Posts Tagged: "Administrative Patent Judge"

Competitors like Mylan and Teva, rather than inventing better treatments or cures for dry eyes chose the shortcut. They attacked Allergan’s patent in the PTAB. Allergan responded by assigning their patent to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe who in turn invoked sovereign immunity at the PTAB, and demanded their rights in a real court with a real judge and jury. Mylan, Teva, the PTAB, Congress, and class action lawyers have formed a mob to gang up on Allergan for defending their intellectual property rights. They filed hundreds of suits accusing Allergan and the Tribe of fraud, conspiracy, and sham transactions stemming from an “invalid” patent. The attackers are mistakenly focusing on the patent as the problem. The problem is not the patent, but rather all of the incentives that reward copying instead of innovating.

The USPTO has provided us with a comment from Chief Judge David Ruschke, who defends APJs of the PTAB as having extensive legal and technical experience. The problem is this view is simply not consistent with the data. While APJs may be technically competent, there is little doubt many on the PTAB were appointed when they simply did not have extensive legal experience… PTAB judges preside over administrative trials, which have all the trappings of litigation (i.e., motions to dismiss, discovery, discovery disputes, hearings, testimony, depositions, constitutional rulings, jurisdictional matters, questions of contract interpretation and privity, and much, much more. No matter how much Ruschke and others do not want to acknowledge the truth, it is perfectly accurate to say that patent agents and patent examiners have absolutely no experience in that world. They simply can’t, unless they are engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.

This study uncovered several shocking revelations. First, 12.64% of PTAB judges were appointed with less than 5 years of experience prior to their appointment as APJs (i.e., 5 years or less removed from graduating from law school), while some PTAB judges were appointed with as little as 2 years of experience. Indeed, 7.47% of APJs had 4 or less years of experience when they were appointed to the PTAB… There were zero federal district court judges appointed with 10 years or less experience, while 46.55% of PTAB judges were appointed with 10 years or less experience… This would mean that 46.55% of PTAB judges were appointed while they were still at best senior associates. Worse, 4.60% of PTAB judges were appointed with 3 or fewer years of experience, which means those 4.60% of PTAB judges were appointed at a time when they were only at a junior associate level.

Given the PTAB’s ability to make decisions precedential, Ruschke’s argument about how important and meaningful it is to have expanded panels to ensure uniformity misses the mark. The PTAB does not designate many cases as precedential (another problem for a different day), but it is possible for a three-judge panel decision to be made precedential. In fact, there have been a number of cases that have been pronounced as precedential by the PTAB where the decision was made by a three-judge panel. That being the case, why is it necessary for any expanded panels unless PTAB leadership is trying to influence Administrative Patent Judges despite the lack of a precedential designation? And doesn’t such an attempt to influence call into question the decisional independence of APJs?

Patents that have withstood scrutiny in Article III federal courts are not bad patents, they are good patents, and they ought not to be struck down by an Article I administrative tribunal. The procedures of the AIA are working in a way to subjugate Article III federal courts to the arbitrary, capricious and egregiously overactive whims of an administrative tribunal in search of work to satisfy the several hundred newly hired “judges.”… Why is the PTAB spending precious resources re-litigating and ultimately killing good patents? The PTAB was created by Congress to review dubious patents and revoke bad patents. So why is the PTAB diverting its attention and re-litigating issues already addressed by federal judges and juries? Is it really likely that claims confirmed valid in federal court are invalid? In any rational world it would be per se unlikely that patent claims previously adjudicated as valid in federal court are invalid.

The St. Regis tribe is seeking discovery on due process concerns posed by the potential of political or third-party pressure asserted to “reach an outcome inconsistent with the binding Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedents.”… The St. Regis tribe is seeking the oral hearing to push for discovery in a total of 18 topics. These topics include the makeup of the panels in the St. Regis proceedings, the date each APJ was added to the panel, how the makeup of the panel was decided, who determined the makeup of the merits panel, when the decision on the panel’s makeup was made as well as the disclosure of all ex parte communications concerning the St. Regis case. St. Regis is also seeking communications made on the sovereign immunity issue between specific APJs, including APJs Jacqueline Harlow and Jennifer Bisk.

As we mark the fifth anniversary of the effective date of Patent Trial and Appeal Board trials on September 16, we find that the early years of the practice have been a learning experience both for the PTAB and for PTAB practitioners.  Reflecting on the past five years, three key lessons emerge for practitioners, from practice and directly from the APJs presiding over these cases when they have spoken on topic: Follow the rules, including those that are explicit and those that are unspoken, know your audience, and focus on the facts.  

Hiring senior associates to be Administrative Patent Judges was a mistake, hiring so many senior associates from the same firm was an even bigger mistake. Making it clear that their job was to kill patents at all costs was inexcusable. Interpreting the rules at every turn to be disadvantageous to patent owners is un-American, violates fundamental notions of fairness of procedure, and tilts the balance so heavily toward challengers that it has become more feared by patent owners than any government agency or body. In short, the PTAB has destroyed the U.S. patent system and the value of U.S. patents. In my opinion, the only solution for the very serious transgressions of the PTAB is to disband this runaway tribunal.

The USPTO admits that the Director does not have statutory authority to adjudicate an issue after a panel has been chosen, but argues that the Director can assert administrative authority to intentionally select Judges that will rule diametrically opposite to those Judges originally assigned to the case, thereby stacking any panel the Director chooses to achieve the result the Director wants in any case… This admission by the USPTO is both stunning and scandalous for at least two reasons. First, the Administrative Procedure Act, which applies to the PTAB, demands decisional independence, which obviously is not happening when the Director of the USPTO can stack a panel to achieve a particular desired outcome.

While the Patent Office likes to tout statistics that assert most patent claims challenged in IPR are not invalidated, those statistics are simply not credible. When reporting its statistics the Patent Office ignores the reality that once an IPR is actually instituted few claims are actually adjudicated to be patentable. The Office is also grossly misleads when they characterize claims not subject to a final written decision as “remaining patentable.”… Recently I’ve heard a story from a former PTAB judge who explained that institution of IPR challenges is far more likely when there are multiple petitions filed against the same patent because it makes it easier for PTAB judges to meet their production quota. If that is not proof that the PTAB is hopelessly broken I don’t know what is.

Presently the USPTO has a panel of three APJs decide whether to institute a trial, and then normally has the same three-APJ panel conduct the trial, if instituted. Under the proposed pilot program the single APJ making the IPR institution decision would be on the panel conducting the IPR trial, joined by two other APJs not associated with the IPR institution decision. Regardless of efficiencies, having a single APJ make institution determinations is fraught with due process concerns because decision whether to institute an inter partes review is not appealable.