Posts Tagged: "35 USC 284"

Canadian intellectual property owner BlackBerry Limited filed a suit alleging patent infringement claims against Menlo Park, CA-based social media giant Facebook Inc. in the Central District of California. BlackBerry alleges that Facebook, along with its subsidiaries WhatsApp and Instagram, violate patents held by BlackBerry in the field of mobile messaging communications.

The Supreme Court will hear WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., which asks whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases where patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)… Because lost profits damages were awarded for lost contracts for services to be performed on the high seas, outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. patent law, the Federal Circuit reversed that $93.4 million award… In December 2017, the office of Solicitor General Noel Francisco filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. The Solicitor General argued that WesternGeco’s entitlement to damages should be informed by the traditional common-law rule that a victim of a tort should be returned to the position that victim would have occupied if not for the defendant’s legal wrong.

Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Gilead Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 14-846-LPS (Delaware Dist. Court, Sept 22, 2017) (“Idenix v. Gilead”), is a good example of the exercise of such discretion by a district court.  Rich in facts, the case is suitable for the application of the flexible contextual standards the Supreme Court showed preference for in Halo.  Also, the case involves balancing the public good of promoting innovation by deterring willful infringement against the public good of facilitating imitation and refinement through imitation.  It is apparent from the Court’s reasoning that it was being very mindful that without the particular “refinement through imitation,” involved in the case, a life-saving cure for hepatitis C would not have been discovered.  Enhanced damages were not awarded.

In rejecting the objective prong of Seagate, the Court rejected the notion that a defendant may escape the specter of enhanced damages by asserting a defense that the defendant was unaware of at the time the infringement occurred. For example, the Court pointed out that under the Seagate test, “[t]he existence of . . . a defense insulates the infringer from enhanced damages, even if he did not act on the basis of the defense or was even aware of it.” Halo at 10. But, as the Court stated, “culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. Moreover, in response to an argument by Pulse based on the Court’s earlier Safeco decision, the Court held that “[n]othing in Safeco suggests that we should look to facts that the defendant neither knew nor had reason to know at the time he acted.” Id. at 11.

Essentially, the Supreme Court told the Federal Circuit that they needed remedial reading lessons. The statute is clear: “may” means district courts have discretion. The Supreme Court also seemed instruct the Federal Circuit to stop making stuff up that clearly isn’t found within the statute. It is truly ironic, even downright funny, how the Supreme Court can so clearly see that the Federal Circuit is not being true to the simple, easy to understand, straight-forward terms of a statute but at the same time lack the capacity to similarly see that they are themselves doing the very same thing. If intellectual honesty means anything the Supreme Court would hold themselves to the same standard and stop applying judicial exceptions to patent eligibility that enjoy no textual support in the statute.