Posts Tagged: "claim construction"

In last year’s decision in Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Network, Inc. 815 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the Federal Circuit reversed the District Court’s jury instruction that the terms “portable” and “mobile” should be given their “plain and ordinary meaning.” During claim construction at the District Court, Eon argued that “portable” and “mobile” did not need construction and that the terms could simply be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 1317. Silver Springs argued that the terms ought to be construed, but the District Court agreed with Eon and found that the meanings of those terms are clear and would be readily understandable to a jury. Id. However, the Federal Circuit held that a determination that a particular term needs no construction may be inadequate when a term has more than one meaning.

Rembrandt sued Samsung for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Texas and convinced a jury that Samsung infringed its two asserted patents, awarding $15.7 million in damages. Samsung appealed claim construction, denial of JMOL of obviousness, a Daubert motion on a damages expert, and the refusal to limit damages. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s claim construction and its denial of Samsung’s JMOL motions, affirming those decisions… The Federal Circuit vacated because allowing Rembrandt to “avoid the consequence of its failure to mark undermines the marking statute’s public notice function.” The Federal Circuit remanded to the district court to properly limit damages, and also remanded the question of whether the marking statute applies on a patent-by-patent or claim-by-claim basis because the parties had not squarely addressed the issue during the present appeal.

A Federal Circuit Rule 36 judgment can be a valid and final judgment for purposes of preclusive effects. Additionally, district court findings affirmed by a Rule 36 judgment can have preclusive effect as long as each is “necessary” to the final appellate judgment. The Federal Circuit did not address the Circuit split regarding the preclusive effect of independent, alternative holdings.

Core Wireless sued Apple for infringing its patent directed to a cellular network system including a mobile station providing for improved transmission of data packets. The jury found that Apple did not infringe Core Wireless’ patent. At issue on appeal is whether the district court misapplied the magistrate judge’s pretrial claim construction and whether the claim construction adopted by the district court when ruling on Core Wireless’ JMOL was erroneous… Ultimately, the Court concluded that the district court correctly denied Core Wireless’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and properly upheld the jury’s verdict of noninfringement.

A claim term can be limited to an embodiment described in the specification, if the claim would otherwise be found invalid and the embodiment was not disclaimed. Thus, a claim term with no ordinary meaning can be defined according to a single example in the specification, if the example provides “a clear objective standard” for that term.

The Federal Circuit heard the case on TVIIM, LLC v. McAfee, Inc. A unanimous panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed jury determinations of non-infringement and patent invalidity and affirmed the district court’s denial of motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) and for a new trial… Litigators risk jury confusion by relying on “ordinary meaning” for a key claim term, without articulating what that meaning is. An alternative “ordinary meaning” will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, alternative meanings may be considered harmless, if substantial evidence nevertheless supports a finding of invalidity under any construction.

What happens if a patent owner who suffered that Rule 36 summary loss to Google at the Federal Circuit were to decide to sue another party – perhaps Apple – on the same claims that were invalidated in the above mentioned hypothetical Google proceeding? No doubt Apple’s attorneys would be rightfully indignant, and if the proceeding were in federal district court you could guarantee there would be sanctions, likely against both the patent owner and the attorneys representing the patent owner. Why? Because those claims have been lost (i.e., invalidated) in a prior proceeding, and it does not matter that Apple was not privy to that prior proceeding. The underlying property right has been lost, and whether the Federal Circuit wants to admit it or not that is binding precedent.

LAB sued Eli Lilly & Company, alleging marketing of the drug Cialis induced infringement of LAB’s patent. Eli Lilly subsequently requested that the Board conduct inter partes review of the patent. The Board agreed to do so and ultimately found the patent to be obvious in light of three prior art references… The Court then found the Board’s construction of certain claim terms to be overly broad, stating the Board’s construction “would make the patent claims applicable to individuals with erectile dysfunction not caused by penile fibrosis.”

A preliminary injunction was appropriate when non-infringement depended on an erroneous claim construction; the evidence did not show the proposed combination of references for non-obviousness was enabled; irreparable harm was likely despite other competition, and the injunction tipped in favor of the public interest… The Court held that the fact that other infringers may be in the marketplace does not negate irreparable harm. It also held that the loss by Scag of customers may have far-reaching, long-term impact on its future revenues, and the sales lost by Scag are difficult to quantify due to “ecosystem effects,” where one company’s customers will continue to buy that company’s products and recommend them to others.

Claim differentiation does not broaden claims beyond their meaning in light of the patent as a whole, and cannot override clear statements of claim scope found the specification and prosecution history… Disavowal can occur when the specification plainly describes “the present invention” as having that feature. Here, the specification states that an important characteristic of the present invention is a “reduction in upper width … resulting from the extended short seals.” Disavowal can also occur when the specification distinguishes or disparages prior art based on a specified feature. The specification did that here, by stating that prior art bags are difficult to secure over trash receptacle lips and explaining how the described short seals solve this problem.

what is particularly interesting about this case is that Smith, who had prevailed at the district court and was awarded about $322,500 in damages, thought he could not challenge the correctness of a claim construction made by the district court. While Smith could not have filed a cross appeal in this case concerning the claim construction, Smith could have asserted ‘alternative grounds in the record for affirming the judgment.’ Because Smith did not raise any such alternate grounds on appeal, the Federal Circuit could not address the correctness of the district court’s claim construction.

Lifenet’s patent is for plasticized soft tissue grafts used for transplantation in humans. The specification discloses that plasticizers can be removed before implantation, although they need not be, as claim 1 discloses three options for the implanting technician, one option being direct implantation without removing plasticizers. LifeCell’s accused grafts are preserved in a solution prior to implantation, and it is undisputed that significant amounts of plasticizers are removed during this soaking process. During claim construction, the parties disputed the meaning of the term “non-removal.” The district court concluded that construction of this term was unnecessary because it was easily understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art to have its plain meaning.

GPNE sued Apple for direct infringement of claims in two of GPNE’s patents. The patents at issue relate to a two-way paging system, where the paging devices are capable of not only receiving messages but also sending messages back in response. The claims asserted by GPNE all recited “nodes” rather than “pagers,” even though the word “node” was not used anywhere other than in the Abstract of the two patents containing the asserted claims. Seizing on this, Apple argued at the Markman hearing that a “node” as claimed should be construed as being a “pager.” The district court ultimately agreed with Apple, and ultimately so too did the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s changed claim construction of “data flow,” violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), even if it was correct. In particular, it deprived the petitioner of the procedural protections of the APA, which prohibits an agency from changing legal theories during a proceeding without giving respondents notice of the change and the opportunity respond to the new theory. Because the Board changed its construction of the term “data flow” absent any suggestion from the parties, and without any notice, there was no meaningful opportunity to respond to the unanticipated change. Therefore, the Court vacated the decision of the Board to afford the parties an opportunity to present arguments on the Board’s newly-adopted construction of “data flow.”

The Court agreed with Facebook in that these claim terms had no accepted meaning in the art, which meant that they cannot be construed broader than the specification disclosuses. The Court noted that the prosecution history also provided support for the district court’s construction. Further, because the other evidence was persuasive, there was no need to determine whether certain statements made by the patentees during prosecution rose to clear and unmistakable disclaimer, which is what Facebook argued in the alternative.