Posts Tagged: "infringement"

This case concerned the subject matter eligibility of patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, for a computer-related invention. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that two patents were ineligible, and reversed the court’s decision that one patent was eligible. All three patents at issue were held to be drawn to abstract ideas, and none of them had a patentable inventive concept… There was no inventive concept because the ’142 claims provided only generic computers performing generic functions. The proper inquiry is whether each step in a claim does more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions, not whether the prior computers already applied that concept.

On the heels of a busy term last year, the stage is set for the Supreme Court to review two more important issues regarding utility patents during the October term. The first issue involves one aspect of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) — i.e., whether a party who supplies a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States can be liable for infringement. The second issue arises from SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), to determine whether laches remains a viable defense to patent infringement with respect to pre-litigation damages in certain circumstances.

Perhaps the most challenging to accept is the notion that a tribunal created with a specific purpose of invalidation can be impartial to both the petitioners and the defendants. The AIA tribunal stands in contrast to the Court system, as their inherent mission is not to evaluate, but to challenge, contest, and invalidate. In addition, a “winners and losers” system, allowing one party to outspend the other, or to create joinders to outnumber the other, remains very damaging to the inventors, investors and small businesses.

Stryker Corporation was awarded $70 million in lost profits after a jury found that Stryker’s patents were valid and willfully infringed by Zimmer. The district court affirmed the jury’s verdict, awarded Stryker treble damages for willful infringement, and awarded Stryker attorney’s fees. Stryker’s patents concerned portable, battery-powered, and handheld pulsed lavage devices used in orthopedic procedures to deliver pressurized irrigation for medical therapies, including cleaning wounds.

Schlumberger raised Rutherford’s potential conflict of interest to the court in April 2014, and subsequently filed a motion to disqualify Dynamic’s counsel. The district court found that Rutherford’s work at Schlumberger was substantially related to her current work at Acacia. The court found that because the accused features of Petrel existed in the older versions that Rutherford was exposed to, and because she was involved at Schlumberger in efforts to license Petrel to other companies, the evidence created an irrebuttable presumption that she acquired confidential information requiring her disqualification.

The analysis of unique patent numbers asserted each year surprisingly suggested a decline since 2010. This is an important measure, because it shows that the rise in the number of lawsuits reported by many studies is the result of only a few players (plaintiffs) who had to file many cases due to AIA and joinder rules. Additionally, although it was assumed by many experts that the number of patents per case will increase over time in order to reduce the risk of invalidation through IPR, that number has not changed significantly. In fact, it dropped last year.

Two recent Federal Circuit opinions provide some answers to the issues presented by complaints alleging non-compliance with the BPCIA. In Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that an aBLA filer’s participation in the patent dance is not mandatory under the BPCIA. 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Where an aBLA filer elects to forego the patent dance by failing to provide the aBLA and the biosimilar manufacturing information to the RPS, the only remedy available to the RPS lies in a declaratory judgment action for patent infringement, as expressly contemplated by § 262(1)(9)(C). In addition, the court concluded that an aBLA filer who did not engage in the patent dance was required to provide a notice of commercial marketing and that such notice could be effectively given only after the FDA had approved the aBLA. The court’s ruling left open the question whether an aBLA filer who participated in the patent dance was required to provide a notice of commercial manufacturing. This decision is on appeal to the Supreme Court, which has yet to decide whether it will hear the issue.

On one hand, LifeTech argues that the Federal Circuit ruling was in conflict with the text and structure of the Patent Act as well as the presumption of extraterritoriality. Expanding the reach of the extraterritoriality in patent law, it claims, would distort the incentives for multinational companies to supply components from facilities in the United States, potentially causing long-term economic damage and disrupting the international system of national patents. On its side were the Solicitor General and amici curiae who also believe that if the ruling were upheld, it would likely interfere with modern global supply logistics and disproportionately burden U.S. manufacturers with global operations.

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion with large ramifications for patent holders and potential infringers alike. Deciding the consolidated cases of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. and Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., the Court ruled that enhanced patent damages are appropriate to punish an infringer’s egregious, deliberate, or flagrant patent infringement. The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s Seagate test, which had provided an accused infringer with a complete defense to a charge of willfulness (and thus enhanced damages) if the infringer was able to construct, even years after the infringement began, a reasonable argument that the patent was invalid or not infringed, even where the infringer in fact had acted in bad faith. The Court also lowered the required burden of proof from clear and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence. At the same time, it seems clear that mere negligence is not enough to establish entitlement to enhanced damages. While the Supreme Court referred to the 180 years of enhanced damages jurisprudence since the Patent Act of 1836 as setting forth the appropriate approach, it may take several years of additional litigation for predictability to emerge from today’s decision.

Earlier today, in a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., the United States Supreme Court did what much of the patent world expected it would do, which is overrule the Federal Circuit’s “unduly rigid” test for the awarding of enhanced damages for willful damages put in place by In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F. 3d 1360, 1371 (2007)(en banc).

When a standard faces competition, it is essential to be the first on the market with products and to establish the highest market share. The network effect will make it increasingly difficult for competing standards to get a foothold. Two competing standards will, therefore, be under pressure to gain market share in the early stages of adoption by getting to market first, with superior performance, and with the lowest price. In view of the network effect, getting to market first is usually the highest priority. But in the early stages of adoption, being a little bit later with superior performance is still viable.

The Court vacated the judgment against Mankes and remanded the case for further consideration. Because the law was in a state of flux, the Plaintiff pled facts that arguably would have supported an infringement theory under the law applicable when it was filed. The plaintiff could not have known the facts necessary to support a complaint under the law as it exists now. Because of this, the Court declined to affirm or reverse, and instead remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration under the new standards. Presumably, this would also give the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint.

The Court held that the district court must review the design disclosed in the patent as a whole, and consider whether functional elements contributed to the ornamentation of the design. Although a design patent protects ornamental features rather than functional features, the claims are not limited solely to ornamental elements. The combination of form and function to achieve an ornamental result is within the scope of a design patent. This is particularly true given that design patents are statutorily permitted to cover “articles of manufacture” which almost always serve a functional purpose. Because design patents “protect the overall ornamentation of a design, not an aggregation of separable elements,” eliminating individual elements of the design from consideration was found to be improper, and the Court remanded for further proceedings.

The Federal Circuit affirmed. Undertaking an extensive analysis of the legislative history of Lanham Act damages, the Court attempted to explain a 1999 amendment inserting language regarding willfulness. Because the “willful violation” language appears to modify violations of § 1125(c) regarding dilution, Romag argued that the amendment negated any preexisting willfulness requirement for causes of action other than dilution. Relying heavily on Second Circuit precedent, which governed the district court decision, the Court disagreed.

The Court affirmed that B/E could not challenge the validity of MAG’s patents, because of assignor estoppel. In this case, MAG acquired the patents by assignment from a third party, who in turn acquired the patents from the inventors. After this assignment, one of the inventors went to work for B/E. The district court held that this inventor was as assignor of MAC’s patents and was barred from challenging the validity of the patents under the doctrine of assignor estoppel. Further, B/E was held to be in privity with its current employee (and past inventor/assignor of the patents). The assignor estoppel therefore attached to B/E, which was barred from attacking the validity of the patents.