Posts Tagged: "Judge Kimberly Moore"

“The Aatrix ruling is significant because when deciding a motion to dismiss all factual allegations made by the plaintiff (i.e., the patent owner) in the complaint are supposed to be taken as true,” explained patent attorney Gene Quinn. “The Federal Circuit has not always seemed to apply basic, fundamental procedural rules when reviewing cases dismissed for lack of patent eligibility on a motion to dismiss. Returning patent litigation to the status quo required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will make it much more difficult for defendants to prevail on motions to dismiss if complaints are properly worded.”

Elbit’s expert argued that the asserted claims were obvious because the two-step and three-step methods are “mathematically equivalent” in that the three-step method simply reorders steps employed in the prior art without producing a new or unexpected result. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Thales’s expert sufficiently explained the differences between the two-step and three-step methods. The panel also agreed with the Board that Elbit’s expert’s testimony was “unsupported” and not entitled to weight because he failed to account for or address the relative angular rate signal limitation in claim 3 anywhere in his opinion.

Despite its ultimate conclusion, the Court observed that Nordt failed to “persuasively or precisely” articulate to the Board “what structural limitation is imparted” by the “injection molded” language. The Federal Circuit explained that had Nordt better articulated its arguments to the Board it may well have succeeded at the Board. Nevertheless, Nordt’s failure to identify that structure did not affect the panel’s conclusion, as the structural nature of “injection molded” can be gleaned from the plain claim language in conjunction with the specification.

Berkheimer is also equally important, if not more important, because it stands for the proposition that questions of fact can and do underline patent eligibility determinations. This is important not only because it will make summary judgment more difficult for infringers, but because if there are questions of fact underneath the patent eligibility determination it should be exceptionally difficult (if not virtually impossible) for district courts to dismiss patent infringement complaints using FRCP 12(b)(6). This is true because under FRCP 12(b)(6) all facts asserted in the complaint by the plaintiff (i.e., the patent owner) are taken as true and dismissal appropriate only where there can be no victory by the plaintiff even based on the facts plead in the complaint.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of LG‘s motion for summary judgment that various claims of Core’s patents were directed to patent ineligible subject matter under Section 101. The Court also affirmed the district court’s denial of LG’s motions for judgment as a matter of law that the claims were anticipated and not infringed… The concept of summarizing information can be patent eligible (not abstract) when specifically applied to improving the efficiency of the electronic device, as in a “particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices.”

In re Brunetti, the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) decision affirming a refusal to register the mark “FUCT” because it comprised immoral or scandalous matter under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“Section 2(a)”). While the Board properly relied on substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the bar against registering immoral or scandalous marks was held to be an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.

In Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Rec. Prods., after unsuccessfully defending a patent infringement lawsuit, Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. (“BRP”) appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. BRP argued that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,568,969 (“the ‘969 patent”) and 6,793,545 (“the ‘545 patent”) were obvious, that patentee Arctic Cat failed to mark patented products, that the jury based its royalty award on improper expert testimony, and that BRP did not willfully infringe the asserted claims. BRP also appealed the district court’s award of treble damages and the ongoing royalty to Artic Cat… While the burden of persuasion under the statute is always on the patentee… the alleged infringer who challenges the patentee’s compliance with the marking statute has the initial burden of production because placing the burden on the patentee “could lead to a large-scale fishing expedition.”

In determining indefiniteness of a claim based on a testing method referenced in the patent, courts will evaluate whether the method is well known in the art and could reasonably be adapted for the claimed purpose. Intervening rights is an affirmative defense that may arise when claims are substantially changed after an intervening reexamination. For lost profits, a non-infringing alternative does not have to be a direct substitute; it can be an alternative in a hypothetical market absent the infringing product. Enhanced damages are discretionary and may be declined when willful infringement is not egregious, e.g. in light of its defenses and when patentee amended its claims in reexamination. Irreparable injury based on an erroneous lost profits finding will not stand. Further, a permanent injunction may be reconsidered by evaluating the sales in the actual market after the grant of an injunction.

In an obviousness inquiry, material prior art references disclosing combinations of claimed limitations cannot be disregarded based on a drug product’s commercial viability or FDA approval. Teaching away from a claimed feature requires a reference to disclose that the feature is unworkable rather than less favorable.

After a panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, in Aqua Products v. Matal, Aqua requested an en banc rehearing. The USPTO Director Joseph Matal joined the appeal on behalf of the USPTO. At issue was whether the Board could place the burden of proof for patentability of amended claims on the patent owner in an IPR, and the Board’s underlying interpretation of the relevant statutes, specifically § 316(d) governing claim amendments and 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) allocating the burden of proof in an IPR… With respect to the burden of proof, the burden of persuasion for patentability of amended claims in an IPR proceeding is placed on the petitioner, not the patent owner. However, considering Judge Reyna’s concurrence, patent owners might still have the burden of production; depending on future cases.

Lifetime Industries, Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 2017-1096, (Fed. Cir. Sept 7, 2017) is an appeal involving a dispute over the correct pleading standard in the context of allegation of infringement of a patented product.  The appeal resulted in the reversal of a district court’s final judgment granting Trim-Lok, Inc.’s motion to dismiss Lifetime’s complaint for failing to adequately allege that Trim-Lok either directly or indirectly infringed claims of its U.S. Patent 6,966,590 (’590 patent)… In sum, the Federal Circuit opinion in Lifetime is a good refresher on sufficiency of facts needed for filing a complaint alleging patent infringement. It is a refresher also on proving infringement resulting from assembly of components to make the claimed product when not all of the components are made by the same party.

The dispute arose from a Mexican patent infringement suit between Stellar and two of Allied’s Mexican distributors. Allied manufactures the products accused of infringement in the United States, which are then sold in Mexico by Allied’s Mexican’s distributors. Allied sells the same product in the United States under a different name… For a patent dispute to be an actual controversy, the courts look at affirmative actions taken by the patentee, communication between the parties, the relevant litigation history, and the relationship between any foreign suits and the US parties and patents. Assertion of a foreign patent against foreign distributors does not per se create an actual controversy, for declaratory judgment, regarding infringement of a corresponding US patent by a US manufacturer.

The Court found that the Board did not provide an adequate explanation for finding that the “30%” limitation was inherent in the reference, as a predicate for its holding of obviousness. Nevertheless, the Board “made the necessary underlying factual findings to support an obviousness determination.”  Specifically, the reference disclosed the same process for manufacturing electric cables, the steps did not differ in any material way, and there were no unexpected results. The Court also pointed to precedent that shifts the burden to the patentee. “[W]here all process limitations are expressly disclosed by the prior art reference, except for the functionally expressed limitation at issue, the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on.”

A party need not prove its infringement case with detailed facts at the pleadings stage. For direct infringement, it is sufficient to identify where the alleged infringement occurred, when it occurred, who performed the allegedly infringing act, and why. For induced infringement, the pleadings must also allege an intent to infringe. For contributory infringement, it is sufficient to plead that the alleged infringer had knowledge, not necessarily intent, that its activities would lead to infringement.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s decision, finding that it “failed to adequately articulate its reasoning, erroneously rejected relevant evidence of nonobviousness, and improperly shifted to Stepan the burden of proving patentability.” … The Board cannot shift the burden of proving patentability to the applicant, and must provide sufficient reasoning or explanation for why a skilled artisan would have found the claimed invention obvious, particularly when given evidence of unexpected results or “no reasonable expectation of success.” It is not enough for the Board to merely state that a combination of prior art would have been “routine.”