Posts Tagged: "CAFC"

In the second IPR, NuVasive never received an opportunity to respond to contentions citing the Michelson Patent. First, arguments in the first IPR did not carry over to the second IPR. Second, it was not until Medtronic’s reply that NuVasive received notice of Michelson, and then was denied an opportunity respond. NuVasive’s ability to enter observations regarding cross-examination of an expert who opined on Michelson was not an adequate opportunity to respond. The “observations are not a vehicle for submitting new evidence, including new expert declarations, by the patent owner,” and “indeed, the permitted content and format of observations are tightly circumscribed.”

Neste filed a petition for inter partes review of REG’s U.S. Patent No. 8,231,804 (‘804 patent) and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ultimately found all of the challenged claims anticipated by either of two references. REG appealed, citing exhibits allegedly demonstrating a date of invention earlier than the prior art. Anticipation can be found where prior art discloses the claimed range in a different unit of measure that can be converted using reasonable and reliable methods. Prior invention is fact-intensive and must take into account all of the relevant evidence. Exhibits offered to show the fact of a communication, and not the truth of the communication’s contents, are not excludable as hearsay.

In a nutshell, if you are going to write a patent application in such a way that at the end of the it the reader is left wondering what the innovation is, what the problem being solved is, or the technical particulars on how the innovation actually solves the problem, you should not expect a patent. In other words, if you write your patent applications without actually defining the technological solution and how it is implementing the desired functionality you describe, and how that is an improvement, you will not get a patent because the claims will be patent ineligible. On the other hand, if you write your patent applications to describe (and claim) an invention that is adequately described so that someone of skill in the art will understand what is innovative (i.e., how and why), thick with technical disclosure and explanation as to how computer functionality is being improved, or even generic components are working in unconventional ways, then you will get a patent because your claims will be patent eligible.

The Federal Circuit recently issued a non-precedential decision in a patent infringement action involving American pop music stars Justin Timberlake and Britney Spears and their production companies. The Federal Circuit’s decision vacated an earlier award of attorneys’ fees to Timberlake, Spears and the other defendants based on a finding that the case was exceptional within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 285. The per curiam decision from the panel made up of Judges Moore, Linn and O’Malley explained that certain of the factors relied upon by the district court to find this case to be exceptional were entitled to no weight under § 285. Thus, the attorneys’ fee order of the district court was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Modeled after the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA seeks not only to encourage competition in the field of biologics but also to promote innovation by, among other things, providing twelve years of market exclusivity to pioneer biologics… Like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA also sets out a process for identifying disputes over patent infringement and managing any ensuing litigation once an applicant seeks a biosimilar license… To streamline the first wave of litigation, the BPCIA mandates that following the biosimilar applicant’s receipt of the RPS’s detailed statement on infringement, the parties negotiate in good faith to select patents for litigation from the lists initially provided by the RPS and the biosimilar applicant. [§ 262(l)(4)].

The ’510, ‘984, and ‘797 patents were each held eligible for similar reasons. Again, the court found that even if the claims were directed to an abstract idea, they would be eligible under step two of the Alice framework. The Court again relied on the unique and unconventional distributed architecture found in the specification and construed into the claim in the previous proceeding. This architecture allowed for load distribution – a technological and unconventional solution to a technological problem. While the ‘984 claims contained generic components and functions, the overall ordered combination of the limitations were unconventional and solved the technological problem.

In EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., No. 15-1237, 815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the Federal Circuit reversed a jury verdict and ordered judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”)—without further proceedings in the district court—on an unarticulated claim construction that was raised by neither party below or on appeal. Specifically, the case presents the issue: “Whether the Federal Circuit erred in ordering entry of judgment as a matter of law on a ground not presented in a Rule 50 motion in the district court, even though the ground presented a purely legal question.”

Amdocs (Israel), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., Appeal No. 2015-1180, is a precedential case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that reverses a judgment on the pleadings that certain asserted software claims directed to gathering network information were patent-ineligible. In so doing, Step One of Alice/Mayo is not clarified at all, because the majority accepted “for argument’s sake” the district court’s view of the disqualifying abstract ideas, and in each instance then explained why the claims seen in their entirety are not disqualified under Step two… The Federal Circuit concluded that the claim is “much closer to those in BASCOM and DDR Holdings than those in Digitech, Content Extraction, and In re TLI Commc’ns. The Court explained that even if it were to agree that claim 1 is directed to an ineligible abstract idea under step one, the claim is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’

In 2013, Cardiocom, LLC (“Cardiocom”), a subsidiary of Medtronic, Inc. (“Medtronic”), sought inter partes review of two patents owned by Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc. (“Bosch”). The Cardiocom petitions were denied in January 2014. Medtronic later sought another inter partes review of the same two patents, without naming Cardicom as an interested party… Section 314(d) bars review of questions regarding the application and interpretation of statutes “closely related” to the decision whether to institute an IPR, including reconsideration of the Board’s decision to institute.

A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s rejection of all pending claims as obvious in an appeal arising from a method for treating or preventing influenza by oral inhalation of zanamivir. The teaching here seems to be that references can be combined to show that it would have been obvious to zero in on one of a few options disclosed in the prior art. Judge Newman filed a dissenting opinion.

While TecSec had urged the panel to reassign the case to a different judge on remand in part because the district court judge repeatedly held against TecSec, raised dispositive issues sua sponte, had been reversed on appeal for many of those issues, and had pre-judged a § 101 issue that has not yet been raised, reassignment is only appropriate in exceptional circumstances. “Here, reassignment is governed by Fourth Circuit law, which applies a three factor test for reassignment: 1) whether the judge would be reasonable expected to have substantial difficulty putting her views that were held to be incorrect out of her mind; 2) whether reassignment is necessary to preserve the appearance of justice; and 3) the degree of waste of judicial resources and duplication if the case were reassigned. See United States v. Guglielmi, 929 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1991). Nothing in this case merits reassignment on remand.”

It is well known that hindsight reconstruction is an insidious error that infects patent prosecution. The Federal Circuit has noted that it is a difficult task to avoid “subconscious reliance on hindsight” and tools are available to “inoculate the obviousness analysis against hindsight”. However, it is well known that practitioners could benefit in countering the pernicious problem of subconscious hindsight directed analysis with additional tools. This article is intended to provide an additional tool outlining a new analytical approach to detecting hindsight: 1) identification of a proxy problem upon which an “obvious” advantage is predicated, and 2) showing that either a) the proxy problem is secondary to the problem solved by the inventor and would have been insufficient to drive advancement of the art, and that the examiner has failed to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have regarded the proxy problem as sufficiently significant so as to require solution, or b) a showing that the proxy problem posed to POSITA presupposes the problem and its solution as solved by the inventor and is derivative. Once it is shown that the proxy problem is subsidiary or presupposes the problem solved by the inventor it becomes a less difficult task to show that the invention was not considered as a whole or that the problem was improperly phrased.

Claim differentiation does not broaden claims beyond their meaning in light of the patent as a whole, and cannot override clear statements of claim scope found the specification and prosecution history… Disavowal can occur when the specification plainly describes “the present invention” as having that feature. Here, the specification states that an important characteristic of the present invention is a “reduction in upper width … resulting from the extended short seals.” Disavowal can also occur when the specification distinguishes or disparages prior art based on a specified feature. The specification did that here, by stating that prior art bags are difficult to secure over trash receptacle lips and explaining how the described short seals solve this problem.

The Court reasoned that the claims were limited to straightforward steps that a skilled artisan could perform mentally and that the inventors admitted to doing so. The claims, on their face, do not call for computer implementation, and Synopsys did not advance a claim construction requiring a computer. Additionally, complex details in the specification are insufficient to transform broad claims from an abstract idea into patentable subject matter. Given the breadth of the claims, the Court declined to decide if a computer-implemented version of the invention would be patentable under § 101.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that this evidence did not demonstrate a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer in claim scope. The Court emphasized that disavowals must be evaluated in the context of the entire prosecution history. Thus, the term “cells derived from a vascularized tissue” included both parenchymal (organ) and non-parenchymal cells. The file history statements did not amount to an unmistakable disclaimer of non-parenchymal cells, in light of the full prosecution history and the claim language pending at the time of the alleged disavowal.