Posts Tagged: "indefinite"

The district court determined that the term was indefinite, the Federal Circuit reversed. According to the Federal Circuit, a claim is indefinite “only when it is not amenable to construction or insolubly ambiguous.” Under that standard, the majority determined, the ’753 patent survived and was not indefinite. The Supreme Court characterized this test as the Federal Circuit tolerating “some ambiguous claims but not others.”

The en banc Federal Circuit on September 13, 2013, heard oral argument on whether to overrule its en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and hold that claim construction can involve issues of fact reviewable for clear error, and that it is not entirely an issue of law subject only to de novo review. On appeal is the district court decision that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim term “voltage source means” to correspond to a rectifier or other voltage supply device. It thus rejected ULT’s argument that the term invokes Section 112 ¶6 and that the claim is invalid for indefiniteness for lack of specific structure in the specification. A Federal Circuit panel reversed in a nonprecedential decision, concluding from a de novo review that “voltage source means” does invoke Section 112 ¶6 and that the claim is invalid for indefiniteness. That panel decision was vacated when the appellate court decided to consider the claim construction issue en banc.

The basic law relative to § 112, ¶6 explains that a decision on whether a claim is indefinite under § 112, ¶ 6 requires a determination of whether those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification. Traditionally, claim terms are typically given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. The question with means-plus-function claiming, however, is whether evidence from that mythical individual skilled in the art is even admissible. No structure in the specification means the person of skill in the art cannot save the disclosure by understanding. Thus, means-plus-function claims are largely valid at the mercy of a federal judge who in all certainty is not one of skill in the art and who likely has an aversion to such claiming techniques because they prefer dealing with tangible structure.

Earlier today the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a decision in Noah Systems, Inc. v. Intuit, Inc. According to the Federal Circuit the specification of the ’435 patent must contain an algorithm that performs the function associated with the “access means” limitation, otherwise the limitation is indefinite and the claim invalid. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit would determine that the algorithm disclosed was incomplete. This lead the Court to explain that when the specification discloses an algorithm that only accomplishes one of multiple identifiable functions performed by a means-plus-function limitation, the specification is treated as if it disclosed no algorithm. An incomplete algorithm means no algorithm as all, which means that what one of ordinary skill in the art would understand from the disclosure is no longer relevant. This is where I would depart from the Federal Circuit and think that the law as it relates to means-plus-function claiming of computer software is all wrong. Means-plus-function claims has always been about what someone of ordinary skill in the art would appreciate (see, for example, USPTO 112 guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162 (9 February, 2011) so why is that not the case with respect to computer software?

All of this might be confusing to a Judge who is unfamiliar with computers, but that is not the test, is it? The question is supposed to be whether it would be confusing to a person of relevant skill in the relevant technology area. Indeed, disclosure sufficient for means-plus-function claiming may be implicit or inherent in the specification if it would have been clear to those skilled in the art what corresponds to the means-plus-function claim limitation. See MPEP 2181 and Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 1999). Indeed, the Federal Circuit in Atmel concluded that the title of the article incorporated by reference in the specification may, by itself, be sufficient to indicate to one skilled in the art the precise structure of the means for performing the recited function. So the focus is supposed to be on one of skill in the art even when interpreting whether the specification provides adequate support for means-plus-function claiming. Nowhere in the majority opinion is it stated that a person of skill in the art would not have known and would have found the claim vague or ambiguous.

The question of whether a term is defined adequately is really a legal question, so the views and opinions of those who are not well versed in the law are hardly probative. Inventors invent and patent attorneys describe those inventions to satisfy the legal requirements. If inventors could describe their inventions to meet the legal requirements they wouldn’t need patent attorneys, but we all know that inventors who represent themselves make numerous errors and always obtain far more narrow protection than they would have been entitled to receive. They just don’t understand the law well enough and are not qualified to offer opinions on matters of law.

As I’ve said before, no one could rightly accuse me of being biased against patents. But, as I also pointed out in this article on Judge Rader’s dissent in Media Technologies Licensing, LLC v. The Upper Deck Company, I don’t believe every patent is “bullet proof,” or to use Judge Plager’s phrase, that some patents aren’t built on “quicksand.” In fact, I agree with Judge Plager’s dissent in the denial of rehearing en banc in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., issued May 26, 2010, which argues that the “definiteness” requirement in the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C § 112 needs more “teeth” than Federal Circuit precedent appears to give it.

The meaning of words often depends on the context in which they appear.  That principle is also true of terms which appear in patent claims.  In Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. v. CTS Cement Manufacturing Corp., the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that the context matters in reversing a district court grant of summary judgment that certain patent claims were not infringed or…