Posts Tagged: "35 U.S.C. § 315"

In its petition for writ, SSL Services argued that the PTAB’s decision to institute the IPR incorrectly denied the application of 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), the statute governing multiple proceedings at the USPTO; giving the USPTO Director authority to reject a proceeding based on substantially similar prior art or arguments already presented to the agency in a validity review. While the PTAB laid out a multi-factor test for applying the multiple proceedings rule in a 2017 precedential decision in General Plastic v. Canon, SSL Services argued that this test is legally incorrect because the factors in that test do not find support in the statute. Further, the PTAB has applied Section 325(d) to bar the institution of IPRs in far less meritorious cases, including multiple cases where the asserted prior art had only been cited in the original prosecution of the patent and not a validity challenge after the patent had issued. This has resulted in a standard for applying Section 325(d) which is unworkable, SSL Services argued.

In Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. the Federal Circuit ruled the time-bar for filing a petition for inter partes review in Section 315(b) begins to run as soon as a complaint for infringement is served in district court, regardless of whether the complaint is involuntarily or voluntarily dismissed or is ultimately successful on the merits. There are no exceptions to the statutory time limit for filing a petition for inter partes review in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB didn’t meaningfully examine Salesforce’s relationship with RPX and the nature of RPX as an entity that helps its clients extricate themselves from patent litigation. Both of those factors are ones which are contemplated by the PTAB’s Trial Practice Guide.

Inter Partes Review proceedings (IPRs) are subject to statutory timing provisions. The Court, sitting en banc, reviewed whether PTAB decisions determining whether an IPR was timely filed are appealable. More specifically, the Court considered whether the bar on judicial review of institution decisions, under Section 314(d), applies to the Board’s time-bar determinations, under Section 315(b)… Time-bar determinations by the patent office are reviewable by the Federal Circuit.

Today, the Federal Circuit reversed Achates, and ruled that time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable. “We find no clear and convincing indication in the specific statutory language in the AIA, the specific legislative history of the AIA, or the statutory scheme as a whole that demonstrates Congress’s intent to bar judicial review of § 315(b) time-bar determinations,” wrote Reyna in the majority opinion, which included Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Newman, Moore, O’Malley, Wallach, Taranto, Chen and Stoll. The lack of such a clear and convincing indication from Congress coupled with the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency actions lead the majority to hold that time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable.