Posts Tagged: "CAFC"

Jimmie Reyna: A Man for All Seasons for the Supreme Court

While it is certainly possible that the President has narrowed his consideration to these three candidates, history teaches us that strange twists and turns can and do occur in the Supreme Court nominating process. With four years of experience on the Federal Circuit, confirmed to that court unanimously with a 86-0 vote and vocal bipartisan support, Judge Reyna would be the first Mexican-American to become a Supreme Court Justice, he would be the first international trade lawyer to become a Supreme Court Justice, and he would bring 30 years of broad legal experience and IP training to the High Court. The American Bar Association has ranked him as unanimously well-qualified, its highest ranking.

Federal Circuit says PTAB decision on redundancy of asserted IPR grounds not appealable

The Federal Circuit held, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), that it does not have jurisdiction to review an institution decision, because a “determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” The PTAB’s decision on the redundancy of Harmonic’s asserted grounds for review constituted a portion of the Institution Decision and was therefore unappealable, absent some other appealable question.

CAFC overturns $18 million verdict because jury improperly left to determine claim scope

Following a five-day trial, the jury found the asserted claims valid and infringed, and awarded Eon $18,800,000. In determining only that the terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, the district court left the ultimate question of claim scope unanswered, and improperly left it for the jury to decide. Instead of remanding, the Court independently found that, when read in their appropriate context, the terms “portable” and “mobile” could not be construed as covering the accused products at issue. The jury’s infringement finding was reversed.

Federal Circuit: Disparagement of Prior Art in the Specification Can Limit Claim Language

UltimatePointer argued that the district court improperly construed “handheld device” to require direct pointing, because there was no disavowal or lexicography in the specification to exclude indirect pointing. Nintendo argued that the specification extols direct pointing and repeatedly criticizes indirect pointing. The Court agreed, holding that repeated characterization of the invention as a “direct pointing system,” repeated descriptions of the advantages of direct pointing, and repeated disparagement of indirect pointing all indicate that the term “handheld device” should be limited to direct pointing devices.

Federal Circuit: Exclusive licensee with all substantial rights can sue without patent owner

Over the course of several amendments, Disney granted increasing rights to Candella, by which Disney specifically intended to give Candella standing to sue for patent infringement. The court held that the rights retained by Disney were not “substantial rights” sufficient to deprive Candella of standing, because Disney did not retain a right to exclude. Disney merely had a financial interest in any enforcement efforts by Candella. Thus, Candella did not have to join Disney to maintain the lawsuit.

Will the Supreme Court consider a CAFC penchant for setting aside patent jury verdicts?

We along with several other attorneys represent ParkerVision, the plaintiff, which secured a $173 million infringement verdict that the courts subsequently threw out based on their own assessment of the evidence. In this case, the roles of courts and juries are front and center. The Federal Circuit has been dismissive of jury findings. As Judge Newman has observed, the Federal Circuit frequently “reweigh[s] the evidence to reach [the court’s] preferred result, rather than considering whether substantial evidence as presented at the trial supports the verdict that was reached by the jury.” Other judges and scholars have concurred in this view.

CAFC find Inequitable Conduct on argument plus withholding contradictory evidence

In the second reexamination, OWW’s representations about a lack of corroborating evidence constituted inequitable conduct, because OWW was aware that such corroborating evidence existed. Specifically, James Colvin, OWW’s director of R&D, was in possession of two letters from Michael Scalise (Scalise Letters), an attorney for Silipos, which clearly stated that the Silosheath product line included gel only on one side. Further, Mr. Colvin was also aware of three declarations filed with Alps’s summary judgment motion which likewise corroborated Comtesse’s testimony. Nevertheless, Mr. Colvin took no action to correct the representations of OWW’s counsel to PTAB. The district court thus found that OWW had committed inequitable conduct because of the inaction of Mr. Colvin, and it declared the patents to be unenforceable.

BRI in IPR may be narrower than broadest ordinary meaning, broader than Phillips standard

The Court noted that the Board failed to account for how the claims and specification inform the ordinary skilled artisan as to what ordinary definition the patentee was using. The Court noted that just because “around” has several dictionary definitions does not mean all these meanings were reasonable in light of the specification. The Court argued that all of the components of the cable connectors encircled an inner electrical conductor, and thus it would seem odd to construe “reside around” without recognizing the context of its use in terms of the cable.

CAFC reaffirms PTAB discretion not to address all claims in IPR final written decision

On February 10, 2016, a divided Federal Circuit panel reaffirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB) authority to institute trial and provide a final written decision on only a subset of the challenged claims in an AIA post-grant proceeding. At issue on appeal was the PTAB’s final decision not to address all claims that were challenged in the underlying inter partes review (IPR) Petition.

Voluntary Narrowing of Patents Claims Waives Right to Later Jury Trial on Untried Claims

Nuance originally asserted over 140 claims from eight different patents against defendant ABBYY. The case was quickly referred to a special master for scheduling following Markman. The master followed Nuance’s proposal to limit the patents asserted at trial to four, and the total claims to fifteen. The district court agreed, and Nuance thereafter narrowed its case further: to seven claims from three patents. The jury found non-infringement on all claims. Eight months later, in a motion by ABBYY to compel costs, Nuance responded that the costs award should be stayed until its remaining patents had been tried. Nuance argued that the completed trial was only the “initial” trial and it had reserved its right to try the other patents in a subsequent trial.

Restricted Sales Do Not Exhaust Patent Rights Under Supreme Court Rulings

The Federal Circuit took the case en banc to review the applicability of the patent exhaustion doctrine under Mallinckrodt and Jazz Photo, in view of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Quanta and Kirtsaeng. The Federal Circuit affirmed the holdings in Mallinckrodt and Jazz Photo, and distinguished them from the Supreme Court’s decisions. In Quanta, the Supreme Court was reviewing whether a patentee’s rights in a product were exhausted by a licensee’s sale of a product.

CAFC: Defendant had no notice of intent to pursue patent rights in US after foreign proceedings

Each week, we succinctly summarize the preceding week of Federal Circuit precedential patent opinions. We provide the pertinent facts, issues, and holdings. Our Review allows you to keep abreast of the Federal Circuit’s activities – important for everyone concerned with intellectual property. We welcome any feedback you may provide. – Joe Robinson, Bob Schaffer, Parker Hancock, and Puja Dave 83-2.…

CAFC reaffirms patent exhaustion doctrine cases en banc in Lexmark Int’l v. Impression Products

In a painfully long decision that at one point analyzed a 1628 statement of Lord Coke as relating to British common-law principles and what light that might shed on modern day patent exhaustion, the Federal Circuit held that when a patentee sells a patented article under otherwise-proper restrictions on resale and reuse communicated to the buyer at the time of sale, the patentee does not confer authority on the buyer to engage in the prohibited resale or reuse. The patentee does not exhaust its rights to charge the buyer who engages in those acts—or downstream buyers having knowledge of the restrictions—with patent infringement. The Federal Circuit also held that a foreign sale of a U.S. patented article, when made by or with the approval of the U.S. patentee, does not exhaust the patentee’s U.S. patent rights in the article sold, even when no reservation of rights accompanies the sale. Loss of U.S. patent rights based on a foreign sale remains a matter of express or implied license.

Nike v. Adidas: Federal Circuit refines PTAB motion to amend practice in inter partes review

The USPTO argued that at the heart of the requirement that substitute claims be patentable over prior art not of record but known to the patentee is nothing more than a requirement that the patent owner submit information necessary to satisfy the duty of candor owed to the Office. The Federal Circuit agreed, but noticed that there was no allegation that Nike had violated the duty of candor. Absent an allegation that there has been a violation of the duty of candor, the Federal Circuit ruled that it is improper to deny a motion to amend for failure to raise prior art not found in the granted petition.

Federal Circuit Reiterates High Standard for Prosecution History Disclaimer

In a January 29, 2016 decision, the Federal Circuit vacated a jury judgment of non-infringement and ordered the District of Delaware to conduct a new trial where construction of a claim term based on prosecution history disclaimer was found to be too narrow. In rejecting the district court’s construction as too limiting, the Court emphasized the high standard for finding prosecution history disclaimer of claim scope. Examining the two prosecution history passages said to be a disclaimer, the Court found that each was readily susceptible to a narrower reading than the one needed to support the district court’s conclusion.