Posts Tagged: "inter partes reexamination"

Under the status quo, neither the patentee nor the public is able to rely on judicial determination of an issue that might later be taken to the PTAB. Knowles, Dissenting Op. at 10. Should the differences in standards between the courts and the PTO for proving invalidity, which contribute to the status quo in a large measure, be allowed to continue? Or, should the policy objectives of judicial efficiency and repose be given effect to preserve the finality of judgement of a court of last resort? These questions have assumed added significance post-AIA since one of the purposes of AIA was to save time and cost. As for standards, courts give claims their customary meaning and require clear and convincing evidence to prove a patent invalid. On the other hand, the PTO gives claims their broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) and requires a preponderance of evidence to prove invalidity. In her dissent, Judge Newman urged the court to recognize the significant legal and economic consequences of conflict between judicial ruling and agency decision, in which patent life and investment resources are consumed in duplicate litigation with no reliable finality. Id.

The issue was whether the PCT, which disclosed a “connection to fibre optics bundle which provides for lighting” was a sufficient written description to support the “light guide” “permanently affixed” in the “first channel” of the patented claims. The Board reversed the Examiner and concluded that the earlier application had sufficient written description to qualify as a priority document… The Federal Circuit affirmed. The disclosure of a species, here a “fibre optics bundle,” was sufficient support for a priority claim by a later-filed patent application utilizing genus claims, here a “light guide,” because the patent-in-suit was in a predictable art field and the genus claims covered well-known limitations.

Although the majority opinion was silent with respect to a prior claim construction by the Federal Circuit relating to the patent, Judge Newman wrote in dissent that the majority’s failure to address the issue (which was briefed) allowed for a final claim construction by the Federal Circuit to for the first time lack preclusive effect.

The motion of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe (“the Tribe”) is based on the misplaced theory that Tribal Sovereign Immunity is applicable to administrative proceedings before the PTAB. While the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that, as a matter of judicial construct, Native American Tribes (like the Tribe) can be immune from “suits” in a court absent abrogation or waiver (see Paper 81, at 8), such immunity does not extend to all government action. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998). In this regard, a PTAB proceeding is not a “suit” in court, but instead an administrative proceeding in which the Office (through the PTAB) takes “a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent.” Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (“Cuozzo”).

The industry reaction to Aqua Products v. Matal has been swift. In IPWatchdog’s Industry Roundup blog post, there was broad acclaim. However, for those involved with post-grant proceedings before the AIA, however, Aqua Products at most means a return to the amending regime allowed under the previous inter partes post-grant procedure, inter partes reexaminations. Given that IPRs were explicitly designed to extend and amend the previous inter partes reexamination procedures, a comparison of amendment practice under the two procedures makes a number of lessons clear.

After a panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, in Aqua Products v. Matal, Aqua requested an en banc rehearing. The USPTO Director Joseph Matal joined the appeal on behalf of the USPTO. At issue was whether the Board could place the burden of proof for patentability of amended claims on the patent owner in an IPR, and the Board’s underlying interpretation of the relevant statutes, specifically § 316(d) governing claim amendments and 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) allocating the burden of proof in an IPR… With respect to the burden of proof, the burden of persuasion for patentability of amended claims in an IPR proceeding is placed on the petitioner, not the patent owner. However, considering Judge Reyna’s concurrence, patent owners might still have the burden of production; depending on future cases.

Those now familiar with IPR proceedings will already have recognized how little resemblance current IPR proceedings have to what most supporters of the AIA envisioned upon its passage. In current practice, the role of the Director as an independent IPR gatekeeper never materialized because the USPTO’s implementing rules bypass the Director altogether, assigning the institution function to the PTAB, which in turn routinely assigns both the institution and final decisions to the same three judge panel. As a result, most of the safeguards against patent owner harassment were lost…. By failing to adopt the implementing rules needed to carry out the intent of the AIA, and by adopting other rules and procedures that are plainly skewed towards petitioners, the PTAB has intentionally tilted its IPR proceedings against patent owners. While this has been good for the PTAB, which has quadrupled in size, it was neither Congress’s intent nor that of most of AIA’s supporters to create an unfair IPR patent “killing field.”

The Court found that the Board did not provide an adequate explanation for finding that the “30%” limitation was inherent in the reference, as a predicate for its holding of obviousness. Nevertheless, the Board “made the necessary underlying factual findings to support an obviousness determination.”  Specifically, the reference disclosed the same process for manufacturing electric cables, the steps did not differ in any material way, and there were no unexpected results. The Court also pointed to precedent that shifts the burden to the patentee. “[W]here all process limitations are expressly disclosed by the prior art reference, except for the functionally expressed limitation at issue, the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on.”

The Board failed to address all grounds for proposed rejections under the APA by ignoring certain arguments made by Vicor during the reexamination. Additionally, the Board failed to address all four Graham factors. “[E]vidence relating to all four Graham factors…must be considered before determining whether the claimed invention would have been obvious…” The Board’s decision was erroneous because the same panel reached inconsistent conclusions on the same issue between the same parties and on the same record, and without explanation.

The Federal Circuit reversed. Indeed, it found that the Board committed legal error by improperly relying on inherency to find obviousness and in its analysis of motivation to combine the references. The court found that the Board erred in relying on inherency to dismiss evidence showing unpredictability in the art in rejecting Honeywell’s argument that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine the references with a reasonable expectation of success. It referred to an earlier opinion [citations omitted] to state that “the use of inherency in the context of obviousness must be carefully circumscribed because “[t]hat which may be inherent is not necessarily known” and that which is unknown cannot be obvious.”

At the Federal Circuit, Honeywell argued that the Board erred in (1) finding a motivation to combine the references with a reasonable expectation of success, (2) rejecting Honeywell’s objective evidence of patentability, and (3) relying on a new ground of rejection (Omure), without giving Honeywell notice and opportunity to respond. The Court found that the Board improperly relied on inherency to find the claims obvious and in its analysis of motivation to combine. First, the Board’s analysis was internally inconsistent. While finding that “the claimed combination’s stability/miscibility is an inherent property of HFO-123yf and cannot confer patentability, the Board also acknowledged that inherent properties must be considered if they demonstrate unexpected and nonobvious results.

A reasonable expectation of success in combining references to obtain the claimed invention does not require absolute certainty or predictability. As a result, an invention is not non-obvious simply because persons of ordinary skill in the art continues to study aspects of the claimed invention after an initial disclosure. Rather, conducting additional or follow-up studies can be strong evidence that success is expected or likely.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s finding of obviousness of certain challenged claims based on a means-plus-function limitation, affirmed the Board’s finding of obviousness as to other challenged claims and affirmed the Board’s findings that the prior art discloses all other limitations of the challenged claims on appeal… In a patentability determination, the Board must identify the structure of a means-plus-function limitation disclosed in the specification; it is insufficient to merely disagree with patentee’s arguments. Additionally, if a practitioner reopens prosecution and amends claims during inter partes reexamination, additional prior art can be cited against the amended claims.

In re AT&T Intellectual Prop. II, L.P., Appellant AT&T Intellectual Property II, L.P. (“AT&T”) appealed from a final decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) in an inter partes reexamination where the patent-in-suit was found invalid as anticipated.

Cisco challenged Cirrex’s patent via inter partes reexamination, asserting a lack of written description. The Board affirmed the Examiner’s findings, that the patent, as amended, contained both patentable and unpatentable claims. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that all of the claims are unpatentable for lack of written description.