Posts Tagged: "Judge Timothy Dyk"

The Federal Circuit denied appellant SAS’s petition for rehearing en banc from a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, without an explanatory opinion. Judge Newman dissented. Without discussing the facts of the case, she undertook to review the statutory provisions for inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings under the America Invents Act (“AIA”). According to Newman, the Court should have granted the petition, in order to correct the Patent Office position that “the final order of the [Patent Trial and Appeal] Board need not address every claim raised in the petition for review.” According to Judge Newman, a review of the statutory provisions of the AIA makes it clear that, if the PTAB decides to institute review, it should do so for all of the challenged claims, not just some of the challenged claims.

In 2013, Cardiocom, LLC (“Cardiocom”), a subsidiary of Medtronic, Inc. (“Medtronic”), sought inter partes review of two patents owned by Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc. (“Bosch”). The Cardiocom petitions were denied in January 2014. Medtronic later sought another inter partes review of the same two patents, without naming Cardicom as an interested party… Section 314(d) bars review of questions regarding the application and interpretation of statutes “closely related” to the decision whether to institute an IPR, including reconsideration of the Board’s decision to institute.

The Court found substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of infringement. While Samsung’s expert offered conflicting testimony, a reasonable jury could have credited Apple’s expert. Thus, there was no error in the district court’s conclusion that substantial evidence supported the jury verdict of infringement… Note that the underlying dispute in this case does not concern design patents that were also asserted against Samsung, and which are currently being reviewed by the Supreme Court.

This decision reestablishes what should always have been the case; namely that the Federal Circuit is an appellate court that does not consider evidence outside the record or engage in fact finding on their own. The Federal Circuit has been increasingly out of control for years, acting as a trial court and jury rather than an appellate court. Hopefully that will end today.

This case concerned the subject matter eligibility of patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, for a computer-related invention. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that two patents were ineligible, and reversed the court’s decision that one patent was eligible. All three patents at issue were held to be drawn to abstract ideas, and none of them had a patentable inventive concept… There was no inventive concept because the ’142 claims provided only generic computers performing generic functions. The proper inquiry is whether each step in a claim does more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions, not whether the prior computers already applied that concept.

However, in spite of the Court’s determination that the Markush group was closed, the Court agreed with Multilayer that the use of the transitional phrase “consisting of” does not necessarily suggest that a Markush group is closed to mixtures, combinations, or blends. Although recognizing that, typically, there exists a presumption that Markush groups are closed to “blends,” the Court acknowledged that the presumption can be overcome by a combination of other claim language and the specification itself. Here, the Court found explicit evidence of an intent to include blends insofar as the Markush group itself included blends and categories of resins that overlap, and certain dependent claims required layers of film to comprise blends of at least two resins.

Unlike Judge Chen’s breadth-based approach, Judge Hughes appears to adopt the proposal of using the European technical effect ( or “technological arts”) analysis to determine whether a U.S. claim is patent-eligible… The CAFC decides that the above claim indeed is related to an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. This once again approaches the “technical problem” analysis of European law, which at least has the advantage of possessing something of a legal principle about it, as opposed to being a tautology.

Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC (Fed. Cir. June 15, 2016) (Before Dyk, Wallach, and Newman, J.) (Opinion for the court, Wallach, J.). The test for obviousness is not whether the devices disclosed in various references are physically combinable, but whether a person of ordinary skill, in possession of teachings of the references, could arrive at the claimed invention. Further, the modification of Caterpillar would be minimal, as it would simply require replicating the mechanism for moving the first jaw to move the second jaw.

In light of Commil, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit… First, the Court concluded that Warsaw’s non-infringement theory was objectively unreasonable. Second, the Court concluded that NuVasive had presented sufficient evidence such that a jury could conclude that Warsaw knew it was inducing doctors to infringe NuVasive’s patent. In a concurrence, Judge Reyna expressed several concerns about the court’s reasoning in reaching this conclusion.

In a May 13, 2016 decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) decision upholding an Examiner’s denial of registration based on a finding that the term CHURRASCOS was generic as used for a restaurant, because the word “refer[s] to beef or grilled meat more generally” and that the term “identifies a key characteristic or feature of the restaurant services, namely, the type of restaurant.”

The records revealed that Dr. Bielawski repeatedly testified that he personally conducted laboratory testing on J&J’s accused lenses when, in fact, the testing was conducted by Dr. Bielawski’s graduate students and various lab supervisors. Further, evidence suggested that Dr. Bielawski overstated his qualifications and experience with the relevant testing methods, and in fact had no experience whatsoever. There was also evidence that Dr. Bielawski withheld test results and data analysis that would have undermined his opinions and trial testimony.

The Federal Circuit affirmed. Undertaking an extensive analysis of the legislative history of Lanham Act damages, the Court attempted to explain a 1999 amendment inserting language regarding willfulness. Because the “willful violation” language appears to modify violations of § 1125(c) regarding dilution, Romag argued that the amendment negated any preexisting willfulness requirement for causes of action other than dilution. Relying heavily on Second Circuit precedent, which governed the district court decision, the Court disagreed.

Halo sued Comptoir for infringing a large number of U.S. design patents, copyrights, and one common-law trademark relating to a number of Halo’s furniture designs. Both companies manufacture and sell furniture. Comptoir is a Canadian company that manufactures furniture in China, Vietnam, and India, and then imports that furniture into the United States for sale. Comptoir moved to dismiss the suit on forum non conveniens grounds, alleging that the Federal Court of Canada would be the appropriate forum for the dispute.

The Federal Circuit held, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), that it does not have jurisdiction to review an institution decision, because a “determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” The PTAB’s decision on the redundancy of Harmonic’s asserted grounds for review constituted a portion of the Institution Decision and was therefore unappealable, absent some other appealable question.

UltimatePointer argued that the district court improperly construed “handheld device” to require direct pointing, because there was no disavowal or lexicography in the specification to exclude indirect pointing. Nintendo argued that the specification extols direct pointing and repeatedly criticizes indirect pointing. The Court agreed, holding that repeated characterization of the invention as a “direct pointing system,” repeated descriptions of the advantages of direct pointing, and repeated disparagement of indirect pointing all indicate that the term “handheld device” should be limited to direct pointing devices.