Posts Tagged: "Judge Haldane Robert Mayer"

Rothschild sued ADS for patent infringement of Rothschild’s patent related to a home security system. The district court granted Rothschild’s motion to dismiss and denied ADS’s cross-motion for attorney fees, finding that Rothschild did not engage in conduct sufficient to make the action exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285. ADS appealed, and the Court reversed and remanded. The Court found that the district court abused its discretion citing three reasons.

In a rare IPR affirming patentability, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) found claims of US Patent No. 6,945,013 to be patentable that were directed to a “method for automatically aseptically bottling aseptically sterilized foodstuffs” in which bottles are “aseptically disinfected at a rate greater than 100 bottles per minute”. However, this unusual pro-patentee outcome was too much for the Federal Circuit. It ultimately vacated and remanded on claim construction grounds, thus highlighting the success of IPRs in achieving their goal of judicial economy.

In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and held that Helsinn’s pre-AIA patent claims, “were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date,” and furthermore, “the AIA did not change the statutory meaning of ‘on sale’ in the circumstances involved here.” The asserted claims of the post-AIA patent were also ready for patenting prior to the critical date… The on-sale bar, before and after the AIA, does not require a finding that the offer or sale disclosed the details or claimed features of the invention, so long as the product embodies those features when sold. An invention is reduced to practice, and ready for patenting, when it is reasonably shown to work for its intended purpose, which for a pharmaceutical product is not contingent upon FDA approval.

Earlier today the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a major decision interpreting provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA), specifically the AIA on-sale bar provisions. In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit panel of Judges Dyk, Mayer and O’Malley determined: “after the AIA, if the existence of the sale is…

This case concerned the subject matter eligibility of patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, for a computer-related invention. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that two patents were ineligible, and reversed the court’s decision that one patent was eligible. All three patents at issue were held to be drawn to abstract ideas, and none of them had a patentable inventive concept… There was no inventive concept because the ’142 claims provided only generic computers performing generic functions. The proper inquiry is whether each step in a claim does more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions, not whether the prior computers already applied that concept.

Simply stated, the industry and the public deserve better than Judge Mayer. His anti-patent views so cloud his judgment that he twists, exaggerates and misrepresents in order to attempt to impose his radical views into the law. There is no place for a judge like that. It is time for him to leave the Court. If he chooses not to do that it would seem appropriate for the Court to do what they would with an attorney who grossly exaggerates and mischaracterizes cases and rulings.

The Court also affirmed that the this means-plus-function term was indefinite. In the case of computer-implemented functions, the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function. The patents-in-suit did not disclose an operative algorithm for the claimed “symbol generator.” A patentee cannot claim a means for performing a specific function and then disclose a “general purpose computer” as the structure performing that function. The specification must disclose an algorithm in hardware or software for performing the stated function.

Unlike Judge Chen’s breadth-based approach, Judge Hughes appears to adopt the proposal of using the European technical effect ( or “technological arts”) analysis to determine whether a U.S. claim is patent-eligible… The CAFC decides that the above claim indeed is related to an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. This once again approaches the “technical problem” analysis of European law, which at least has the advantage of possessing something of a legal principle about it, as opposed to being a tautology.

The Court affirmed that B/E could not challenge the validity of MAG’s patents, because of assignor estoppel. In this case, MAG acquired the patents by assignment from a third party, who in turn acquired the patents from the inventors. After this assignment, one of the inventors went to work for B/E. The district court held that this inventor was as assignor of MAC’s patents and was barred from challenging the validity of the patents under the doctrine of assignor estoppel. Further, B/E was held to be in privity with its current employee (and past inventor/assignor of the patents). The assignor estoppel therefore attached to B/E, which was barred from attacking the validity of the patents.

Halo sued Comptoir for infringing a large number of U.S. design patents, copyrights, and one common-law trademark relating to a number of Halo’s furniture designs. Both companies manufacture and sell furniture. Comptoir is a Canadian company that manufactures furniture in China, Vietnam, and India, and then imports that furniture into the United States for sale. Comptoir moved to dismiss the suit on forum non conveniens grounds, alleging that the Federal Court of Canada would be the appropriate forum for the dispute.

Finally, the Court held that the Board’s denial of Nike’s motion to amend for failure to show patentable distinction over “prior art not of record but known to the patent owner” was improper. The Court held that the Board’s finding that Nike’s “conclusory statement” was “factually inadequate” under its interpretation of the Idle Free decision was too rigid and was an improper ground to deny Nike’s motion. Accordingly the Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the decision to the district court.

The USPTO argued that at the heart of the requirement that substitute claims be patentable over prior art not of record but known to the patentee is nothing more than a requirement that the patent owner submit information necessary to satisfy the duty of candor owed to the Office. The Federal Circuit agreed, but noticed that there was no allegation that Nike had violated the duty of candor. Absent an allegation that there has been a violation of the duty of candor, the Federal Circuit ruled that it is improper to deny a motion to amend for failure to raise prior art not found in the granted petition.

The Federal Circuit held that the structure and language of §122(a) indicate that Congress intended the exceptions to confidentiality to be narrow and reviewable. §122(a) contains two portions: a mandatory clause follows by two exceptions. The word ‘shall’ in the first portion of the provision made it mandatory for the PTO to maintain the confidentiality of patent applications. In addition, the word ‘necessary’ in the first exception indicated a narrow exception and afforded the agency no discretion. In light of this, coupled with the language of the second exception, the Court concluded that the PTO’s determination of “special circumstances” in the second exception is reviewable.

Even though the Board is generally not bound by the district court’s construction of claim terms, it does not mean that “it has no obligation to acknowledge that interpretation or to assess whether it is consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the term.” Here, given that PI’s main argument was the proper interpretation of the term “coupled,” which was construed by the district court, the Board had an obligation “to evaluate that construction and to determine whether it was consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the term.” Because the Board failed to address the district court’s interpretation of the term “coupled” and failed to provide adequate explanation for its decision to reject the claims as anticipated, the Court reversed and remanded.