Posts Tagged: "Judge Jimmie Reyna"

In an appeal from an IPR in which the Board upheld the patentability of several patent claims, the Federal Circuit vacated the decision and remanded to the Board with instructions to consider the patentability of certain dependent claims… The patentability of independent Claims 1 and 17 was the sole basis for the Board’s decision in this appeal from the ’592 IPR; the Board did not separately address the dependent challenged claims. The holding of unpatentability of claims 1 and 17 in the ’728 IPR, and the affirmance by the Federal Circuit, abrogated the basis for the Board’s decision that the claims in the ’592 IPR were patentable.

In its decision, the Federal Circuit upheld a lower court’s ruling that Advanced Video did not have standing to sue for patent infringement after it was determined that the co-owner of the patent did not assign ownership to the patent under the terms of an employment agreement… Although Hsiun never signed an assignment declaration, she also never objected to the USPTO procedures leading up to the grant of the ‘788 patent. Newman’s dissent focused mainly on the terms of Hsiun’s employment agreement, which demonstrated that Ms. Hsiun’s inventions were the property of the employer.

In 2011, Advanced Video filed suit against HTC for patent infringement in the Southern District of New York. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing, finding that Advanced Video did not have an ownership interest in the patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Judge Newman dissented, arguing that Advanced Video had full ownership of the ?788 Patent and standing to sue for infringement. She found that the Employment Agreement, including the “will assign,” trust and quitclaim provisions, demonstrated a mutual intent and understanding that any inventions created during Ms. Hsiun’s employment at Infochips would be owned by Infochips.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of several claims in a patent owned by Monsanto… Extrinsic evidence is permissible to interpret an allegedly anticipating references and to shed light on what it would have meant to a POSA. For purposes of inherent anticipation, recognition is not required within the prior art itself and need not antedate the patent at issue or have contemporaneous recognition by a POSA.

Inter Partes Review proceedings (IPRs) are subject to statutory timing provisions. The Court, sitting en banc, reviewed whether PTAB decisions determining whether an IPR was timely filed are appealable. More specifically, the Court considered whether the bar on judicial review of institution decisions, under Section 314(d), applies to the Board’s time-bar determinations, under Section 315(b)… Time-bar determinations by the patent office are reviewable by the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit heard the case of Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc. After Biscotti, Inc. (“Biscotti”) sued Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”) for patent infringement, Microsoft filed three unsuccessful inter partes reviews (“IPR”) challenging certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,144,182 (“the ‘182 patent”) as anticipated or obvious. The ‘182 patent relates to tools and techniques for providing video calling solutions. The IPRs focused on independent claims 6 and 69, and their dependent claims. On appeal Microsoft challenged the Board’s standard of review… The Federal Circuit reiterated that anticipation is a question of fact subject to substantial evidence review, that ultimate claim construction and claim construction relying solely on intrinsic evidence is subject to de novo review, and subsidiary factual findings based on extrinsic evidence are reviewed for substantial evidence.

In HTC Corp. v. Cellular Communs. Equip., Appellants HTC Corporation and ZTE (USA) Inc. (“HTC”) appeal a final written decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) in an inter partes review. The Board instituted inter partes review of challenged claims in patents owned by Appellee Cellular Communications Equipment, LLC’s (“CEE”). The PTAB concluded that HTC failed to show that any of the challenged claims were unpatentable… There is no need for the PTAB to explicitly construe claim terms if the PTAB’s findings were sufficient to establish its understanding of the scope of the claimed subject matter.

In Two-Way Media Ltd v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC, (Opinion for the court, Reyna, J.), the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision finding four patents owned by Two-Way Media were directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 1 of the ‘187 patent was representative of the ‘187 and ‘005 patents, and described a method for transmitting message packets over a communications network, like the Internet… For claims directed to judicial exceptions under § 101, a patent cannot identify a sufficient inventive concept solely in the specification and survive the Alice inquiry; the inventive concept must be found in the claims themselves in order to transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application.

The Uniloc patent invalidated by the PTAB in this case is U.S. Patent No. 5490216, titled System for Software Registration and issued in February 1996. It claims a registration system for licensing execution of digital data in a use mode, the system including both local and remote licensee unique ID generating means, and a mode switching means operable on a platform which permits the use of digital data only if the locally-generated licensee unique ID matches the remotely-generated licensee unique ID. The innovation solved issues in prior art systems for software registration for software transferable by physical media which used shell programs or did not utilize information unique to the intended licensee which is distinguishable from the identification of the platform. According to data collected from Lex Machina, Uniloc’s ‘216 patent has been asserted in 65 cases filed in U.S. district court going back to September 2003.

In Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., the majority of a Federal Circuit panel affirmed a district court’s holding that several claims of four related patents “are directed to an abstract idea and otherwise lack an inventive concept, such that they are patent ineligible under § 101.” *** In a patent-eligibility analysis under Alice, characterizing what the claims are “directed to” is a key aspect of inquiry for abstract ideas. Overly broad and “categorical” characterizations of the claimed invention may be detrimental to the patentability of claims.

The Federal Circuit heard the case of Secured Mail Solutions LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., where the Appellant, Secured Mail Solutions LLC (“Secured Mail”) appealed from the grant of a motion to dismiss on grounds that the claims of seven asserted patents are directed to subject matter ineligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Universal’s motion to dismiss… Claims determined to be patent-ineligible based on intrinsic evidence from the specification can be dismissed, at the motion to dismiss stage, without need for “extraneous fact finding outside the record.”

After a panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, in Aqua Products v. Matal, Aqua requested an en banc rehearing. The USPTO Director Joseph Matal joined the appeal on behalf of the USPTO. At issue was whether the Board could place the burden of proof for patentability of amended claims on the patent owner in an IPR, and the Board’s underlying interpretation of the relevant statutes, specifically § 316(d) governing claim amendments and 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) allocating the burden of proof in an IPR… With respect to the burden of proof, the burden of persuasion for patentability of amended claims in an IPR proceeding is placed on the petitioner, not the patent owner. However, considering Judge Reyna’s concurrence, patent owners might still have the burden of production; depending on future cases.

In Re: Smith International, the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the Board’s construction of “body” was unreasonably broad. While the claims do recite “body” without further elaboration, the specification does not use the term generically… The broadest reasonable interpretation of a term in a patent claim must be consistent with the specification. An analysis looking for whether the broadest possible meaning is proscribed by the specification is a backwards approach to claim interpretations and is improper.

In re Cray, Inc., the Federal Circuit applied the recent Supreme Court’s TC Heartland decision to grant a writ of mandamus, directing the Eastern District of Texas to transfer Raytheon’s patent case to a proper venue. The district court refused the transfer based on notions of targeting the district for a benefit, according to a four-part test it adapted from In re Cordis Corp. The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the listed criteria were not sufficiently tethered to the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)… In determining venue in a patent infringement case, the location of defendant’s employees who work from home is not a regular and established place of defendant’s business when the defendant corporation has no material connection to that place, as by rent, inventory, conditioning employment based on the location, or other relevant facts.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board’s construction of the term ‘body’ was unreasonably broad even given proper usage of the broadest reasonable interpretation claim standard… This ruling obviously makes perfect sense. Absent a comprehensive glossary that defines each and every term appearing in a patent application it would be impossible for any applicant to ever proscribe and/or preclude any and all possible broad readings for various terms that a patent examiner may come up with after the fact. Defining every term has never been required and anticipating frivolous examiner arguments has never been required, and is in fact considered inappropriate.