Posts Tagged: "FUCT"

‘FUCT’ SCOTUS Case Applicant Fails to Convince TTAB to Register FUCK Mark

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) yesterday rejected Erik Brunetti’s attempt to reverse an examiner’s decision to refuse four separate registrations for the mark “FUCK” for luggage, cell phone cases, jewelry and other goods and services. Brunetti was the respondent in the 2019 Supreme Court case, Iancu v. Brunetti (Case No. 18-302), in which the court held that the Lanham Act’s blanket ban on federal registration of “immoral or scandalous” trademarks is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The mark at issue in that case was “FUCT,” for use on streetwear.

After Brunetti: The Trademark Bar Reacts to Fractured Decision

The Supreme Court issued its decision yesterday in Iancu v. Brunetti. As largely expected, the Court followed its own lead in Matal v. Tam and struck down the Lanham Act’s bar on “immoral or scandalous” trademarks as violating the First Amendment. Below are some insider perspectives on what the ruling means for brands and trademark practitioners going forward.

Supreme Court ‘FUCT’ Case Ends With a Bang: Ban on ‘Immoral or Scandalous’ Marks Fails First Amendment Scrutiny

The Lanham Act’s ban on federal registration of “immoral or scandalous” trademarks is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  So held the United States Supreme Court on Monday, resoundingly, if a bit uneasily, in Iancu v. Brunetti.  It’s a good result, and one that the trademark bar and the free speech community had broadly urged, including Debevoise’s client, the International Trademark Association (INTA), in an amicus brief that we had the privilege of writing. 

Tam 2.0? SCOTUS Likely to Strike Down Bar on Immoral/Scandalous Marks in Iancu v. Brunetti

Following our visit to the Supreme Court for Monday’s entertaining oral argument in Iancu v. Brunetti, we can report that the Court seems likely to strike down, on First Amendment grounds, the statutory restriction on federal registration of trademarks that are “immoral or scandalous.”  It seems less likely that the case will generate a clear and ringing statement of First Amendment principles. Rather, the justices’ comments at argument seem to presage a limited, cautious opinion. The Court’s main legal concerns appear to be the facial overbreadth of the existing statute and its history of inconsistent application. Congress and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) may  therefore be left with room to try again, seeking a narrower and more predictable approach to limiting the federal registration of dirty words as trademarks (especially given the Court’s main practical concern of the loss of civility represented by the proliferation of such marks).

Brunetti Briefs: Section 2(a) Bar on Immoral or Scandalous Marks Fails Constitutional Test

On April 15, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Iancu v. Brunetti, a case the International Trademark Association (INTA) has remarked raises a critical issue for all trademark owners—namely, which trademarks reliably can be expected to obtain registration under the Lanham Act. At the heart of the case, and of the amicus brief we helped file for INTA this week, is whether free speech concerns should trump the statutory bar on registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks. INTA says the First Amendment should win out, and the statutory bar should fall. The category of marks at issue is exemplified by the FUCT apparel mark, owned by Erik Brunetti, to which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) denied federal registration. After the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Section 2(a)’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech, the U.S. government sought the Supreme Court’s review, and the Court granted certiorari. It must now decide whether the prohibition in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act on the federal registration of “immoral . . . or scandalous” marks like FUCT is invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.