Posts Tagged: "diehr"

Putting Words in the Mouth of McRO: The PTO Memorandum of November 2, 2016

The USPTO Memorandum of November 2, 2016 as to Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions (“USPTO Memo”) inappropriately attributes the phrase “computer-related technology” to McRO, Inc. dba Planet Blue v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 120 USPQ2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The phrase “computer-related technology” does not appear in McRO or even in Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); rather, it appears in Enfish, LLC, v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed Cir. 2016) and only after Enfish appropriately cites Alice.

Mayo v. Prometheus: A lawless decision by an omnipotent Court wreaking havoc on patents

As we approach the fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision this is what I know — Mayo is a lawless decision by a Court that has become too powerful. Mayo continues to wreak havoc on the patent system and innovators, and has resulted in patent protection being easier to obtain for cutting edge software, biotech, genetic and medical innovations in Europe, Canada, Australia and even China. Mayo is at the root of all of the problems facing the industry relative to patent eligibility, and if I could repeal only one Supreme Court decision in the patent space it would be Mayo. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo is probably the worst, most wrongly decided case by the Supreme Court in the patent field ever. I say “probably” only because there are so many contenders to choose from that picking only one is truly difficult. Only the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange comes at all close to Mayo in terms of damage to the patent system. Only the Supreme Court’s decision in Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics comes close to Mayo in terms of intellectual dishonesty.

Federal Circuit Provides Additional Insight on §101 Protections for Software Patents

In a September 13, 2016 decision relating to subject matter eligibility of software patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), and held that McRO’s patents were eligible for protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The disputed patent claims recited a method for “automatically . . . producing accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters.” The McRO patents identified that a problem in the prior art was that animators, even using the assistance of computers, had to manually manipulate the character model for lip movement. The McRO patents solved this problem by using rules to automatically depict more realistic synchronization of lip movements and speech.

After Alice: Is New Legislation Needed? Before Alice: Was there a Precedent?

the Courts have found it difficult to use the Mayo two-part test in the examination of a patent’s validity thus creating great uncertainty… One should not confuse the uncertainty of the complex U.S. patent system with the clarity of the Alice decision. There is no reason to believe any new legislation will provide any improvement in deciding what should, and what should not, be patentable.

The Broken Patent-Eligibility Test of Alice and Mayo: Why We Urgently Need to Return to Principles of Diehr and Chakrabarty*

Our Judicial Mount Olympus pays, at best, lip-service to Chakrabarty’s observation that, in enacting 35 U.S.C. § 101 in 1952, Congress chose the statutory classes (in Chakrabarty, referring specifically to “composition” and “manufacture” but which would be equally applicable to “apparatus” (i.e., machines) and “process”) to be given an “expansive” and “broad” construction. That command in Chakrabarty would suggest that rulings of patent-ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 would be the exception, not the rule. By contrast, this unending stream of patent-ineligibility rulings from the lower courts after Alice suggests a serious disconnect, showing no adherence to, or even observance of this command by Chakrabarty to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be “expansively” and “broadly” inclusive, but to be instead very restrictive. As former Chief Judge Rader might characterize it, this restrictive two-part test of Alice has made 35 U.S.C. § 101 not a “coarse screen,” but instead an extremely “narrow funnel.” In other words, the draconian two-part test of Alice was broken from the start.