Posts Tagged: "Judge Timothy Dyk"

In Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs. the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) in a Covered Business Method (“CBM”) review proceeding, agreeing with the Board that petitioner Westlake was not estopped from maintaining a CBM review of the challenged claims and confirming that the challenged claims are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101… Dissenting-in-part, Judge Mayer would have held that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision by the Board regarding a motion to terminate a post-grant review proceeding as barred by § 325(e)(1).

The district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Preston’s state-law claims did not arise under federal law and Nagel’s patent counterclaims did not present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III because the patent dispute was not imminent. Therefore, the district court remanded the case and Nagel timely appealed… The AIA and its strengthening of federal court jurisdiction over patent claims did nothing to override the rule that a district court decision to remand a case to state court is not appealable under §1447(d).

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to deny the trademark cancellation petition, finding that the Board used an incorrect standard for “fame” in its likelihood of confusion analysis… The Court rejected the Board’s all-or-nothing analysis, holding that it must consider all of the relevant confusion factors, on a scale appropriate to their merits, under the totality of the circumstances. It explained that the proper legal standard for evaluating the fame of a mark is the class of customers and potential customers of a product or service, not the general public…

The Court disagreed that the district court’s sole basis for finding exceptional circumstances was that NOVA filed an action in equity. The Court noted that the district court also relied on the substantive weakness of NOVA’s position, which can independently support an exceptional-case determination. It is the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position that can lead to an exceptional case determination not correctness or success of that position. For instance, NOVA’s allegations of fraud were supported exclusively by conflicting testimony, a fact going to the strength of the action.

Patlex, which dealt with reexamination of applications by an examiner — not by an Article I tribunal — could be considered a next step beyond McCormick. MCM, however, simply cannot be viewed as consistent with either Patlex or McCormick on any level. Indeed, the Supreme Court was abundantly clear in McCormick, which remains good law. The courts of the United States (i.e., Article III courts), not the department that issued the patent, is the only entity vested with the authority to set aside or annul a patent right. Since the PTAB is not a court of the United States, it has no authority to invalidate patent rights. It is just that simple.

In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and held that Helsinn’s pre-AIA patent claims, “were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date,” and furthermore, “the AIA did not change the statutory meaning of ‘on sale’ in the circumstances involved here.” The asserted claims of the post-AIA patent were also ready for patenting prior to the critical date… The on-sale bar, before and after the AIA, does not require a finding that the offer or sale disclosed the details or claimed features of the invention, so long as the product embodies those features when sold. An invention is reduced to practice, and ready for patenting, when it is reasonably shown to work for its intended purpose, which for a pharmaceutical product is not contingent upon FDA approval.

Earlier today the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a major decision interpreting provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA), specifically the AIA on-sale bar provisions. In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit panel of Judges Dyk, Mayer and O’Malley determined: “after the AIA, if the existence of the sale is…

A claim term can be limited to an embodiment described in the specification, if the claim would otherwise be found invalid and the embodiment was not disclaimed. Thus, a claim term with no ordinary meaning can be defined according to a single example in the specification, if the example provides “a clear objective standard” for that term.

On April 6, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision in The Medicines Company v. Mylan, Inc. (2015-1113, 2015-1151, and 2015-1181) that imports certain subject matter from the specification into the claims… This case provides some key takeaways for patent practitioners, some more obvious than others. First, as has been known for some time, referring to the “invention” in a patent’s specification can hurt, as can indicating that a particular process “includes all” of the embodiments the specification describes. This is why patents for inventions in the U.S. now curiously, if understandably, usually avoid using the word “invention”. Also, setting forth definitions in a specification can have unintended consequences not just for the term being defined but also for terms that are not explicitly defined even if unequivocally characterized in some other way. Prosecution history also matters too, particularly where an applicant distinguishes its invention during prosecution by explicitly characterizing “the invention” in terms divorced from the language of the claims themselves.

On January 3, 2017 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the court) handed down two decisions relating to obviousness under § 103 – In re: Marcel Van Os, Freddy Allen Anzures, Scott Forstall, Greg Christie, Imran Chaudhri, No. 2015-1975 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Van Os) and In re: Ethicon, Inc., No. 2015-1696 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Ethicon). In Van Os, the Appellants appealed a decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) affirming the Examiner’s rejection of the claims of U.S. Patent Application No. 12/364,470 under § 103. The court addressed the question of whether the PTAB properly held that the claims were obvious in light of prior art. The court vacated and remanded. In Ethicon, the Appellant appealed a decision from the PTAB affirming, in a merged inter partes reexamination, the Examiner’s rejection of the claims of U.S. patent 7,591,844 (the ’844 patent) under § 103. The court addressed the question of whether the PTAB properly affirmed the rejection of the claims of the ’844 patent under § 103. The court affirmed. These two cases raise several interesting questions, especially given that they were decided on the same day.

The Federal Circuit noted that precedent requires a prior art reference to disclose the invention without modification in order to anticipate. “[A] prior art reference that must be distorted from its obvious design does not anticipate a patent claim.” The Court applied that principle here and found that the first reference (Rambert) would only anticipate if one of its elements was removed. The Board failed to explain the removal of that element. The second reference (Bouttens) also required “significant and impermissible modification,” which was also unexplained. Consequently, the Board’s conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence.

The Federal Circuit’s decision in Akamai V broadened the circumstances in which the actions of others may be attributed to a single actor to support liability for direct infringement. Here, a patent that claims a method of administering treatment can be directly infringed if a physician performs some of the claimed steps and the patient performs the other steps under the physician’s direction and control. The infringement is induced by the drug manufacturer when it unambiguously encourages the performance of the infringing steps, as in its labeling for the drug.

The Court’s opinion stresses that in an obviousness analysis, it should consider “whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” An explicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the references is not necessary to support a conclusion of obviousness… Judge Newman dissented with the majority’s finding there was motivation to combine the references without hindsight. She argued that the references recite thousands of polymer and copolymer components for stent coating materials, but not the copolymer of the ’844 patent.

In appealing from a final IPR decision, the appellant must have standing, based on evidence of record or supplemental evidence showing an “injury in fact.” Alleged economic injury must be specific and proven, and does not arise just from statutory appeal provisions or from IPR litigation estoppel when appellant’s infringement of the challenged patent is not a potential issue.

The Federal Circuit vacated the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (“Board”) cancellation of two JobDiva service mark registrations—one in whole and the other in part—and remanded for further consideration. As the Court pointed out in its opinion, JobDiva could have avoided the issues in this case by initially registering “marks to identify both software and services performed by software.” Practitioners should take care to register a mark for all goods and services for which the mark may be used.