLS Bank, which was decided two months before the final invalidity contentions were served. The district court agreed that the Alice decision was sufficient cause to re-assert the §101 defense in the final invalidity contentions.

While Alice rejections can be found all over the USPTO, roughly two-thirds of them are found in TC 3600. Only TC 2900 has not had any Alice rejections. Looking deeper into the 3620s, 3680s, and 3690s, the reach of Alice becomes apparent. Using Juristat’s data, we counted all rejections in these art units since June 19, 2014, the date Alice was decided. We then calculated the percentage of those rejections that cited Alice, focusing only on examiners that have issued at least ten rejections since the Alice decision. As shown in Figure 3, roughly three-quarters of all rejections in these art units are Alice rejections, with several examiners having a 100% Alice rejection rate.

Sadly, this is not an isolated case. I’ve seen similar rejections in a diverse (and utterly random) number of art areas and technologies ranging from predictive computer algorithms, to voice recognition technology, to methods for user-customization of advertising received on a device. While some of the rejected claims were arguably directed to an abstract idea, only a small minority had any apparent connection to “organizing human activity” as that phrase has been used in the case law.