Posts Tagged: "Judge Kathleen O’Malley"

The Federal Circuit decision in the case of CRFD Research v. Matal resolves three appeals involving a single patent: CRFD’s ‘233 patent describing methods and systems that allow a user to begin a session on one communication-enabled device and transfer it to another… Lack of anticipation based on a single reference does not preclude a finding of obviousness based on the same reference. Even if a reference’s is insufficient for anticipation, which is a question of fact, that same reference teachings may be used to find obviousness, a question of law based on underlying factual findings.

In an obviousness inquiry, material prior art references disclosing combinations of claimed limitations cannot be disregarded based on a drug product’s commercial viability or FDA approval. Teaching away from a claimed feature requires a reference to disclose that the feature is unworkable rather than less favorable.

Because it is clear when infringement occurs, and the scope of the claims is reasonably certain, the Court reversed the judgment of invalidity due to indefiniteness… Claims having functional elements are not indefinite, as encompassing both an apparatus and a method, if they make clear whether infringement occurs upon creating the apparatus or upon its use. A claim with functional language clearly tied to a structure that defines its capabilities is an apparatus claim; such functional language does not make the claim indefinite by also claiming a method of use.

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit entered a non-precedential decision in Art+Com Innovation Pool GmbH v. Google LLC, which affirmed a lower court’s invalidation of a patent covering methods of displaying geographic information to a user. The patent, issued in 2013 to Berlin-based Art+Com Innovationpool and claiming a priority date of December 1995, had been asserted in a patent case decided in the District of Delaware in which the German-based patent owner was seeking more than $100 million from Google for infringement committed by its Google Earth service.

After a panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, in Aqua Products v. Matal, Aqua requested an en banc rehearing. The USPTO Director Joseph Matal joined the appeal on behalf of the USPTO. At issue was whether the Board could place the burden of proof for patentability of amended claims on the patent owner in an IPR, and the Board’s underlying interpretation of the relevant statutes, specifically § 316(d) governing claim amendments and 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) allocating the burden of proof in an IPR… With respect to the burden of proof, the burden of persuasion for patentability of amended claims in an IPR proceeding is placed on the petitioner, not the patent owner. However, considering Judge Reyna’s concurrence, patent owners might still have the burden of production; depending on future cases.

Lifetime Industries, Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 2017-1096, (Fed. Cir. Sept 7, 2017) is an appeal involving a dispute over the correct pleading standard in the context of allegation of infringement of a patented product.  The appeal resulted in the reversal of a district court’s final judgment granting Trim-Lok, Inc.’s motion to dismiss Lifetime’s complaint for failing to adequately allege that Trim-Lok either directly or indirectly infringed claims of its U.S. Patent 6,966,590 (’590 patent)… In sum, the Federal Circuit opinion in Lifetime is a good refresher on sufficiency of facts needed for filing a complaint alleging patent infringement. It is a refresher also on proving infringement resulting from assembly of components to make the claimed product when not all of the components are made by the same party.

Idemitsu Kosan Co. v. SFC Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision to invalidate as obvious certain patent claims directed to a device that emits light when electric current is passed through a particular organic medium… During inter partes review, it is possible for claims to be invalidated for reasons first articulated in rebuttal to a Patent Owner’s arguments. Patent owners should anticipate a petitioner’s counterarguments to its positions, including those made in Patent Owner’s Reply. Further, features of the invention that are alleged to distinguish over the prior art may not carry sufficient weight if they are not recited in the claims.

A party need not prove its infringement case with detailed facts at the pleadings stage. For direct infringement, it is sufficient to identify where the alleged infringement occurred, when it occurred, who performed the allegedly infringing act, and why. For induced infringement, the pleadings must also allege an intent to infringe. For contributory infringement, it is sufficient to plead that the alleged infringer had knowledge, not necessarily intent, that its activities would lead to infringement.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s decision, finding that it “failed to adequately articulate its reasoning, erroneously rejected relevant evidence of nonobviousness, and improperly shifted to Stepan the burden of proving patentability.” … The Board cannot shift the burden of proving patentability to the applicant, and must provide sufficient reasoning or explanation for why a skilled artisan would have found the claimed invention obvious, particularly when given evidence of unexpected results or “no reasonable expectation of success.” It is not enough for the Board to merely state that a combination of prior art would have been “routine.”

In Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., a district court dismissed a patent infringement complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, because the patent was drawn to patent ineligible subject matter. On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the patent “claims an improvement to computer memory systems and is not directed to an abstract idea.” Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The majority determined that the patent claims drawn to a computer memory system did not cover an abstract idea and, therefore, the second step of the Alice test was an unnecessary inquiry… “Our review of the ’740 patent claims demonstrates that they are directed to an improved computer memory system, not to the abstract idea of categorical data storage,” Judge Stoll wrote. “The specification explains that multiple benefits flow from the ’740 patent’s improved memory system.”

In an IPR brought by Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Personal Audio appealed a Board determination that invalidated its patent for storing and distributing episodic media files. Personal Audio challenged the Board’s claim construction, but the Court affirmed the Board. Before reaching the merits, the Court addressed whether EFF had standing to participate in the appeal in view of Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. In that case, a non-profit organization representing the public interest did not have standing to appeal a PTAB decision, because it did not meet the Article III case-and-controversy requirement.

The Federal Circuit vacated three interference decisions, in which the Board found that Stanford’s claims were unpatentable for lack of written description, and remanded for further proceedings… The Court thus vacated the interference decisions and remanded for the Board to (1) “reconsider whether Quake’s relevant patents and applications satisfy the written description requirement” and (2) examine whether the artisan “would have known, as of the priority date, that the … specification references to Illumina products meant random MPS sequencing as recited in the claims” and whether he or she “would have understood that the … specification disclosed random MPS sequencing, as opposed to whether the specification did not preclude targeted MPS sequencing.”

Patlex, which dealt with reexamination of applications by an examiner — not by an Article I tribunal — could be considered a next step beyond McCormick. MCM, however, simply cannot be viewed as consistent with either Patlex or McCormick on any level. Indeed, the Supreme Court was abundantly clear in McCormick, which remains good law. The courts of the United States (i.e., Article III courts), not the department that issued the patent, is the only entity vested with the authority to set aside or annul a patent right. Since the PTAB is not a court of the United States, it has no authority to invalidate patent rights. It is just that simple.

In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and held that Helsinn’s pre-AIA patent claims, “were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date,” and furthermore, “the AIA did not change the statutory meaning of ‘on sale’ in the circumstances involved here.” The asserted claims of the post-AIA patent were also ready for patenting prior to the critical date… The on-sale bar, before and after the AIA, does not require a finding that the offer or sale disclosed the details or claimed features of the invention, so long as the product embodies those features when sold. An invention is reduced to practice, and ready for patenting, when it is reasonably shown to work for its intended purpose, which for a pharmaceutical product is not contingent upon FDA approval.