Posts Tagged: "Judge Jimmie Reyna"

In patent infringement suits brought against a corporate defendant in a state with multiple judicial districts, venue is only proper in the single district where the defendant maintains a principal place of business. If the principal place of business is not in the state of incorporation, venue is proper in the single judicial district where the office registered in its corporate filings is located.

After the case was filed in the Eastern District of Texas, ZTE filed a motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 and § 1400(b). The district court ruled that the Eastern District of Texas was a proper venue. Relying on Fifth Circuit law, the district court denied ZTE’s motion to dismiss, finding that ZTE “failed to meet its burden to show that it does not have a regular and established place of business in the District.” ZTE filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on the defendant.

Appellant General Hospital Corp. (“GHC”) appealed the Board’s dismissal of an interference because the claims of its involved patent application lacked sufficient written description. The disclosure of a wide range with exemplary values does not provide written description support for a narrower claimed range, absent something to indicate the claimed range was considered critical or that inventor was in possession of the specific claimed embodiments. The Board cannot reject a motion to add a new claim to a patent application involved in an interference without explaining its findings.

On Thursday, April 20th, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a decision in Medinol Ltd. v. Cordis Corporation et. al. which vacated and remanded a lower court’s ruling that claims of patent infringement alleged by Israeli pharmaceutical firm Medinol were barred by the equitable defense of laches. The Federal Circuit’s decision comes after the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s previous precedence on laches as an equitable defense in SCA Hygiene Products v. First Quality Baby Products, decided last year. The case was decided by a panel consisting of Circuit Judges Timothy Dyk, Jimmie Reyna and Kara Stoll.

An IPR petition is not time-barred for reasons of privity with a district court defendant in a prior litigation when no evidence shows that the petitioner controlled the litigation and would be bound by its outcome, or was in privity with a litigant for other reasons. It is not enough for the petitioner to indemnify litigants or have an interest in the outcome. Similarly, for a district court defendant to be a real party in interest in an IPR, the petitioner must have filed the petition at the behest or on behalf of the defendant. Finally, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery, when the requested discovery would not prove privity on the grounds alleged in the motion.

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently issued a decision in DSS Technology Management v. Apple, which reversed an earlier decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to invalidate patent claims covering a wireless communication networking technology… While this may seem like an ordinary, garden variety misapplication of the law of obviousness by the PTAB, there is more beneath the surface. In this case one of the Administrative Patent Judges hearing the case at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was APJ Matt Clemens, who previously represented Apple as a defense attorney in patent infringement matters prior to joining the board… It is astonishing that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board STILL does not have Rules of Conduct or any kind of Code of Judicial Ethics that applies to Administrative Patent Judges. This is inexcusable, period.

The Federal Circuit found that the Board failed to provide sufficient explanation for its obviousness finding, instead using a conclusory approach that asked whether the missing limitation resulted from “ordinary creativity” of a skilled artisan. According to the panel majority, the question of whether the claims resulted from ordinary creativity was akin to asking whether the claims were obvious as a result of common sense. Therefore, the Federal Circuit began by returning to it’s 2016 ruling in Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which dealt with the proper use of common sense as part of an obviousness rejection.

Collateral estoppel is not limited to identical patent claims or claims within a single patent and may preclude a contradictory construction of a claim term already construed in an inter pates review of a related patent, particularly when both patents provide identical lexicography for the disputed term.

The broadest reasonable construction of “sterilant concentration levels” encompassed both the “gas laden” (or “in air”) sterilant levels and the residual sterilant levels. Nothing in the specification or the claims supported a construction limited to one or excluding the other.

The Board is not compelled by Federal Circuit precedent or PTO guidelines to consider arguments and evidence presented for the first time during oral argument. However, if the Board does consider new arguments or evidence, the responding party must be given an opportunity to submit rebuttal arguments and evidence.

The Federal Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Timothy Dyk, Jimmie Reyna and Richard Taranto noted that “the matter at hand reveals a gap in our jurisprudence on what constitutes ‘use’ under § 271(a).” The Federal Circuit found no controlling precedent on the definition of “use” of a claimed system when the accused infringer must act to put the claimed system into service but does not appear to possess any element of the claimed system. Further, the panel felt that McDonald’s had overstated the Federal Circuit’s holding in Uniloc as the appellate court concluded that a single party can still use a system and directly infringe a patent even when that system requires multiple parties to function. “Therefore, Uniloc only broadened the scope of potential direct infringers under § 271(a),” the Federal Circuit found.

In SimpleAir v. Google, The district court found claim preclusion applied because the patents at issue had the same title and specification as previously litigated patents, SimpleAir files a terminal disclaimer to overcome obviousness-type double patenting, and Simple Air could have included the newly asserted patents in its previous actions. However, the district court never compared the claims of the patent at issue to the claims of the previously litigated patents.

In Atrix Software v. Green Shades Software, Aatrix sued Green Shades for infringement, and Green Shades moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, holding: (1) claim 1 of the ‘615 patent was not directed to any tangible embodiment and was not patent-eligible subject matter under § 101; and (2) under the Alice/Mayo two-step analysis, the remaining claims were for abstract ideas without inventive concepts and were also ineligible. Aatrix appealed. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s decision, reversed its denial of Aatrix’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and remanded for further proceedings… Allegations in a patent infringement complaint that create a factual dispute about whether the claimed invention contains an inventive concept will defeat a motion to dismiss under § 101. For software inventions, such allegations include improvements in how a computer functions. An amended complaint to make such allegations should generally be allowed.

“The Aatrix ruling is significant because when deciding a motion to dismiss all factual allegations made by the plaintiff (i.e., the patent owner) in the complaint are supposed to be taken as true,” explained patent attorney Gene Quinn. “The Federal Circuit has not always seemed to apply basic, fundamental procedural rules when reviewing cases dismissed for lack of patent eligibility on a motion to dismiss. Returning patent litigation to the status quo required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will make it much more difficult for defendants to prevail on motions to dismiss if complaints are properly worded.”

To fall within the safe-harbor protection against obviousness-type double patenting, a patent application must be properly designated as a divisional application before the patent issues. Attempts to retroactively re-designation a CIP application as a divisional does not bring the patent granted from that application within the protection of the safe-harbor, whether or not any benefit was gained from the initial CIP designation.